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SUMMARY 
Samuel Johnson's religious views are shaped by his staunchly Anglo-Catholic 
soteriology which reflects a synthesis of Tridentine, Arminian, and latitudinarian 
ideas. The guiding principles of Johnson's soteriology are experientialism and 
moralism: Johnson is less concerned with doctrinal niceties and even theologic;al 
orthodoxy than with the effects of soteriology on moral deportment. At the 
heart of Johnson's soteriology is affirmation of conditional salvation and 
consequent denial of the Protestant notion of justification by faith alone. 
Following William Law, Johnson is convinced the appropriation of Christ's 
expiatory merits is contingent on faith, obedience, and repentance. He concedes 
but is diffident toward the effects of original sin. He denies or sharply questions 
predestination and prescience. He replicates Tridentine dogma in asserting the 
necessity of propitiatory acts of repentance, denying the possibility of assurance 
of salvation, and positing no material distinction between justification and 
sanctification. 
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INTRODUCTIONl 
The business of life is to work out our salvation; and the days are few, in which 
provision must be madefor eternity. 
Samuel Johnson 
from Sermon 15 
Scholarly attention to Samuel Johnson's religious views has tended to 
focus on his firm Anglican orthodoxy;2 the relation of his beliefs to the 
innovative but inchoate "liberal" opinions emerging in the eighteenth 
century;3 his assertedly excessive scruples and their vexing effect;4 and his 
controversial "conversion experience."5 At the back of Johnson's generic 
religious orientation, however, lies his admittedly unsystematic 
soteriological scheme. It is this soteriological scheme that, to a large 
degree, provides an explanation of the general shape of Johnson's 
religious views which, in tum, influences his thinking and actions. If, as 
Boswell observes, from the time of Johnson's reading William Law's A 
Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life during his brief residence at Oxford, 
"religion was the predominant object of his thoughts,"6 one may 
naturally conclude that for Johnson, to whom consideration of eternal 
salvation and the eternal state were governing principles of life, the 
soteriology that informed them was of crucial significance and deserves 
serious examination. A recognition of Johnson's implicit soteriological 
scheme furnishes a key to comprehending the intensity of his religious 
scruples, the nature of his "conversion," and the rationale for his "sturdy 
prejudice."7 
1 Footnotes contain abbreviated bibliographical information; full information appears in the 
bibliography. 
}Chapin, "Religious Development" and Religious Thought; Griffith, "The Faith of Samuel 
Johnson"; and Quinlan, A Layman's Religion. 
3Brown, "Religious Problem"; Hudson, Eighteenth-Century Thought; and Sachs, "Reason and 
Unreason." 
4Byrd, "Spiritual Anxiety"; Hagstrom, "On Dr. Johnson's Fear of Death"; and Humphreys, 
''Troubled Believer." 
5Basney, "Johnson and Religious Evidence"; Chapin, '"Wonderful' Experience"; Greene, "'Late 
Conversion"'; and Quinlan, "Rumor." 
6Boswell, Life, 14. 
7Hudson, op. cit., 7. 
Indisputably the strongest influence on the young Samuel Johnson's 
religious views was his mother Sarah, 8 proud daughter of a yeoman and 
property owner.9 Her theological outlook may broadly be classified as 
Calvinistic, but not in distinction from high-church Anglicanism of the 
eighteenth century. As Chester Chapin observes, 
.. .if Sarah's "Calvinism" refers merely to the fact that her 
approach to the Bible was "literal and devout," that she believed in 
a very real hell and taught this belief to Sam, then she believed and 
taught only what thousands of orthodox middle-class women 
believed and taught to their children, then, and for many 
generations thereafter, whether "Calvinist," "evangelical," or 
strictly "high church."10 
Aside from the perpetually annoying question of predestination (which 
the authors of the Book of Common Prayer addressed in quite a latitudinarian 
fashion), Anglican confession, though not always dogma and practice,11 of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was at one with Calvinism.12 
Chapin is merely recognizing by insinuation that virtually all middle-class 
"lay" Protestant religion operated within the strictures of historic 
Christian orthodoxy, and even were Sarah's religious views incorrectly 
described as strictly "Calvinist," the sentiments to which such an 
appellation point are, for practical purposes, indistinguishable from 
orthodox Protestantism in almost any form: that is, the theological ideas 
to which the child Johnson was exposed were not unique: 
It is misleading to regard Sarah's unimaginative and literal 
approach to religion as the product of "evangelical" or Calvinist 
influence. What we have here is simple Protestant fundamentalism, 
a fundamentalism shared by the vast majority of the orthodox 
middle classes, whether Baptist, Presbyterian, or Anglican.13 
8His father Michael had little or no discemable influence on his son's religious views. See 
Chapin, "Samuel Johnson's Earliest Instruction in Religion," 357-360. 
9Bate, Samuel Johnson, 5, 13. Sarah was not reluctant to remind Samuel's father and her husband 
Michael, a bookseller by trade, of her social superiority. 
10chapin, Religious Thought, 7. 
llHudson, op. cit., ch. 7 
12chapin, "Samuel Johnson's Earliest Instruction in Religion," 361. 
13ibid., Religious Thought, 9. 
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Employment of the epithet "fundamentalism" is unfortunate since it 
potentially prejudices understanding of the period and subject. Further, it 
unwarrantably anticipates Protestant American fundamentalism in linking 
it to the classical orthodoxy of the eighteenth century, despite the sharp 
distinctions between the two,14 In any case, the thrust of Chapin' s 
remarks is accurate: the influence of the skepticism of Enlightenment 
heterodoxy had not yet filtered down to the English middle classes, and 
Johnson's theological orientation-in creed if not necessarily 
temperament-was Anglican orthodoxy. This "basic Anglicanism"15 
consists creedally of the expression of Christianity preserved in 
Anglicanism's Thirty-Nine Articles, "doctrinal formulae accepted by the 
Anglican community in the attempt to define its dogmatic position 
midway between Reformed Protestantism and Roman Catholicism."16 
This "midway position," known theologically as via media, is a crucial 
element of Johnson's soteriology. 
Boswell describes how, as a child, Johnson was exposed to his mother's 
thetic religious instruction: 
Her piety was not inferiour to her understanding; and to her 
must be ascribed those early impressions of religion upon the mind 
of her son, from which the world afterwards derived so much 
benefit. He [Johnson] told me, that he remembered distinctly 
having had the first notice of Heaven, "a place to which good 
people went," and hell, "a place to which bad people went," 
communicated to him by her, when a little child in bed with her; 
and that it might be the better fixed in his memory, she sent him to 
repeat it to Thomas Jackson, their man-servant; he not being in the 
way, this was not done, but there was no occasion for any artificial 
aid in its preservation.17 
He believed his mother erred in placing in his hands the anonymous 
work The Whole Duty of Man without simultaneously "having his attention 
directed to the arrangement, to the style, and other excellencies of 
composition; that the mind being thus engaged by an amusing variety of 
14Henry, Evangelical Responsibility, 32, 33. 
15Chapin, op. cit., 368. 
16Hardon, The Spirit and Origins, 173. 
17Boswell, Life, 5. 
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objects, may not grow weary,"18 and he claimed to have become 
inattentive to religion before his tenth birthday because (he told Boswell) 
"The church at Lichfield, in which we had a seat, wanted 
[required] reparation, so I was to go and find a seat in other 
churches; and having bad eyes, and being awkward about this, I 
used to go and read in the fields on Sunday. This habit continued till 
my fourteenth year; and still I find a great reluctance to go to 
church .... "19 
Boswell notes Johnson's concession that as an adolescent he ''became a 
sort of lax talker against religion, for I did not much think against it."20 
During his brief residence at Oxford, however, Johnson abandoned his 
religious apathy. The motivation of that abandonment-more than its 
occasion-is of chief significance in a consideration not only of Johnson's 
general religious views but also of his soteriology. 
Boswell quotes Johnson, 
"When at Oxford I took up [William] Law's Serious Call to a Holy 
Life, expecting to find it a dull book (as such books generally are), 
and perhaps to laugh at it. But I found Law quite an overmatch for 
me; and this was the first occasion of my thinking in earnest of 
religion, after I became capable of rational inquiry."21 
Boswell interposes, "From this time forward religion was the 
predominant object of his thoughts; though, with the just sentiments of a 
conscientious Christian, he lamented that his practice of its duties fell far 
short of what it ought to be."22 Even allowing for possible hyperbolic 
inaccuracy in Boswell's assessment, it is quite indisputable that Law's 
devotional work-occasionally even its very wording23-shapes 
Johnson's religious views. 
18ibid., 14. 
19ibid. 
20ibid. 
21ibid. 
22ibid. 
23Quinlan, Layman's Religion, 24, 25. See also Chapin, Religious Thought, 32, 33. 
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Though Law's Serious Call exerts considerable influence on the whole of 
Johnson's faith,24 it is the book's influence on Johnson's soteriology that is 
of interest here. What is immediately evident on examination of A Serious 
Call is its pervasive emphasis on Christian experience and corresponding 
lack of doctrinal exposition. To be sure, "Law assumed his readers were 
Christians [and] his efforts [thus] were devoted to awakening them to the 
profound implications of their faith."25 Notwithstanding, the virtual void 
of doctrine-defined here not as Christian moral instruction but in the 
theological sense as orthodox belief derived from the Bible and tradition-
in Law's work, a void not wholly unique in the Christian tradition, is most 
striking. Law's attitude toward the Scriptures (and therefore the Faith 
itself) may be characterized, in the description of Richard Mouw, as 
"pietism."26 "While the doctrinalist tends to define the human 
predicament in terms of ignorance," Mouw relates, "the pietist sees 
human beings as plagued by troubled hearts, doubts and fears. On the 
pietist view, then, the Bible's primary use is in speaking to these subjective 
states .... "27Tuough Law's Serious Call is not concerned primarily with 
setting forth a particular attitude toward the Scriptures, it is concerned 
with outlining the procedures for the fulfillment of individual holiness as 
the moral obligation of believers, quite divorced from any consideration 
of a divine objective supply of holiness to humanity on the grounds of 
Christ's life and death. A covenantal or forensic dimension of 
devoutness28-say, Christ's righteousness imputed to humans on account 
of his bearing the penalty for the sin of mankind-is wholly absent from 
Law. 
Recognizing the overwhelmingly positive contribution of devotional 
literature historically by both Roman Catholics and Protestants,29 Martyn 
Lloyd-Jones nonetheless criticizes the form of Roman Catholic-High 
24Quinlan, op. cit., chap. 1. 
25'b'd 6 t t ., • 
26Mouw, "The Bible in Twentieth-Century Protestantism," 144, 145. I refer here not to the 
largely Lutheran pietistic movement (see Harold 0. J. Brown, Heresies, ch. 18) but to pietism as 
a ~eneral theological-Biblical orientation. 
2 Mouw, op. cit., 145. 
28Aithaus, Theology, 224-233; Calvin, Institutes, III, ch. xi. 
29LJoyd-Jones, Expository Sennons, 230. 
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Church Anglican pietism espoused by Law in that "[i]t regards holiness as 
a special vocation."30 It requires withdrawal from the always-tempting 
world, formally in the case of monastic Romanism, and attitudinally in the 
case of Anglicanism and other Protestantism and ''becomes the exclusive 
business of [one's] life."31 It thereby tends to bifurcate the church into the 
truly spiritual (usually the monastic clergy who enjoy the luxury to fulfill 
such devotion) and the ordinary believers (the laity who are not 
ordinarily afforded the resources to fulfil that devotion). 
The relevance to Johnson of Lloyd-Jones's criticism of the pietistic 
conception of spirituality is that the latter concedes the basic validity of 
Law's thesis while correspondingly retaining a this-wordly orientation. As 
Quinlan observes, 
.. .it seems to have had a dual influence on Johnson. In the first 
place, A Serious Call helped to develop his deep sense of religion. 
Both the habit of recording his prayers and his practice of self-
examination may have resulted directly from his study of this 
work. A second influence, it would seem, was to increase the 
severity of his scruples and to contribute to his fear that he might 
not be saved. 32 
This second effect of Law's work shapes (as this dissertation will argue) 
Johnson's entire soteriology inasmuch as, to the mind of Johnson at least, 
it weds the procurement of eternal salvation to a monastic-ascetic 
conception of the religious life apart from the context of an understanding 
of the objective, judicial role of the Father and Christ in effecting that 
salvation. Chapin correctly perceives that "Law has an ideal-the ideal of 
Christian perfection-which is extremely rigorous, extremely ascetic, and 
quite impossible for ordinary human flesh to live up to."33 Combining 
this rigorous "ideal" with a void of judicial soteriology on which the 
weary soul can repose irresistibly conduces to the sort of "spiritual 
anxiety"34 Johnson suffers.35 
30ibid., 234. 
31ibid. 
32Quinlan, op. cit., 26. 
33Chapin, op. cit., 38. 
34Max Byrd, "Spiritual Anxiety," passim. 
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Maurice Quinlan's discussion of the influence of the sixteenth-century 
Anglican theologian Richard Hooker on Johnson's thought and the 
accurate description of Hooker's theological and ecclesiological approach 
as "a via media between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism"36 furnish 
additional keys to understanding the tension in Johnson's soteriology 
between the experientialism of Romanism and the judicial soteriology of 
the Thirty-Nine Articles. The evidence, indeed, seems to support the 
conclusion that Johnson's overwhelmingly experiential soteriology is-
like that of a number of his moralistic Anglican contemporariesj7_at 
significant points more akin to Tridentine dogma than to orthodox 
Protestantism. 
Johnson's soteriology, like his religious views in general, is not, 
however, easily classified. It has been variously-and contradictorily-
described as Augustinian,38 Arminian,39 and Pelagian.40 The intent of this 
dissertation is to explore his religious convictions and arrive at a fuller 
understanding of his complex soteriology. 
35''To put it paradoxically, he developed a Calvinistic sense of the load of original sin without 
any Calvinistic sensation of the omnipotence of God in lifting the load from a person's back," 
Chadwick, "The Religion of Samuel Johnson," 130. But for a corrective to this observation, see 
ch. 2 on original sin. In addition, Kass observes," ... [In his sermons] Johnson transforms the 
motivation for right conduct from the Christian ascetic ideal of self-denial to a motivation based 
on pragmatic and secular self-interest," Kass, "Consolations," 33. While this observation is 
partially justified, one cannot exert in the face of Johnson's repeated statements exhorting an 
altruistic devotion that he was concerned only for "secular self-interest." However, it is possible 
that the wedding of devotion to pragmatism could itself compound the spiritual anxieties of a 
man for whom valid religious motivation is a central concern. 
36Quinlan, op. cit., 154, 155. . 
37Hudson, op. cit., 203, 204. 
38Griffith, op. cit., 7. 
39chadwick, "Religion of Samuel Johnson," 129. 
40f.Iudson, op. cit., 203. 
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Chapter 1: 
THEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION 
Wilt thou forgive that sin where I begun, 
Which was my sin, though it were done before? 
Wilt though forgive that sin through which I run, 
And do run still, though still I do deplore? 
When thou hast done, thou hast not done; 
For I have more. 
John Donne 
from "A Hymn to God the Father," 1633 
In Johnson's writings we do not find a systematic account of his religious 
or theological views. His soteriological ideas are expressed piecemeal. 
Johnson seems much more interested in the subjective aspects of 
salvation-human works, repentance, perseverance, conversion, 
assurance (due partly, as noted above, to the influence of Law)-than its 
objective aspects-election, original sin, justification, propitiation, 
adoption, and so forth. Of the latter he says little. As Nicholas Hudson 
observes, 
Theoretical questions concerning man's inward nature, the role 
of God and Christ in his regeneration, and the motives to 
repentance were of importance to Johnson primarily as they either 
promoted or hindered the individual's feeling of responsibility for 
his own salvation through a moral life.1 
It would be unwarranted to deduce from this neglect either that Johnson 
was agnostic about the objective dimensions of soteriology or that he 
flatly denied their existence. It is more reasonable to assume that Johnson, 
professed the eighteenth-century orthodox Anglican conception of 
soteriology and took it for granted, stressing rather the more "this-
worldy" practices of repentance and good works, without which salvation 
is an impossibility. 
Johnson's lack of interest in objective soteriology, however, does 
influence his understanding of soteriology. This lack of affirmation of a 
1 Hudson, Eighteenth-Century Thought, 203. 
fully orthodox and Reformational objective soteriology, in fact, shapes his 
soteriology and issues in the well known and quite practical consequences 
normally associated with Johnson's religious scruples and anxieties.2 
Stuart Brown writes, "It is not, I think, permissible to impose a 
formalistic analysis upon a man's religious experience and attitude, 
particularly if he is not a theologian."3 It is nonetheless valuable to 
examine Johnson's unsystematically expressed soteriological views to 
discover their connections. It is profitable, in addition, to compare and 
contrast them with prominent views within historical orthodoxy. 
Johnson utters what is possibly his most succinct statement of his 
soteriology on April 15, 1778 at Mr. Dilly's in response to a query posed 
by the "ingenious Quaker lady,"4 Mrs. Knowles. 
I expressed [recalls Boswell] a horrour at the thought of death. 
MRS. KNOWLES. "Nay, thou should' st not have a horrour for 
what is the gate of life." JOHNSON. (standing upon the hearth 
rolling about, with a serious, solemn, and somewhat gloomy air,) 
"No rational man can die without uneasy apprehension." MRS. 
KNOWLES. "The Scriptures tell us, 'The righteous shall have hope in 
his death."' JOHNSON. "Yes, madam; that is,·he shall not have 
despair. But, consider, his hope of salvation must be founded on 
the terms on which it is promised that the mediation of our 
SAVIOUR shall be applied to us,-namely, obedience; and where 
obedience has failed, then, as suppletory to it, repentance. But what 
man can say that his obedience has been such, as he would approve 
of in another, or even in himself upon close examination, or that his 
repentance has not been such as to require being repented of? No 
man can be sure that his obedience and repentance will obtain 
salvation.s 
Johnson expressed similar sentiments earlier. In Rambler 1106 written 
Saturday, April 6, 1751, Johnson addresses the issue of repentance. He 
submits: 
2Hagstrum, "On Dr. Johnson's Fear of Death" and Humphreys, "Troubled Believer." 
3Brown, "Religious Problem," 17. 
4Boswell, Life, 390. 
5ibid., 394. See also Pierce, Religious Life, 56. 
6Yale edition, iv, 220-226. My emphasis. 
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A constant and unfailing obedience is above the reach of 
terrestrial diligence; and therefore the progress of life could only 
have been the natural descent of negligent despair from crime to 
crime, had not the universal persuasion of forgiveness to be obtained 
by proper means of reconciliation recalled those to the paths of virtt.ie 
whom their passions had solicited aside .... 
These "proper means of reconciliation" by which one gains "acceptance 
with God" include "corporal austerities" and "voluntary afflictions." One 
who lacks these means is "as [one] suspended over the abyss of eternal 
perdition." That is, one's eternal state depends on his good works and 
repentance. 
Likewise, on Friday, May 7, 1773, in conversation with Boswell, 
Goldsmith and others, Johnson remarks, "But charity, for instance, is not 
definable by limits. It is a duty to give to the poor; but no man can say 
how much another should give to the poor, or when a man has given too 
little to save his soul."7 
In addition, Johnson's sermons clearly communicate this sentiment: 
"But it may be hoped, that a sufficient remedy against this sin [pride] may 
be easily found, by reminding those who are infected with it, that the 
blood of Christ was poured out upon the cross to make their best endeavors 
acceptable to God" ;B "If we consider this sacrament [communion] as a 
renewal of the vow of baptism, and the means of reconciling us to God, 
and restoring us to a participation of the merits of our Saviour, which we had 
forfeited by sin, we shall need no persuasions to a frequent communion" ;9 
"The terms, upon which we are to hope for any benefits from the merits 
of Christ, are faith, repentance, and subsequent obedience" ;10 ''The whole 
life of man is a state of probation; he is always in danger [of damnation], 
and may be always in hope [of heaven]" ;11 and "Salvation is promised to 
us Christians, on the terms of faith, obedience, and repentance."12 
7Boswell, op. cit., 222. My emphasis. 
8Johnson [Sermon 6], Sermons, 72. My emphasis. 
9ibid. [Sermon 9], 103. My emphasis. 
lOibid., 104. 
11ibid. [Sermon 22], 233. . 
12ibid. [Sermon 28], 303. Emphasis in original. 
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In the dialogue with Mrs. Knowles and in the other remarks, crucial 
elements of Johnson's soteriology appear: (1) Christ mediated for our 
salvation; (2) the application of that mediation is perpetually conditional; 
(3) those conditions are obedience and repentance; (4) none can be certain 
that his obedience and repentance have been sufficient; therefore, (5) none 
can be certain of his salvation. 
The sermons, in fact, teem with these sentiments. A sampling of 
Johnson's sermonic declarations will demonstrate this assertion. 
In Sermon 3 exhorting the listeners to fear God, Johnson states: 
It is sufficient to observe, that the religion which makes fear the 
great principle of action, implicitly condemns all self-confidence, all 
presumptuous security; and enjoins a constant state of vigilance 
and caution, a perpetual distrust of our own hearts, a full conviction 
of our natural weakness, and an earnest solicitude for divine 
assistance .... Of that religion, which has been taught from God, the 
basis is humility; a holy fear which attends good men, through the 
whole course of their lives; and keeps them always attentive to the 
motives and consequences of every action; if always unsatisfied 
with their progress in holiness, always wishing to advance, and 
always afraid of falling away.13 
Sermon4 dealing with charity reinforces Johnson's view of conditional 
salvation: 
Whatever superiority may distinguish us, and whatever plenty 
may surround us, we know, that they can be possessed but a short 
time, and that the manner in which we employ them must 
determine our eternal state ... .14 
In condemning pride in Sermon 6 Johnson states: 
But it may be hoped, that a sufficient remedy against this sin may 
be easily found, by reminding those who are infected with it, that 
13ibid. [Sermon 3], 30, 31. 
14ibid. [Sermon 4], 44. 
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the blood of Christ was poured out upon the cross to make their 
best endeavours acceptable to God.15 
It should be noted that Johnson here clearly implies Christ's atonement 
is designed to supplement men's efforts; there is no hint good works are 
not necessary to salvation as in the Protestant idea that Christ's merits are 
credited to the Christian's account. 
Johnson is convinced men forfeit their salvation every time they sin; 
they cannot expect salvation if they have violated their covenantal 
communion with Christ: 
... every sin, and much more any habit or course of sin long 
continued, is, according to the different degrees of guilt, an 
apostacy or defection from our Saviour; as it is a breach of those 
conditions upon which we became his followers; and he that breaks 
the condition of a covenant, dissolves it on his side. Having 
therefore broken the covenant between us and our Redeemer, we 
lose the benefits of his death; nor can we have any hopes of 
obtaining them, while we remain in this state of separation from 
hi 16 m. 
In Sermon 10 Johnson asserts that salvation is contingent on conformity 
to the laws of God. 
It is now certain that we are here, not in our total, nor in our 
ultimate existence, but in a state of exercise and probation, 
commanded to qualify ourselves, by pure hearts and virtuous 
actions, for the enjoyment of future felicity in the presence of God; 
and prohibited to break the laws which his wisdom has given us, 
under the penal sanction of banishment from heaven into regions of 
misery.17 
These sentiments adorn virtually every Sermon of Johnson's. The cluster 
of convictions they represent are that Christ died to render man's 
imperfect but sincere works acceptable as payment for salvation, that 
obedience and repentance are conditions on which salvation is dependent, 
15ibid. [Sermon 6), 72. 
16ibid. [Sermon 9), 100. 
17ibid. [Sermon 10), 109. Emphasis in original. 
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and that man can never be certain he has attained the conditions 
necessary to salvation. 
Maurice Quinlan is at least partially justified in objecting to Robert 
Anderson's Life of Johnson. Whether Johnson remained aligned with the 
Calvinistic tenets of Anglicanism he learned from his mother, Quinlan 
asks, "Which tenets? Certainly there appears to be no evidence that 
Johnson favored any of the distinctive doctrines of Calvinism, such as 
predestination, the witness of the Spirit, or salvation by faith alone."18 It is 
quite possible, as Quinlan notes, that the "basic reason for this 
misconception seems to be a notion that any Christian who works out his 
salvation in fear must be a Calvinist."19 Indeed, it may be argued that the 
ascetic life is much more suited to Roman Catholicism than any form of 
Protestantism. 20 
The generic form of Anglicanism in which Johnson was reared21 is not 
equivalent to theological, specifically soteriological, Calvinism. The 
austerity of the practical aspects of eighteenth-century Anglicanism to 
which Johnson was exposed, when reinforced by the ascetic spiritual ideal 
of William Law could, in fact, render Anglicanism's confessionally derived 
dictum of justification by faith alone almost meaningless. Observed 
against the background of the prominent soteriological schools of the day, 
Johnson's soteriology settles much more easily into Roman Catholicism 
than creedal Protestantism of any sort. 
Philip Griffith insists that "nothing in Johnson's conversation contradicts 
his Augustinian Christianity."22 Yet the description of Johnson's religion 
as Augustinian is tenuous and, in the case of his soteriology, distinctly in 
error. The appellation Augustinian with reference to Johnson is 
misleading, for employment of the term implies soteriology (" ... the word 
Augustinian has commonly been reserved to designate Augustine's 
lBQuinlan, Layman's Religion, 162. 
19ibid., 163. 
20J3ray, "Asceticism and Monasticism," 48. 
21Chapin, Religious Thought, 8-15. 
22Griffith, "Faith of Samuel Johnson," 7. 
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system of grace, not his entire teaching"23); and while Johnson's 
ecclesiological views may reinforce Augustine's, his soteriology is not 
Augustinian. 
While the specific categories of Johnson's soteriology will be discussed 
later in depth, it will suffice here to outline Augustine's fundamental 
soteriological model which varies at critical points from Johnson's. Indeed, 
the issue is significant, for it is precisely Johnson's variation from 
Augustinianism that coincides with his almost unqualified experientialism 
resulting in the perpetual spiritual vexation he suffered. Had Johnson's 
soteriology been truly Augustinian, he would have taken the initial steps 
to a full Reformed soteriology (grounded in Augustinianism24) which 
provides quieting spiritual assurance. 
Augustine's soteriology was forged most comprehensively in his 
refutation of the heretical views of Pelagius. Pelagius flatly denied original 
sin.25 The relation of Adam's sin (and, therefore, its consequences) to his 
posterity is illustrative, not hereditary: Adam serves as a bad example, but 
his sin and concomitant guilt are not transmitted to the humanity who 
follow. Children are born unsoiled by sin and possessing a free will to 
obey infallibly the commands of God or to perform evil.26 By logical 
extension 
Some of [Pelagius's] followers seem to have held that Adam was 
created mortal and that his death was not due to his sin, that new-
born children need not be baptized, for they have no original sin 
inherited from Adam which needs to be washed away, and that 
some men before and after Christ have so used their free will that 
they have been sinless. God's grace, so at least some Pelagians 
held, is seen in giving man free will at his creation, in giving man 
the law as a guide to his choice, and in sending Jesus Christ who by 
his teaching and good example assists men to do good.27 
23Portalie, Guide, 177. 
24schaff, Creeds, 1:372. 
25Wiggers, "Pelagian View," 153. On this point Johnson agrees with Augustine as against 
Pelagius. See Boswell, op. cit., 482. 
26Latourette, History, 1:180. 
27 ibid., 181. 
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In stark contrast, Augustine affirms the utter depravity of humanity, 
"born of a corrupted and condemned stock."28 Their sin is '1>oth original 
and personal."29 Augustine's support of not only original sin but also 
immediate imputation of that sin to Adam's posterity is forthright: 
The first man brought sin into the world, whereas this One 
[Christ] took away not only that one sin but also all the oth.ers 
which he found added to it. Hence, the apostle says, "And the gift 
[of grace]30 is not like the effect of the one that sinned: for the 
judgment on that one trespass was condemnation; but the gift of 
grace is for many offenses, and brings justification" [Rom. 5:16]. 
Now it is clear that the one sin originally inherited, even if it were the 
only one involved, makes men liable to condemnation. Yet grace justifies 
a man for many offenses, both the sin that he originally inherited in 
common with all the others and also the multitude of sins which he 
has committed on his own.31 
In contradistinction to Pelagius, Augustine contends that sin eliminates 
man's free will: 
.. .it was in the evil use of his free will that man destroyed himself 
and his will at the same time .... He serves freely who freely does 
the will of his master. Accordingly he who is slave to sin is free to 
sin. But thereafter he will not be free to do right unless he is 
delivered from the bondage of sin and begins to be the servant of 
righteousness. 32 
It is God alone who in his unmerited grace delivers "from the bondage 
of sin." 
A correlate of Augustine's negative estimate of unregenerate (i.e, 
natural) humanity is his insistence, following St. Paul, that the grace of 
salvation cannot be merited. His impassioned reasoning is most cogent: 
But now, can that part of the human race to whom God hath 
promised deliverance and a place in his eternal kingdom be 
restored through the merits of their own works? Of course not! 
28Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 27, 355. 
29ibid., ch. 29, 356. 
30fhis editorial interpolation appears in the original source; it is not this writer's. 
31Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 50, 369. My emphasis. 
32ibid., ch. 30, 356, 357. 
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For what good works could a lost soul do except as he had been 
rescued from his lostness? Could he do this by the determination 
of his free will? Of course not! For it was in the evil use of his free 
will that man destroyed himself and his will at the same time. For 
as a man who kills himself is still alive when he kills himself, but 
having killed himself is then no longer alive and cannot resuscitate 
himself after he has destroyed his own life-so also sin which arises 
from the action of the free will turns out to be victor over the will 
and the free will is destroyed. 33 
This predicament would be horrid indeed were it not for the justification 
effected by God on the merits of Christ's death on our behalf. In fact, even 
the emancipation of the will is not sufficient for salvation, for men are still 
accountable for the sin committed in their federal representative, Adam. 
Since men are in this state of wrath through original sin-a 
condition made still graver and more pernicious as they 
compounded more and worse sins with it-a Mediator was 
required; that is to say, a Reconciler who by suffering a unique 
sacrifice, of which all the sacrifices of the Law and the Prophets 
were shadows, should allay that wrath.34 
Augustine's conception of how the benefits of this sacrifice are 
appropriated coincides perfectly with his belief in original sin and the 
human will bound to sin. Obviously if man is utterly depraved and his will 
bound, he cannot by his own works appropriate the benefits of Christ's 
sacrifice any more than he can merit them.35 It is faith, the gift of God,36 
"by which the righteous lives. This is the faith that believes in him who 
justifies the ungodly."37 
This is the faith through which glorying is "cut out" [Rom. 1:17; 
4:5; 3:27], whether for the exclusion of that which is self-conceit or 
for the making of that by which we glory in the Lord. This is the 
faith that gains the beautiful outpourings of the Spirit. ... This is the 
faith by which men are saved, according to the saying: "By grace 
33ibid., ch. 30, 356. 
34ibid., ch. 33, 359, 360. 
35ibid., ch. 32, 357, 358. 
36 Augustine, Spirit and Letter, ch. 54, 238, 239. Though he assents that "faith must be in our 
power," he immediately remarks, "Even our believing is a thing that God has granted to us," 
ibid. 
37 ibid., ch. 56, 240. 
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are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift 
of God, not of works, lest any man be lifted up ... " [Eph. 2:8, 9].g-8 
It is by faith, and not by the works of the law, that we appropriate 
Chrisr s sacrifice: "For the work which if a man do he shall live in it is done 
only by the one who is justified: and justification is granted to the prayer 
of faith .... By faith of [in] Jesus Christ is granted to us both the little 
beginning of salvation in possession, and its perfecting [our future 
resurrection] which we await in hope."39 
It is evident that on the salient issue of the appropriation of Christ's 
mediatorial work, Johnson's view varies decisively from Augustine's. 
Johnson held that man's "hope of salvation must be founded on the terms 
on which it is promised that the mediation of our SAVIOUR shall be 
applied to us,-namely, obedience; and where obedience has failed, then, 
as suppletory to it, repentance."40 Augustine, by contrast, following 
Paul,41 concludes that, "By faith of [in] Jesus Christ is granted to us both 
the little beginning of salvation in possession, and its perfecting which we 
await in hope." For Johnson, in short, Christ's merits are contingent on 
and appropriated by obedience and repentance; for Augustine, while 
recognizing the necessity of good works which flow from faith, 42 the 
hope of eternal salvation rests on Christ's merits and is appropriated by a 
faith divinely and gratuitously bestowed apart from the deeds of the law. 
For Augustine, consequently, we "await in hope" the consummation of 
our eternal salvation; for Johnson, we can have no certain hope for we can 
never be sure our obedience and repentance are enough: "[W]hat man 
can say that his obedience has been such, as he would approve of in 
another, or even in himself upon close examination, or that his repentance 
has not been such as to require being repented of? .... A man cannot be 
sure himself that he has divine intimation of acceptance .... "43 
38ibid., 240, 241. 
39ibid., ch. 51, 235. 
40f3oswell, op. cit., 394. 
41Bromiley, Historical Theology, 118. 
42Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 67, 68, 378-380. 
43Boswell, loc. cit. 
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Griffith's judgment, then, that "nothing in Johnson's conversation 
contradicts his Augustinian Christianity" is erroneous inasmuch as it does 
not take into account the decisive element of salvation by grace 
appropriated by faith in Augustine's soteriology that is missing in 
Johnson's. This missing element, in addition, has momentous 
I 
consequences for Johnson's Christian experience. 
When Augustine argues for the valid use of the law, for instance, he 
alludes to the Pauline conception of its application not to the righteous, 
but to the unrighteous (1Tim.1:8, 9). The law may serve "as the 'tutor' 
conducting [the unrighteous man] to grace." The use of the law by the 
righteous, perhaps ironically, "consists in his putting the fear of it upon 
the unrighteous [in order that] when they too have found the plague of 
inveterate covetousness worsened by the stimulus of prohibition and the 
multiplying of transgression, they may take refuge by faith with the grace 
that justifies .... "44 Johnson seems to hold almost the opposite view: the · 
law is used to vex the righteous who can never be certain they have 
fulfilled it as the appropriation of the merits of Christ. He notes in Sermon 
28: 
... let us likewise be careful, lest an erroneous opinion of the all-
sufficiency of our Saviour's merits lull us into carelessness and 
security. His merits are indeed all-sufficient! But he has prescribed 
the terms on which they are to operate. He died to save sinners, 
but to save only those sinners that repent. 45 
Had Johnson's soteriology been genuinely Augustinian, his scruples and 
anxiety would no doubt have been mollified, or at least undergirded by 
the sure confidence that while his standing as a child of God is influenced 
by his obedience and repentance, the fact of his being a Christian is certain 
due to the merits of Christ definitively appropriated once for all by faith. 
While it may be evident that Johnson's soteriology is not correctly 
classified as Augustinian, his writings and conversation may seem in fact 
to substantiate Chadwick's description of the Doctor as "Arminian with 
44Augustine, Spirit and Letter, ch. 16, 206. 
45Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 28], 304. 
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all the force of his forcible being."46 The classification of Johnson's 
soteriology as Arminian, however, is equally-though not as obviously-
incorrect. 
Because Chadwick claims Johnson is "a man of a classical type of 
Arminian faith, with nothing abnormal, paradoxical, or superstitious in its 
framing,"47 whose belief shapes significant features of his theology and 
life, it would be prudent to examine briefly the history and fundamental 
elements of Arminianism. 
Arminianism was a direct reaction against some of the more staunchly 
Augustinian elements of Reformation soteriology, specifically total 
depravity, unconditional election, and the bondage of the will. 
Disagreement among the principal leaders of the continental Reformation 
did not extend to Augustinian soteriology, the cornerstone of both Luther 
and Calvin's salvific dogma. At the heart of soteriological 
Augustinianism-and, therefore, Reformational soteriology-is the 
anthropological insistence on the total depravity and spiritual inability of 
humanity.48 From this radically pessimistic anthropology it almost 
necessarily follows that any scheme of salvation short of monergism 
(''The view that conversion is accomplished totally by the working of 
God" 49) is inadequate and truncated. Humanity is depicted not merely as· 
utterly depraved but also, as Augustine recognized, spiritually impotent. 
Jacobus Arminius, a Dutch theologian of the late sixteenth century who 
was schooled at Geneva in the dogma of Calvinism, later developed some 
reservations about Calvinistic soteriology during his fifteen-year 
pastorate. When he subsequently became professor of theology at the 
University of Leyden, his controversial lectures questioning fundamental 
tenets of Calvinistic soteriology virtually divided the students as well as 
the local Reformed ministers.SO Arminius's early death (1609) preceded 
46chadwick, op. cit., 129. 
47 ibid., 136. 
4Ssee Luther, The Bondage of the Will, passim, and Calvin, Institutes II: i, ii, v. 
49Erickson, Concise Dictionary, 107. 
s0c1ouse, II Arminianism," 70. 
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the most bellicose and epochal period of the controversy, during which 
his followers (called Remonstrants) extended and amplified his teachings, 
and their opponents (the strict Calvinists) succeeded in condemning the 
former's "Arminianism" at Dort (1618-1619).51 
Arminians alert to their history and heritage recognize the basic 
incompatibility between Augustinianism and Arminianism. Arminian 
scholar J.K. Grider, for example, notes that Arminianism "views Christian 
doctrine much as the pre-Augustinian fathers did and as did the later John 
Wesley. In several basic ways it differs from the Augustine-Luther-Calvin 
tradition."52 Arminianism is generally regarded as a foil to Reformed 
soteriology in its insistence on the free will of humanity and consequent 
synergism. Additional tenets include the following: the divine decrees are 
based on prescience; the pollution of sin but not its guilt is transmitted 
from Adam to his posterity; man is not totally depraved; and depraved 
man's free will is a cause of regeneration. 53 
Arminianism differs from Augustinianism mainly over the issue of the 
freedom of the will: the latter denies it and therefore also man's co-
operation with God in exercising faith; the former affirms it and, 
therefore, also that divine-human co-operation. Arminianism does not, 
though, dissent from the Augustinian dogma of justification by faith 
alone. 
Chadwick buttresses his contention that Johnson's soteriology is 
Arminian by alluding to the Reformation controversy: 
The great debate of the Reformation-the great debate of the 
Christian moral life-is the debate over Augustinianism; in 
Reformation language, Calvinism versus Arminianism. All 
Christians are agreed that the burden of the world and society is 
such that the soul is helpless without the grace of God, and that the 
ultimate Christian act is to trust in God and his providence. 
51Jellema, "Dort," 309, 310. 
52<;rider, "Arrninianism," 79. 
53Nicole, "Arminianism," 65. 
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But do you say, "I trust you, 0 God, and you cannot fail me, and 
you will bring me to heaven for all my squalor''? Or do you say, "I 
trust you, 0 God, and you will help me, and you have given me 
moral freedom, and with your aid I will be the soul you want me to 
be"? That is: Is salvation all an act of God? Or is it a cooperation 
between God and man working together?54 
The differences between Calvinism and Arminianism, of course, involve 
more topics than merely those of the nature of man's constitutional 
sinfulness and the role of man in his salvation.SS But in the sphere of 
experiential soteriology-that which so occupied Johnson's attention-
Chadwick has succinctly and effectively captured the contrast between 
Arminianism and Calvinism. 
Chadwick's statement that the issue of Arminianism centers on the 
question, ''Is salvation all an act of God? Or is it a cooperation between 
God and man working together?" is true enough, for Arminianism posits 
synergism,56 the view that man and God co-operate in human salvation. 
But Johnson, in his response to Mrs. Knowles (and elsewhere), does not 
merely insist that salvation is a co-operative effort, but, in addition, holds 
that Christ's merits are appropriated by obedience and repentance, a 
thesis Arminius disclaims "with all the force of his forcible being." 
Arminius was accused, in fact, of holding that "faith is not the instrument 
of justification,"57 but soundly repudiates the charge. He holds, in fact, 
with Augustine and the Reformers, that 
The Meritorious Cause of justification is Christ through his 
obedience and righteousness .... Faith is the Instrumental Cause, or 
act, by which we apprehend Christ proposed to us by God for a 
propitiation and for righteousness, according to the command and 
promise of the Gospel, in which it is said, "He who believes shall be 
justified and saved, and he who believeth not shall be damned."58 
It is likely that Chadwick mistakes Johnson's soteriology for 
Arminianism because (a) Arminius and Johnson are both synergistic and 
54chadwick, op. cit., 128, 129. 
55Packer, "Arminianisms," passim. 
56Helm, "Synergism," 947. 
57 Arminius, Works, 11:49. 
5Bibid., 406, 407. 
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(b) Arminius, like Johnson, supposes that one who does not persevere in . 
the faith is not justified.59 While on the surface this appears similar to 
Johnson's "conditional salvation," the similarity is only apparent, not 
actual. 
There is a vast difference, in fact, between the synergism of Arminius 
which posits man's co-operative assent in the Spirit's conviction of sin 
leading to salvation, and Johnson's belief that the co-operation extends to 
the necessity of the believer's performing good works for justification. 
Further, Arminius, no less than Augustine,60 maintains that one who 
does not persevere in good works cannot expect to receive eternal 
salvation. 
But we have yet to consider justification,-both about the 
beginning of conversion, when all preceding sins are forgiven;-
and through the whole life, because God has promised remission of 
sins to believers, those who have entered into covenant with Him, 
as often as they repent and flee by true faith to Christ their 
Propitiator and Expiator. But the end and completion of justification 
will be ... near the close of life, when God will grant, to those who 
end their days in the faith of Christ, to find his mercy absolving 
them from all the sins which had been perpetuated through the 
whole of their lives. The declaration and manifestation of 
justification will be in the future general judgment.. .. 61 
Both Johnson and Arminius insist that justification without perseverance 
is an impossibility, but the latter suspends the application of the merits of 
Christ's work on their appropriation by personal faith, while the former 
conditions the crediting of those merits to one's spiritual account on the 
practice of good works. Arminius states: 
That faith and works concur together to justification; is a thing 
impossible .... Christ has not. .. obtained by his merits that we should 
be justified by the worthiness and merit of faith, and much less that 
we should be justified by the merits of works: But the merit of 
59ibid., 407. 
60 Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 67, 68, 378-380. 
61Arminius, op. cit., II:407. 
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Christ is opposed to justification by works; and, in the scriptures, 
Faith and Merit are placed in opposition to each other.62 
Johnson, by contrast, asserts that 
every sin, and much more any habit or course of sin long 
continued, is, according to the different degrees of guilt, an 
apostacy or defection from our Saviour; as it is a breach of those 
conditions upon which we became his followers; and he that breaks 
the condition of a covenant, dissolves it on his side. Having 
therefore broken the covenant between us and our Redeemer, we 
lose the benefits of his death; nor can we have any hopes of 
obtaining them, while we remain in this state of separation from 
him .... [A]fter having alienated ourselves from Christ by sin, we 
are restored, upon our repentance and reformation, to pardon and 
favour, and the certain hopes of everlasting life. 63 
In other words, Arminius believes that faith alone saves, and the saved 
must persevere; Johnson believes that faith and works save, that these are 
both the ground and the condition of salvation. Johnson dissents sharply 
from Arminius' belief that "the merit of Christ is opposed to justification 
by works"; for Johnson, reformation of life is a critical requirement of the 
restoration of the broken covenant, and he says nothing, in fact, of faith, 
and certainly not of justification by faith alone, the Reformation dictum 
Arminius is intent to defend. 
While Johnson would agree with Arminius that justification will be 
granted only "to those who end their days in the faith of Christ," the two 
are at variance over the question of the instrumentation of the 
appropriation of Christ's merits by which one is justified. The equation of 
the two views is due to confounding the good works of perseverance as 
spiritual performance which perforce issue from saving faith (Arminius) 
with meritorious appropriation (Johnson). 
Arminius asseverates 
Faith and faith only, (though there is no faith alone without 
works,) is imputed for righteousness. By this alone we are justified 
62ibid., 407, 408. My emphasis. 
63Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 9], 100, 101. 
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before God, absolved from our sins, and are accounted, 
pronounced and declared righteous before God .... I affirm, 
therefore, that faith is imputed to us for righteousness, on account 
of Christ and his righteousness. 64 
According to Arminius and the Reformers, faith is the instrument of 
justification, though works of necessity follow from faith. According to 
Johnson, conversely, "hope of salvation must be founded on the terms on 
which it is promised that the mediation of our SAVIOUR shall be applied 
to us,-namely, obedience; and ... repentance."65 
One is warranted in concluding that Johnson's soteriology inasmuch as it 
supports original sin, free will and perseverance is more Arminian than 
Augustinian. It nonetheless adjusts both Arminianism and Augustinianism 
in its dogma that good works are the instrument of the application of 
Christ's merits to humanity, that is, that one is justified by good works. It 
is these non-Augustinian, non-Arminian sentiments that characterize 
Johnson's soteriology and thereby shape his religious ethos and life's 
orientation. This point is significant, for it evinces the chasm between 
Reformational, Arminian, and early Anglican orthodoxy on the one hand, 
and Roman Catholic, Restorationist Anglican, and Johnsonian orthodoxy 
on the other. 
Although Augustinian and Arminian soteriology, as we have seen, are 
not suitable classifications for Johnson's soteriology, in Anglican 
soteriology there is a dogma that illuminates the path in search of how 
correctly to categorize and assess Johnson's views. 
Anglican soteriology is perplexing. Initially a reaction against papal 
authority rather than papal dogma, the Church of England has ever 
mediated between Romanism and Protestantism. Indeed, Johnson's 
somewhat ambivalent attitude toward Romanism is less perplexing when 
set within the framework of historical Anglicanism. 
64 Arminius, op. cit., 701, 702. 
65Boswell, loc. cit. 
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The initial impulses within fledgling Anglicanism did not bear the full 
Puritan elements that later would vex the church. The original Anglicans 
were not endeavoring to purge all Roman Catholicism from the new sect,· 
but to reform the excesses of the medieval church.66 Nonetheless the 
Church of England almost immediately assimilated Reformation 
objections to Romanism pervasive on the continent, including the 
Reformers' opposition to the Roman dictum of justification by faith and 
works later so perspicuously and dogmatically enunciated at the Council 
of Trent. 
Early Anglican soteriology seems unambiguous at least in the matter of 
justification. Both early Anglican soteriology and the Thirty-Nine Articles 
testify to the Protestant understanding of justification as judicial and 
imputational: the sinner who exercises faith is declared and regarded 
righteous inasmuch as the impeccable righteousness of Christ's humanity 
is imputed to him. Conversely, Tridentine Roman Catholicism posits 
justification as experiential and impartational: God imparts to the sinner 
who exercises faith the seed of righteousness and capacity to improve it 
whereby his justification increases or decreases in proportion to his 
obedience and repentance. The Reformation view stresses alien 
righteousness-Christ's righteousness credited to the sinner's account; the 
Roman view stresses intrinsic righteousness-Christ's righteousness 
infused into the sinner by which he can fulfill his own justification. Against 
this distinction and its historical background Johnson's soteriology is more 
readily comprehended. 
Philip Hughes provides incontrovertible documentation of the 
insistence on justification by faith alone not only by leading sixteenth-
century Anglican divines John Jewel, Thomas Cranmer, Richard Hooker, 
Robert Barnes, George Joye, and Thomas Bilney but also by the pre-
Church of England clergy John Wycliffe and John Colet.67 Sixteenth-
century Anglican soteriology-especially as expressed by Tyndale68_was 
66J<nappen, Tudor Puritanism, ch. 1, 2. 
67Hughes, Faith and Works, 9-47. 
6Bibid., 20, 21. 
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strongly influenced by Luther,69 the avowed champion of justification by · 
faith alone. 
This pattern of early Anglican soteriology, most instructively articulated 
by Richard Hooker, serves as an excellent foil for comprehending 
Johnson's soteriological orientation. 
Arguably the principal apologist of sixteenth-century Anglicanism, and 
certainly one of its most notable figures historically, is Richard Hooker (c. 
1554-1600). In his magnum opus titled Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity he 
steers a typical Anglican course between Romanism on the right and 
Puritanism on the left.70 His thorough treatment of justification, for 
example, is an objection to (a) the Roman Catholic conception of 
experiential justification and (b) the Puritan belief that the Roman view of 
justification is so heretical and egregious that those who held it during the 
Middle Ages and the Reformation could not be regarded as saved, i.e, 
regenerate. Hooker contends that while the Roman view of justification 
by faith and works "pervert[s] the truth of Christ,"71 they err who assert 
that God's mercy cannot extend to those who due to ignorance embrace 
such false doctrine.72 
In making such a concession to Rome, however, Hooker by no means 
accommodates their idea of works-righteousness; and his description of 
the contrast between the Anglican view of justification and that of Rome 
confirms the similarity of Johnson's view to Rome's at the juncture most 
critical in the context of the Reformation-justification by faith alone. 
Defending Rome against the charge that she cannot be regarded as the 
church of Christ in any sense at all, Hooker suggests the area in which she 
demurs from Protestantism: 
It is true, they [Roman Catholics] do indeed join other things with 
Christ [in salvation]; but how? Not in the work of redemption 
itself, which they grant that Christ alone hath performed 
69Latourette, op. cit. 2:798, 799. 
70J1ooker, Justification, 1:15-75. Laws ... is bound with Justification in the writer's volume. 
71ibid., 22. 
72;.bid., 70-73. Like the Reformers, he identifies Roman Catholicism with Antichrist, 35. 
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sufficiently for the salvation of the whole world; but in the 
application of this inestimable treasure, that it may be effectual to 
their salvation ... _73 
It is not the ground of salvation that is in dispute, but-as in the 
conversation of Johnson with Mrs. Knowles-its means of application. That 
is, Johnson's idea of the application of Chrisfs merits as contingent on 
good works and repentance is what Hooker identifies as precisely Roman 
Catholic. On certain soteriological points the Anglicans are at one with 
Rome: 
... they teach as we do, that all have sinned; that infants which did 
never actually offend, have their natures defiled, destitute of justice, 
and averted from God. They teach as we do, that God doth justify 
the soul of man alone, without any other coefficient cause of justice; 
that in making man righteous, none do work efficiently with God, 
but God.74 They teach as we do, that unto justice no man ever 
attained, but by the merits of Jesus Christ. They teach as we do, 
that although Christ as God be the efficient, as man the meritorious 
cause of our justice; yet in us also there is something required .... 
Christ hath merited to make us just: but as a medicine which is 
made for health, doth not heal by being made, but by being 
applied; so, by the merits of Christ there can be no justification, 
without the application of his merits. Thus far we join hands with 
the Church of Rome. 75 
"Wherein then do we disagree?", Hooker queries. 
We disagree about the nature of the very essence of the medicine 
whereby Christ cureth our disease; about the manner of applying 
it; about the number and power of means, which God requireth in 
us for the effectual applying thereof to our soul's comfort.76 
Romanism posits that righteousness "is a divine spiritual quality,"77 
which God imparts to believers for regeneration and for the capacity to 
perform good works. This quality of righteousness ("inherent grace"78) is 
not static, for it increases in proportion to the increase of good works 
73ibid., 33. 
74In other words, Romanism is not Pelagian. 
75Hooker, op. cit., 17. 
76ibid. 
77ibid., 18. 
7Bibid. 
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which it makes meritorious and decreases in proportion to the 
commission of venial sins, and may be forfeited entirely by mortal sins. 
Consequently, Christians become increasingly or decreasingly justified. 
Venial sins are corrected by ordinary practices associated with Romanist 
tradition, while mortal sins can be corrected exclusively by the sacrament 
of penance, which "changeth the punishment eternal [imposed because of 
mortal sin] into a temporal satisfactory punishment.. .. "79 
This dogma Hooker castigates as "the mystery of the man of sin [the 
Antichrist],"80 and counters with a Protestant insistence on the application 
of Christ's merits by faith alone. 
Whether they speak of the first [regenerative] or second 
justification [that which follows our practice of good works which 
the inherent righteousness renders possible], they make the 
essence of it a divine quality inherent, they make it righteousness 
which is in us ... but the righteousness wherein we must be found, if 
we will be justified, is not our own; therefore we cannot be justified 
by any inherent quality. Christ has merited righteousness for as 
many as are found in him. In him God findeth us if we be faithful; 
for by faith we are incorporated into him. Then, although in 
ourselves we be altogether sinful and unrighteous, yet even the 
man which in himself is impious, full of iniquity, full of sin; him 
being found in Christ through faith, and having his sin in hatred 
through repentance; him God beholding with a gracious eye, 
putteth away his sin by not imputing it, taketh quite away the 
punishment due thereunto, by pardoning it; and accepteth him in 
Jesus Christ, as perfectly righteous than if himself had fulfilled the 
whole law; shall I say more perfectly righteous than if himself had 
fulfilled the whole law?Bl 
Again, Hooker in assenting that Roman Catholics hold the genuine 
foundation of the necessity of the efficacy of Christ's merits while 
improperly implementing that foundation, remarks 
Our countrymen in Rhemes make the like answer that they seek 
salvation no other way than by the blood of Christ; and that 
humbly they do use prayers, fastings, alms, faith, charity, sacrifice, 
sacraments, priests, only as the means appointed by Christ, to 
79ibid., 20. 
BO ibid. 
Blibid., 21. 
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apply the benefit of his holy blood to them: touching our good 
works, that in their own natures they are not meritorious, nor 
answerable unto the joys of heaven; it cometh by the grace of 
Christ, and not of the work itself, that we have by well-doing a 
right to heaven, and deserve it worthily.82 
Hooker then renders his estimation of this Roman conception: 
If any man think that I seek to varnish their opinions, to set the 
better foot of a lame cause foremost, let him know, that since I 
began thoroughly to understand their meaning, I have found their 
halting in this doctrine greater than perhaps it seemeth to them 
which know not the deepness of Satan .... For although this be 
proof sufficient, that they do not directly deny the foundation of 
faith; yet if there were no other leaven in the whole lump of their 
doctrine but this, this were sufficient to prove that their doctrine 
were not agreeable with the foundation of Christian faith. 83 
Perhaps surprisingly, one senses in Hooker's description of the 
Romanist interpretation of justification Johnson's sentiments almost 
exactly. Johnson's scruples, succinctly epitomized in his reply to Mrs. 
Knowles and his noted remarks in the sermons, are motivated chiefly by 
his persuasion that one will be benefitted by the merits of Christ only if 
his works are sufficient, or, works being wanting, his repentance. When 
Hooker speaks of repentance in connection with justification, however, 
his meaning is quite different: it is the concomitant to a humble faith, the 
repulsion of sin that issues from the heart appealing to and trusting in 
God alone through Chrisrs works and abhorring self-righteousness. 
Contrary to Johnson, Hooker asserts there is no quality in man that 
motivates God's gift of applying Christ's merits to his credit; in short, 
while Johnson posits justification by works, Hooker (along with his 
Anglican contemporaries and several of their prominent forebears) 
embraces justification by faith. 
In holding that one's "hope of salvation must be founded on the terms 
on which it is promised that the mediation of our SAVIOUR shall be 
applied to us,-namely, obedience; and where obedience has failed, then, 
82ibid., 65, 66. 
83ibid., 66. 
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as suppletory to it, repentance," Jo'1nson advances the very Roman 
Catholic opinion Hooker describes as "doctrine ... not agreeable with the 
foundation of Christian faith." Johnson, like the Romanists whose 
doctrines Hooker is evaluating, understands that one is saved by Christ's · 
merits; that is not the axis of dispute. The point of disagreement turns on 
the issue of the means of appropriating those Christological merits. 
Johnson would ~ssert-and would act according to the assertion-that 
one "must humbly ... use prayers, fastings, alms, faith, charity, sacrifice, 
sacraments, priests, only as the means appointed by Christ, to apply the 
benefit of his holy blood to [himself]." He asserts the Romish dogma "of 
propitiating God by corporal austerities, of anticipating his vengeance by 
voluntary afflictions, and appeasing his justice by a speedy and cheerful 
submission to a less penalty when a greater is incurred.''84 
Hooker differs by insisting that 
Their doctrine as [Thomas More] thought, maketh the works of 
man rewardable in the world to come through the mere goodness 
of God, whom it pleaseth to set so high a price upon so poor a 
thing; and ours, that a man doth receive that eternal and high 
reward, not for his works, but for his faith's sake, by which he 
worketh: whereas in truth our doctrine is no other than that which 
we have learned at the feet of Christ; namely, that God doth justify 
the believing man, yet not for the worthiness of his belief, but for 
his worthiness which is believed [Christ] .... ss 
Far from teaching the Johnsonian dictum that Christ's merits are 
appropriated by works, Hooker even dissents from More's caricature of 
his views, that it is our faith whereby God counts us righteous. In truth, 
according to Hooker, neither one's work nor faith is the ground of 
justification, which is Christ's merits alone; faith is only the means of the 
application of those merits to the account of him who exercises it. 
In addition, the parallel between Hooker's description of the baneful 
effect on the individual of the Roman conception of justification by faith 
and works and Johnson's spiritual anxiety is interesting. Hooker 
84Johnson, Rambler 110. Yale edition., 222. 
85ttooker, op. cit., 67. 
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characterizes the Scriptural doctrine as "the comfort of them whose hearts 
are overcharged by sin."86 He charges, conversely, that "the doctrine 
professed in the church of Rome doth bereave men of comfort, both in 
their lives, and at their deaths .... "87 If Hooker has accurately depicted the 
effects of the Roman view of justification by works, and if Johnson did in 
fact, as it appears, affirm the Roman view Hooker set out to confute, it is 
inevitable that Johnson's scruples and anxiety resulted directly from his 
belief in the Roman Catholic understanding of justification. 
In addition, the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England are 
straightforward enough in their Protestant soteriological orientation, 
especially Articles IV-XVIII. Article XI is of special interest: 
Of the Justification of Man. We are accounted righteous before God, 
only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by Faith, 
and not for our own works or deservings. Wherefore, that we are 
justified by Faith only, is a most wholesome Doctrine, and very full 
of comfort, as more largely is expressed in the Homily of 
Justification. 88 
Although, as noted below, later divines deviated from the creed (and 
Newman attempted to reinterpret it), the explanation of the eleventh 
article by Thomas Rogers in his exposition of the Articles which first 
appeared in 1579 soundly sets that Article in contradistinction to the 
Roman Catholic idea: 
Besides what hath been said, that works have no place nor 
portion in the matter of our justification, it is evident in the holy 
. 89 scnpture .... 
He continually castigates the Papists, 
who against the justification by faith alone, do hold a justification 
by merits, and that of congruity, dignity, and condignity. 
86ibid., 26. 
87ibid. 
88ttardon, Spirit, 176. 
89Rogers, Catholic, 115. 
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The said Papists teach besides, that life eternal is due unto us of 
debt; because we deserve it by our good works. 
They teach, finally, that by good works our sins are purged.90 
The Articles do indeed seem to confute unequivocally the Roman 
Catholic conception to which Rogers so strenuously objects. 
While the sixteenth-century divines, therefore, influenced as they were 
by Luther, embraced the Reformational view of justification by faith 
alone,91 later Anglicans were not thus convinced. Nicholas Hudson asserts 
that the Restorationist and eighteenth-century divines of latitudinarian 
persuasion recognized that the Articles were stacked against their 
Romanist propensities and therefore "ignored" them: " ... the lack of 
frequent or detailed discussions of grace in Anglican homiletics of the 
period (including Johnson's sermons) makes it very difficult to generalize 
on the prevailing doctrine."92 In a treatment of the topic published in 
1669-1670, George Bull "provoked a storm"93 by labeling the doctrine of 
justification by faith alone a paradox and "deny[ing] that faith is the only 
instrument of justification."94 Bull sets forth the belief later held by 
Johnson that trust in the merits of Christ alone is insufficient for 
justification. 
For it is, alas, too well known, that the greatest part of those who 
call themselves Christians, secure of the mercy of God, the merits 
of Christ, and of their own salvation, pass their days without the 
least anxiety, being at the same time very far short of a true 
Christian life .... They both know and congratulate themselves, that 
they truly, and unfeignedly trust in the merits of Christ.. .. They 
therefore trust truly in Christ, but not as they ought, because they 
do it without any grounds. They depend on the merits of Christ, 
but despise his commands; they eagerly embrace the promises of 
the gospel, but care nothing for its precepts.95 
90ibid., 116. 
91Hughes, passim. 
92ttudson, op. cit., 208. 
9Jcross and More, Anglicanism, 296. 
94Bull, "Justification," 2%, 298. 
95ibid., 298. 
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Bull frankly admits he affirms "that good works are necessary to 
justification."% 
Isaac Barrow, another seventeenth-century divine, predicates 
justification on good works: 
The virtue and effect of that first justifying act doth continue (we 
abide in a justified state) so long as we do perform the conditions 
imposed by God, and undertaken by us at our first justification .... if 
we do persevere firm in faith and obedience, we shall (according to 
the purport of the evangelical covenant) continue in a state of grace 
and favour with God, and in effect remain justified; otherwise the 
virtue of our justification ceaseth, and we in regard thereto are 
more deeply involved in guilt.97 
Barrow reinforces the Roman Catholic understanding of justification as 
experiential rather than alien or judicial and as an "infusion into [one's] 
soul of righteousness, of grace, of virtuous habits."98 It is a work 
"enabling also and quickening him to discharge the conditions of faith and 
obedience required from him and undertaken by him .... "99 
Johnson's notion of conditional justification comports more favorably 
with these latter Papistic salvific schemes than with those of the early 
Anglicans who supported Luther's concept of justification by faith alone 
and of Chrisf s righteousness being imputed to one's account rather than 
imparted to his spirit. Johnson's covenantal language in Sermon 9, in fact, 
seems to mirror Barrows' s comment above: "Having therefore broken 
the covenant between us and our Redeemer, we lose the benefits of his 
death."100 
That Anglicanism was not historically unanimous in its adherence to the 
Reformation belief in justification by faith alone and other distinctively 
Reformational tenets is prominently evidenced in the Oxford Movement 
one-and-a-half generations after Johnson. Its leader, John Henry 
96ibid., 299. 
97Barrow, "Justification," 302, 303. 
9Bibid., 301. 
99ibid. 
100Johnson, op. dt. [Sermon 9], 100. 
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Newman, cites the Anglican Homilies to prove the tenet of justification by 
faith alone does not preclude justification by other means as long as they 
justify in a different sense than does faith,101 a sentiment not at all in 
violation of earlier Anglican views.102 Newman proceeds, 
notwithstanding his expression of reservations about the Roman view, to 
import into the articles the Roman Catholic perspective of impartational 
justification.103 Newman, in any case, objects much more vigorously to 
the Lutheran (i.e., Protestant) dictum of justification by faith alone than to 
"the extreme writers of the Roman school."104 He supports his novel 
synthesis of justification by faith and by obedience with appeals to the 
Anglican divines, 105 and reveals the soteriological latitudinarianism of 
Anglicanism. 
It remains to demonstrate that there can be no question that Johnson's 
soteriology travels within this Roman-and not Reformed-current of 
Anglicanism, that this current is oriented more toward experiential rather 
than judicial soteriological elements, and that the neglect of the judicial in 
favor of the experiential of this Roman current conduces to Johnson's 
anxiety-as, indeed, it tends to do in anyone who embraces it, an 
observation Hooker understands. 
Having surveyed the Roman Catholic current within the soteriology of 
developing Anglicanism and during the nineteenth century, it is now 
opportune to review Johnson's attitude in general toward Romanism. 
What strikes one immediately is that while a loyal Church of England 
man, Johnson has a predominantly favorable estimate of Catholicism.106 
On October 26, 1769, Boswell sups with Johnson and later records their 
discussion, which_ includes an extended dialogue revealing Johnson's 
assessment of Roman Catholicism.107 In response to Boswell, Johnson 
lOlfairweather, Oxford, 151, 152. 
102Hooker, op. cit., 37. 
103fairweather, op. cit., 152. 
104ibid., 216. 
105ibid., 248, 249. 
106Quinlan, op. cit., 163-175. 
107Boswell, op cit., 173, 174. 
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concedes he is "no great enemy to the Roman Catholick religion," and 
goes so far as to claim he prefers Romanism to Presbyterianism. When 
Boswell points out that creedally, Anglicans are at one with the Reformed 
dogma, "even [in] the doctrine of predestination," Johnson demurs by 
attributing the inclusion of predestination in the articles to "part of the 
clamour of the times" and by suggesting that the topic was 
"mentioned ... with as little positiveness as could be," a rejoinder that not 
unnaturally provokes Boswell to inquire whether it is necessary for 
Anglicans to affirm the Thirty-Nine Articles. Johnson does not respond 
unequivocally; instead, he sidesteps the question by drawing attention to 
the controversy surrounding it ("that is a question which has been much 
agitated"). 
Now it has been noted that Johnson does not personally hold Article XI 
on justification by faith alone, no matter how formally he may endorse 
the Articles.108 Unless, therefore, he misunderstands the import of the 
article (a highly unlikely possibility), he cannot unreservedly subscribe to 
the Articles. Johnson does not-and cannot-dispute Boswell's 
observation regarding the creedal identity between Calvinism and 
Anglicanism; and if Johnson is squeamish about the issue of whether an 
Anglican must affirm the Presbyterian dictum of predestination appearing 
in the Articles, he is probably equally squeamish about whether one must 
affirm them unreservedly, knowing as he must that the Protestant view 
of justification, and not his own, is articulated in the Articles. Quinlan 
remarks, 
[Johnson] knew that one must be directed by one's conscience, 
and his conscience told him his best hope of salvation existed in the 
Church of England. Furthermore, because of the latitude the 
Establishment permits, he could feel relatively free to follow certain 
practices and to adopt certain beliefs not in favor with most English 
churchmen but, on the other hand, not specifically interdicted. Thus 
on points where writers on religion disagreed, he could select the 
particular interpretation that seemed right to him, without thinking 
of himself as an apostate. The fact that some of these interpretations 
108ttudson observes, "many [eighteenth-century] Anglicans ... found themselves at odds with 
the articles of their own church ... ," Eighteenth-Century Thought, 204; also, "Very few Anglicans 
could say that they wholeheartedly agreed with all the Thirty-Nine Articles," ibid., 205, n. 42. 
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were basically Roman Catholic is not necessarily evidence of a 
personal predilection for that faith.109 
In defending the Roman doctrines of apostolic succession, purgatory, 
prayer for the dead, confession to priests, and penance, Johnson 
unequivocally denies the uniform Protestant accusation that the mass is 
idolatrous and abominable.llOThis acceptance of the validity of the mass, 
moreover, coincides well with Johnson's belief that Christ's merits are 
appropriated by one's works; for the mass, as Calvin recognized, is 
another specious attempt to appropriate Christ's merits by one's own 
merit: 
But what is the object of the mass, except it be that by the merit of 
a new oblation we may be partakers of the passion of Christ?lll 
For Johnson, however, the mass cannot be criticized on the grounds that 
it is meritorious, because he himself holds that one's works are an 
instrument of salvation. 
At Oxford on June 10, 1784, Johnson "argued in defence of some of the 
peculiar tenets of the church of Rome,"112 including the provision of the 
bread exclusively to the laity in the mass, and present communion with 
deceased saints. Interestingly, Johnson defends Romanism on the very 
issue over which he appears ambivalent some fifteen years earlier-
creedal latitudinarianism. 
"If you join the Papists externally, they will not interrogate you 
strictly as to your belief in their tenets. No reasoning Papist 
believes every article of their faith .... "113 
This latitude, whether supposed or actual, Johnson finds agreeable. 
Perhaps he feels consoled by it: he can thereby rationalize that, just as the · 
Papists do not insist on absolute creedal subscription, the Anglicans should 
109Quinlan, op. cit., 169, 170. My emphasis. 
nn t Cal · 't IV ... . 
"IlO e, e.g., vm, op. ci ., :xvm, passim. 
111 ibid., 726. 
112aoswell, op. cit., 536. 
113ibid., 537. 
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not (do not?) either; he can thereby condone his own soteriological 
deviation from the Thirty-Nine Articles. 
Though Johnson in conversation with Boswell expresses objections to 
certain Roman Catholic practices and perversions,114 his dispute with 
Romanism never seems to be doctrinal; at least he does not trouble 
himself to refute what Protestants regard as its doctrinal errors when he is 
questioned. To be sure, when in a disagreeable humor, Johnson can 
inveigh against the Catholics as easily (and vehemently) as against 
anybody else,115 but on the whole his attitude toward Romanism is 
agreement and especially defense. 
Johnson's favorable attitude toward Romanism supports a key theme 
of this dissertation: Johnson's soteriology is neither Augustinian, 
Calvinistic, Arminian, or creedally Anglican-although on other points it 
partakes of deistic rationalism (on the atonement, for example). In the 
sphere of justification it is firmly Roman Catholic and therefore 
experientialist. Given Johnson's attitude toward Roman Catholicism, one 
should not find this surprising. Indeed, one should find it surprising if 
Johnson's soteriology were found not to be somewhat Tridentine. 
That Johnson's interpretation of justification is in harmony with 
Romanism and not Protestantism is discovered by comparing it to the 
decrees of the Council of Trent (1545-63), the official Roman Catholic 
response to Protestantism. 
Trent insists against the Protestants that the death of Christ does not of 
itself guarantee redemption or secure universal salvation-Chrisf s salvific 
merits must be applied. 
But though He died for all, yet do not all receive the benefit of his 
death, but those only unto whom the merit of his passion is 
communicated .... if [men] were not born again in Christ, they 
never would be justified; seeing that, in the new birth, there is 
114ibid., 173, 174, 301, et al. 
115ibid., 430. 
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bestowed upon them, through the merit of his [ Chrisf s] passion, 
the grace wherewith they are made just.116 
Johnson likewise asserts in Sermon 28 that "Salvation is promised to us 
Christians, on the terms of faith, obedience, and repentance."117 The "merit 
of [Christ's] passion," in the parlance of Trent, is applied to those who 
exercise the grace by which they are justified. 
The crucial argument is not over the fact of the application of Christ's 
merits but the instrument of that application. When Trent speaks of the 
grace bestowed at the new birth, it refers "not [to] remission of sins 
merely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man, 
through the voluntary reception of the grace, and of the gifts, whereby 
man of unjust becomes just [sic], and of an enemy a friend, so that he may 
be an heir according to the hope of eternal life."118 That is, God endows 
the believer with the means whereby he justifies himself before God: 
For, although no one can be just, but he to whom the merits of 
the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ are communicated, yet is this 
done in the said justification of the impious, when by the merit of 
that same most holy passion, the charity of God is poured forth, by the 
Holy Spirit, in the hearts of those that are justified, and is inherent 
therein .... Wherefore, when receiving true and Christian justice, 
they are bidden, immediately on being born again, to preserve it 
pure and spotless, as the first robe given them through Jesus 
Christ.. . .1 1~ 
Johnson holds it indeed the duty of the Christian "to preserve it [his 
justification] pure and spotless" if he is to possess hope of eternal life. He 
remarks, "Having therefore broken the covenant between us and our 
Redeemer [by our sin], we lose the benefits of his death."120 
Trent asseverates that after adequately preparing himself for 
justification, 121 God bestows on man the gifts of faith, hope, and charity 
116schaff, op. cit., 2:90, 91. 
117Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 28), 303. Emphasis in original. 
118schaff, op. cit., 94. 
119ibid., 95-97. Emphasis in original. 
120Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 9), 100. 
121schaff, op. cit., 92. 
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wherewith he can appropriate Christ's merits.122 Because justification is 
not by faith alone, one is liable to forfeit his justified state by lack of good 
works and repentance: 
For God forsakes not those who have been once justified by his 
grace, unless he be first forsaken by them. Wherefore, no one 
ought to flatter himself up by faith alone, fancying that by faith 
alone he is made an heir, and will obtain the inheritance ... )23 
Johnson warned similarly in Sermon 28: 
Yet let us likewise be careful, lest an erroneous opinion of the all-
sufficiency of our Saviour's merits lull us into carelessness and 
security. His merits are indeed all-sufficient! But he has prescribed 
the terms on which they are to operate. He died to save sinners, 
but to save only those sinners that repent. Peter, who denied him, 
was forgiven, but he obtained his pardon ''by weeping bitterly."124 
One's merits, and not his faith alone, determine his standing before 
God.125 The inherent grace infused into him-in contradistinction to the 
Protestant conception of man as justified by the alien righteousness of 
Christ, external to the sinner but credited to his account126-is the means 
whereby one performs good works which merit eternal life. 
And for this cause, life eternal is to be proposed to those working 
well unto the end, and hoping in God, both as a grace mercifully 
promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a reward 
which is according to the promise of God himself, to be faithfully 
rendered to their good works and merits ... _127 
Trent incontestably condemns the Protestant notion of justification by 
faith alone. Canons IX and XI in the chapter on justification pontificate: 
If any one saith, that by faith alone the impious is justified, in such 
wise as to mean, that nothing else is required to co-operate in order 
to the obtaining the grace of Justification, and that it is not in any 
122ibid., 96, 97. 
l23ibid., 101. 
124Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 28], 304. 
12Sschaff, op. cit., 104, 105. 
126calvin, op. cit., III: xi. 
127schaff, op. cit., 107. 
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way necessary, that he be prepared and disposed by the 
movement of his own will: let him be anathema. 
If any one saith, that men are justified, either by the sole 
imputation of the justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, 
to the exclusion of the grace and the charity which is poured forth in 
their hearts 1Jy the Holy Ghost, and is inherent in them; or even that 
the grace, whereby we are justified, is only the favor of God: let 
him be anathema.128 
For Trent, like Johnson, good works, and not faith alone, are the 
condition on which the application to the individual of Christ's merits is 
predicated. Johnson follows Trent, rather that Augustine, Arminius, or the 
Reformers, in grounding justification in the experiential sphere: 
justification imparts the grace necessary to fulfill the good works or 
repentance on which the appropriation of Christ's merits is dependent. 
Hudson is only partially accurate therefore in assessing Johnson's views 
thus: "With not too much qualification, we can say that Johnson believed 
in justification by works, the doctrine excoriated by early Protestants as 
Pelagianism and Popery."129 Johnson's soteriological views incline toward 
but do not embrace Pelagianism (which denies original sin altogether), 
and his doctrine of justification by works is not merely "Popery": it is in 
fact a replication of Tridentine dogma. 
Because, apart from the statements in occasional dialogues recorded bY. 
Boswell, Johnson's religious ideas find their supreme and most direct 
expression in his sermons, they warrant special consideration in extracting 
and assessing his soteriology. 
Not surprisingly, Johnson's sermons are devoted to little else but the 
sphere of sanctification. Not one is intended to elucidate what is ordinarily 
recognized as Christian doctrine; each is a moralistic homily. Even in 
Sermons 9 and 22 dealing with the sacrament of communion, Johnson 
devotes his attention to its practice and subjective implications and ignores 
its theological and doctrinal significance. Kass accurately observes that 
"the Sermons demonstrate that religion is efficacious in this world .... 
12Bibid., 112, 113. 
1291-Iudson, op. cit., 203. 
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Johnson follows the reader into the street, the marketplace, and the 
coffeehouse as he puts religion to the test of addressing the practical 
realities of Monday and Tuesday."13a Kass refers to the "pragmatic 
orientation of the Sermons."131 
Kass is convinced that the overarching concern of Johnson's sermons is 
"that human life is in a special sense 'vacuous' .... In every Sermon, 
Johnson notes that it is the preponderous vacuity in our lives which 
moves us to seek the consolation and encouragement provided by 
religion."132 Gray insists that happiness "is the word, the idea, the 
concernment which binds the entire canon of his sermons together."133 
However, it would seem that the vacuity of life theme and the 
corresponding happiness theme are simply single dominant strands in an 
entire pattern of soteriology. For instance, while sermons 12, 14, and 15 
specifically address the issue of the emptiness of human existence and the 
yearning for happiness, sermon 3 on the fear of God, though subjectively 
oriented as are all of the sermons, stresses the necessity of fear not mainly· 
as an antidote to an empty existence but as a duty of the human creature 
to God, and only secondarily concerns itself with benefits that may accrue 
to the Christian. 
The great purpose of revealed religion is to afford man a clear 
representation of his dependence on the Supreme Being, by 
teaching him to consider God as his Creator, and Governour, his 
Father and his Judge. Those to whom Providence has granted the 
knowledge of the holy Scriptures, have no need to perplex 
themselves with difficult speculations, to deduce their dutv from 
remote principles, or to enforce it by doubtful motives.134' 
In Sermon 4, the motivation Johnson mentions in urging the listeners on 
to charity is divine blessing in eternity for the obedient and retribution for 
the disobedient: 
130Kass, "Consolations," 3-5. 
131 ·b'd 9 i i ., . 
132ibid., 2, 3, 36. 
133Gray, Johnscm's Sermons, 167. 
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... harden not thy heart, but what thou knowest that in thy last 
moment thou shalt wish done, make haste to do, lest thy last 
moment be now upon thee .... And let us all, at all times, and in all 
places, remember, that they who have given food to the hungry, 
raiment to the naked, and instruction to the ignorant, shall be 
numbered by the Son of God, amongst the blessed of the 
Father.135 
It is difficult, further, to understand how in sermon 28, the address to 
convicts, it is "the preponderous vacuity in our lives which moves us to 
seek the consolation and encouragement provided by religion." Rather, it 
is "one earnest effort for salvation"136 that is the chief goal of religion, and 
indeed, of Johnson's sermons: ''The business of life is to work out our 
salvation."137 Alleviating the vacuity and unhappiness of human existence 
is a single propitious effect of the goal of religious life-the salvation of 
the soul. 
In a salient remark of Sermon 8 reprimanding intellectuals for their 
pride, Johnson reveals that adherence to the word of God is the ultimate 
inducement to righteousness. He suggests the proud intellectual consider 
the frequently exalted place of the less intelligent individuals and compare 
it to his own. He then states: 
But if this method of obtaining humility be ineffectual, he may 
however establish it, upon more strong and lasting principles, b'3 
applying himself to the duties of religion, and the word of God. 38 
These "more strong and lasting principles," and not the themes of the 
vacuity of life and the desire for happiness, are the primary inducements 
to virtue and morality in Johnson's religion, especially his sermons. 
Johnson's sermons can be subsumed into six categories: the marital 
sermons (1, 25), the communion sermons (9, 22), the political sermons (24, 
26), the sermons warning against sinfulness or specific sins (2, 6, 8, 10, 13, 
135ibid., [Sermon 4], 51. 
136ibid. [sermon 28], 302. 
137ibid. [Sermon 15], 161. 
138ibid. [Sermon 8], 95. 
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16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 28), the sermons exhorting the practice of Christian 
virtue (3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 19, 27), and the sermons elucidating the vanity of 
human existence (12, 14, 15). The sermons are replete with instructions, 
exhortations, and warnings with respect to individual sanctification; even 
in the political sermons sanctification occupies a decisive role. 
For example, Johnson locates the cause of political turmoil in the 
individual condition, not in social structures: 
In political, as well as natural disorders, the great errour of those 
who commonly undertake, either cure or preservation, is, that they 
rest in second causes, without extending their search to the remote 
and original sources of evil. They therefore obviate the immediate 
evil, but leave the d~t\5tructive principle to operate again; and have 
their work for evervo begin, like the husbandman who mows 
down the heads of noisome weeds, instead of pulling up the 
roots .... The only uniform and perpetual cause of publick 
happiness is publick virtue. The effects of all other things which are 
considered as advantages, will be found causal and transitory.139 
Positive legislation is only partially successful for it cannot examine or 
alter the state of the human heart. Indeed, ''These deficiencies in civil life 
can be supplied only by religion."140 Accordingly, 
[T]he first duty of a [civil] govemour is to diffuse through the 
community a spirit of religion, to endeavor that a sense of divine 
authority should prevail in all orders of men, and that the laws 
should be obeyed, in subordination to the universal and 
unchangeable edicts of the Creatour and Ruler of the world.141 
Hence, while it would be inaccurate to assume Johnson supports civil 
virtue on merely utilitarian grounds, it is evident that he sees sanctification 
as an essential civic virtue. 
Johnson's soteriological scheme operates within the Romanist current of 
eighteenth-century Anglicanism. To that current, salvation is neither 
applied by faith alone nor grounded in the Reformers' idea of Christ's 
139ibid. [Sermon 24], 253. 
140ibid., 256. 
141ibid., 256, 257. 
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righteousness imputed, rather than imparted. Salvation is intensely 
experiential-it is indeed provided by Christ but is additionally dependent 
on man's merits. This anthropocentric view of salvation coupled with the 
abiding influence of Law's ascetic ideal can never permit the solace and 
freedom afforded those who embrace the twin Reformation dicta of 
salvation appropriated by faith alone and justification interpreted as the 
application of the impeccable alien righteousness of Christ's life and death 
to the sinners' account. Johnson's concern is almost perpetually religion as 
it expresses itself in or shapes human experience; creed and dogma are 
subordinate to those supreme purposes. 
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Chapter 2: 
ORIGINAL SIN 
So that the fault does not lies here, that we desire to be good and perfect, but 
through the weakness of our nature fall short of it; but it is, because we have not 
piety enough to attend to be as good as we can, or to please God in all the actions 
of our life. 
William Law 
from A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life, 1728 
While, in the words of Kass, "one obligation of Johnson as a sermon 
writer was to remind his audience about the limitations of human 
nature,"1 how these limitations relate to the Christian doctrine of original 
sin is not entirely clear in Johnson's conversation and writings. 
Nonetheless, it is equally true that Johnson's view of man's nature is 
inseparably related to his view of salvation: 
Johnson asks the conventional moral questions in his Sermons: 
how are we to be saved? what solace or hope is there for man as 
he experiences the emptiness of life? However, his answers are 
always framed by his unconventional and experiential 
understanding of the nature of man.2 
Johnson states in a rejoinder to Boswell, "'With respect to original sin, 
the inquiry is not necessary; for whatever is the cause of human 
corruption, men are evidently and confessedly so corrupt, that all the laws 
of heaven and earth are insufficient to restrain them from crimes' .... "3 
Johnson avoids original sin as a tenet of speculative theology while 
affirming its effects. 
After St. Paul himself, Augustine was the first church father to articulate 
a careful defence of the doctrine that in Adam's sin both his depravity and, 
his guilt are transmitted ("imputed" is the Pauline and theological 
expression) to his posterity. In medieval Romanism, however, the 
1 Kass, "Consolations," 8. 
2ibid., 33. 
3Boswell, Life, 482. He concedes that "the greater part of mankind are base and wicked," 
[sermon 17] Sermons, 190. 
definition of original sin was adjusted to highlight "the absence of original 
righteousness-the privation of supernatural grace through the fall."4 
While Augustine held that "concupiscence" was a central feature of 
original sin, the medieval theologians believed this depravity was not 
essential or inherent; rather, all men possess a propensity to temptation, 
accompanied by free will by which they can capitulate to the temptations 
of life or, conversely, overcome the propensity by good works.5 In simple 
terms, the fundamental problem of mankind for Roman Catholics was 
not the presence of sin, but the absence of righteousness. The Protestant 
Reformation included a revival of the Augustinian notion of "imputed" 
sin and guilt, a revival most clearly represented in Luther's celebrated On 
the Bondage of the Will against Erasmus. 
While we cannot assume Johnson is oblivious to these theological 
debates, it is evident they do not especially interest him. His hamartiology 
seems much more acclimated to the Roman Catholic conception of the 
inherent propensity to sin rather than the Augustinian-Protestant idea of 
the immediate imputation of Adam's corruption and resultant guilt to his 
posterity. He does not say this in so many words, however, and one is left 
to deduce his hamartiology from isolated remarks in his works and in 
Boswell's Life. 
Johnson in fact argues a posteriori for original sin. Men are so obviously 
sinners in their present state that speculation as to the origin of their 
sinfulness is unnecessary. In sermon 5 Johnson submits that "[Edenic] 
happiness was forfeited by a breach of the conditions to which it was 
annexed, and ... the posterity of him that broke the covenant [Adam] 
were involved in the consequences of his fault."6 One wishes Johnson had 
specified the nature of the "involvement" of humanity in Adamic sin, but, 
characteristically, his overriding concern is experiential, not theoretical. 
Theoretical questions concerning man's inward nature, the role of 
God and Christ in his regeneration, and the motives to repentance 
were of importance to Johnson primarily as they either promoted 
4Wallace, "Original Sin," 735. 
5ibid. 
6Johnson, op. cit. [sermon 5], 55. See also Boswell, Hebrides, 88. 
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or hindered the individual's feeling of responsibility for his own 
salvation through a moral life.7 
Owen Chadwick's conclusion that Johnson "developed a Calvinistic 
sense of the load of original sin"8 may be misleading. As Nicholas Hudson 
notes, Johnson's conception of original sin is not even Arminian.9 Much 
less is it Calvinistic. Calvin forcefully denies free will to all but the 
regenerate: ''This being admitted will place it beyond all doubt, that man 
is not possessed of free will for good works, unless he be assisted by 
grace, and that special grace which is bestowed on the elect alone in 
regeneration."10 Calvin is convinced that the will "is so bound by the 
slavery of sin, that it cannot excite itself, much less devote itself to 
anything good; for such a disposition is the beginning of a conversion to 
God which in the Scriptures is attributed solely to divine grace."11 
Johnson suggests that by the sheer exertion of human will apart from 
any divine interposition man must strive for perfection both of his inward 
spiritual condition and his outward societal state. This conception of the 
relation of sin and the will repudiates the Reformation conviction that 
man is so utterly depraved that sheer exertion of will cannot overcome 
the effects of sin: 
To Martin Luther it was a revolutionary discovery that the 
righteousness of God is 'the righteousness by which we are made 
righteous .... ' Medieval thinkers, he believed, had led Christendom 
astray by teaching that human persistence in doing good moral 
and ritual actions would earn merit in the eyes of God and enable 
sinners to achieve salvation. But the appalling consequences of sin 
had so paralyzed the will that sinners could not take the least step 
towards pleasing God.12 
Johnson does not thereby deny that sin is an inherent and pernicious 
feature of mankind. He affirms men bear a heavy burden of sin but does 
7Hudson, Eighteenth-Century Thought, 203. 
Bchadwick, "The Religion of Samuel Johnson," 130. 
9Hudson, op. cit., 206. 
me 1 · 't rr · · · d · a vm, op. ct ., :11:v1 an passim. 11 ·b·d ... t t ., u1:v. 
12R. T. Jones, "Reformation Theology," 565. 
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not always recognize a corresponding form of justification by which that 
burden is relieved. This precarious equation is an essential consequence of 
Johnson's soteriology. 
That Johnson does not deny that men are naturally and inherently sinful 
is evidenced from various sources. He contends, for example, "Pride is a 
corruption that seems almost originally ingrafted in our nature; it exerts 
itself in our first years, and, without continual endeavours to suppress it, 
influences our last."13 In this remark Johnson sounds at least partially 
Arminian. On the question of original sin, Arminianism occupies a 
position midway between Calvinism and Pelagianism. While the former 
posits the direct transmission of Adam's corruption and guilt, the latter 
denies both. Arminianism, by contrast, affirms the transmission of the 
corruption or propensity to sin, but not Adamic guilt, nor in the terms of 
Luther, the ''bondage of the will."14 According to Johnson, however 
Adam's sin affected his posterity, it did not necessarily or finally corrupt 
their will. He contends that: 
We are informed by the Scriptures, that God is not the Authour 
of our present state, that when he created man, he created him for 
happiness; happiness indeed dependent upon his own choice, and 
to be preserved by his own conduct .... Thus religion shews us that 
physical and moral evil entered the world together, and reason and 
experience assure us that they continue for the most part so closely 
united, that, to avoid misery, we must avoid sin, and that while it is 
in our power to be virtuous, it is in our power to be happy ... )5 
Indeed, Johnson's confid~nce in human ability is so great that he 
supposes that by sheer exertion of the will the individual can, however 
conditionally, regain a certain moral completeness. Although he is alert to 
the depravity of man's inclination to sin, he is staunch in his belief in the 
potential man has to correct or improve his lot. His comments from 
Sermon 5 warrant full quotation: 
But a community, in which virtue should generally prevail, of 
which every member should fear God with his whole heart, and 
13Johnson [sermon 6], op. cit., 66. 
14Erickson, Christian Theology, 2:632-636. 
15Johnson, op. cit.[sermon SJ, SS. 
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love his neighbour as himself, where every man should labour to 
make himself "perfect, even as his Father which is in heaven is 
perfect," and endeavour, with his utmost diligence, to imitate the 
divine justice, and benevolence, would have no reason to envy 
those nations, whose quiet is the effect of their ignorance. 
If we consider it with regard to publick happiness, it would be 
opulent without luxury, and powerful without faction; its counsels 
would be steady, because they would be just; and its efforts would 
be vigorous, because they would be united. The governours would 
have nothing to fear from the turbulence of the people, nor the 
people anything from the ambition of their governors. The 
encroachments of foreign enemies, they could not always avoid, 
but would certainly repulse, for scarce any civilized nation has ever 
been enslaved, till it was first corrupted. 
With regard to private men, ... Every man would be industrious 
to improve his property, because he would be in no danger of 
seeing his improvements torn from him. Every man would assist 
his neighbor, because he would be certain of receiving assistance, if 
he should himself be attacked by necessity. Every man would 
endeavour after merit, because merit would always be rewarded. 
Every tie of friendship and relation would add to happiness, 
because it would not be subject to be broken by envy, rivalship, or 
suspicion. Children would honour their parents, because all parents 
would be virtuous; all parents would love their children, because all 
children would be obedient. The grief which we naturally feel at the 
death of those that are dear to us, could not perhaps be wholly 
prevented, but would be much more moderate, than in the present 
state of things, because no man could ever want a friend, and his 
loss would therefore be less, because his grief, like his other 
passions, would be regulated by his duty. Even the relations of 
subjection would produce no uneasiness, because insolence would 
be separated from power, and discontent from inferiority. 
Difference of opinions would never disturb this community, 
because every man would dispute for truth alone, look upon the 
ignorance of others with compassion, and reclaim them from their 
errours with tenderness and modesty. Persecution would not be 
heard of among them, because there would be no pride on one 
side, nor obstinacy on the other. Disputes about property would 
seldom happen, because no man would grow rich by injuring 
another, and when they did happen, they would be quickly 
terminated, because each party would be equally desirous of a just 
sentence. All care and solicitude would be almost banished from 
this happy region, because no man would have either false friends, 
or publick enemies. The immoderate desire of riches would be 
extinguished where there was no vanity to be gratified. The fear of 
poverty would be dispelled, where there was no man suffered to 
want what was necessary to his support, or proportioned to his 
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deserts. Such would be the state of a community generally 
virtuous, and this happiness would probably be derived to future 
generations; since the earliest impressions would be in favour of 
virtue, since those, to whom the care of education should be 
committed, would make themselves venerable by the observation 
of their own precepts, and the minds of the young and 
inexperienced would not be tainted with false notions, nor their 
conduct influenced by bad examples. 
Such is the state at which any community may arrive by the 
general practice of the duties of religion. And can Providence be 
accused of cruelty or negligence, when such happiness as this is 
within our power? Can man be said to have received his existence 
as a punishment, or a curse, when he may attain such a state as this; 
when even this is only preparatory to greater happiness, and the 
same course of life will secure him from misery, both in this world, 
and in a future state?16 
Nor should we regard Johnson's description of "this happy region" as 
merely a noble but unreachable goal (though Johnson does not hold that 
man may attain an earthly utopia). 
Let no man charge this prospect of things, with being a train of 
airy phantoms; a visionary scene, with which a gay imagination 
may be amused in solitude and ease, but which the first survey of 
the world will shew him to be nothing more than a pleasing 
delusion. Nothing has been mentioned which would not certainly 
be produced in any nation by a general piety. To effect all this, no 
miracle is required; men need only unite their endeavours, and 
exert those abilities, which God has conferred upon them, in 
conformity to the laws of religion. 
To general happiness indeed, is required a general concurrence in 
virtue; but we are not to delay the amendment of our own lives, in 
expectation of this favourable juncture. An universal reformation 
must be begun somewhere, and every man ought to be ambitious 
of being the first. He that does not promote it, retards it; for every 
man must, by his conversation [deportment], do either good or 
hurt. Let every man therefore, endeavour to make the world 
happy, by a strict performance of his duty to God and man, and the 
mighty work will soon be accomplished.17 
16ibid., 60-62. 
17 ibid., 62, 63. 
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These sentiments seem extraordinary issuing from a man fully 
convinced that "men are evidently and confessedly so corrupt, that all the 
laws of heaven and earth are insufficient to restrain them from 
crimes' ... ,"18 yet they are perfectly consistent with what Thomas Sowell 
has termed in his epochal work A Conflict of Visions the "unconstrained" 
vision. Discussing the commitment of Johnson's contemporary William 
Godwin to this vision, Sowell remarks, "man's understanding and 
disposition were [in Godwin's estimation] capable of intentionally creating 
social benefits. Godwin regarded ... virtue in tum as being the road to 
human happiness."19 In Godwin's unconstrained vision the statement of 
possibilities of the future exercise of virtue was "not meant as an empirical 
generalization about the way most people currently behaved. It was 
meant as a statement of the underlying nature of human potential. 
Conceding current egocentric behavior did not imply that it was a 
permanent feature of human nature, as human nature was conceived in 
the unconstrained vision."20 Johnson's dedication to the possibilities of 
societal perfectibility by means of personal piety conforms exactly to the 
widely-held historical idea of the unconstrained vision: 
Implicit in the unconstrained vision is the notion that the potential 
is very different from the actual, and that means exist to improve 
human nature toward its potential, or that such means can be 
evolved or discovered, so that man will do the right thing for the 
right reason, rather than for ulterior psychic or economic 
rewards.21 
Johnson's proposal and depiction of perfect piety is more surprising, 
however, when one notes that the latter does not presuppose the 
miraculous imposition of regeneration. In fact, Johnson in the above 
citation is intent to deny the necessity of any direct work of providence in 
the spiritual amelioration of society. 
Such insistence-as well as Johnson's conviction that children properly 
educated would naturally preserve the morally perfect society-reveals a. 
18J3oswell, op. cit., 482. 
19sowell, A Conflict of Visions, 23. 
20ibid., 24. 
21ibid., 25, 26. 
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great deal about his hamartiolgy, and especially his view of original sin. 
Due to their belief in man's sinful, impotent nature, earlier versions of 
spiritual social perfectibility were uniformly grounded in a c<;>mmitment to 
the necessity of the direct interposition of God , whether immediately (as 
in the case of premillennialism), or mediately (as in the case of 
postmillennialism).22 In each case God is seen as the direct agent of the 
improvement. 
To Johnson, by contrast, men possess the inherent ability to improve 
both themselves and society. Indeed, his view of spiritual societal 
amelioration is simply one of a number of cases in which the concept of 
original (inherent) sin plays no role whatever. It is as though in prominent 
instances Johnson fully discounts its effects, if not its existence. Men may 
perform good works, repent, and improve society without the gracious 
miracle of divine interposition. 
Johnson's confidence in humanity is more easily reconciled with his 
devotion to orthodox Christianity when one comprehends Johnson's 
conviction that man is capable of both impeccable morality and abysmal 
depravity-it is all a matter of the proper exercise of the will, without 
whose freedom virtue is an impossibility: 
If we examine all the afflictions of mind, body, and estate, by this 
rule, we shall find God not otherwise accessory to them, than as he 
works no miracles to prevent them, as he suffers men to be 
masters of themselves, and restrains them only by coercions 
applied to their reason. If God should, by a particular exertion of 
his omnipotence, hinder murder or oppression, no man could then 
be a murderer or an oppressor, because he would be with-held 
from it by an irresistible power; but then that power, which 
prevented crimes, would destroy virtue; for virtue is the consequence 
of choice. Men would be no longer rational, or would be rational to 
no purpose, because their actions would not be the result of free-
will, determined by moral motives; but the settled and predestined 
motions of a machine impelled by necessity.23 
22J<romminga, The Millennium in the Church, 21 and passim. 
23Johnson, op. cit., 56. My emphasis. 
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Hudson marshalls evidence of Johnson's ambivalent attitude toward 
free will: 
On the one hand, he asserted like Hobbes or Collins that the will 
was regulated entirely by self-interest. On the other hand, he 
agreed with Bramhall and other advocates for liberty that men 
very often act without clear reasons, or even in direct opposition to 
their 'last judgment' concerning the greatest good.24 
To Johnson, overwhelming rational speculation of the nature of the will 
is a pragmatic moral concern. "How, then," Hudson asks after 
considering Johnson's attribution of human choice to self-interest, "could 
[Johnson] avoid acknowledging the validity of the philosophical 
arguments for necessity?"25 He responds with justification: 
It is not too unfair, I think, to suggest that his objections to 
necessity were largely practical rather than philosophical: he was 
concerned that belief in necessity would destroy the incentives to 
virtuous conduct by dictating that an individual could not have 
avoided committing vice.26 
Johnson admits as much to Boswell in 1781: 
"Do not, Sir, accustom yourself to trust to impressions. There is a 
middle state of mind between conviction and hypocrisy, of which 
many are conscious. By trusting to impressions, a man may 
gradually come to yield to them, and at length be subject to them, 
so as not to be a free agent, or what is the same thing in effect, to 
suppose that he is not a free agent. A man who is in that state 
should not be suffered to live; if he declares he cannot help acting in 
a particular way, and is irresistibly impelled, there can be no 
confidence in him, no more than in a tyger."27 
However inconsistent Johnson may appear in his speculative approach 
to the question of free will, it is certain his compelling moral interest and 
immediate concern to move men to do good force him to affirm it. 
24Hudson, op. cit., 88. 
25ibid., 93. 
26ibid., 94. 
27Boswell, op. cit., 481. Emphasis in original. 
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Because one's views of original sin, human nature, free will, and 
predestination are ordinarily inextricable, Johnson accordingly has 
difficulty with predestination as a divine decree and even omniscience as a 
divine attribute. Johnson is painfully aware of the problems which 
exhaustive prescience pose for moral freedom, as the following 1769 
exchange with Boswell28 evidences. 
BOSWELL. "It appears to me, Sir, that predestination, or what is 
equivalent to it, cannot be avoided, if we hold an universal 
prescience in the Deity." JOHNSON. "Why, Sir, does not God 
every day see things going on without preventing them?" 
BOSWELL. ''True, Sir; but if a thing be certainly foreseen, it must be 
fixed, and cannot happen otherwise; and if we apply this 
consideration to the human mind, there is no free will, nor do I see 
how prayer can be of any avail." He mentioned Dr. Clarke, and 
Bishop Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, and bid me read South's 
Sermons on Prayer; but avoided the question which has excruciated 
philosophers and divines, beyond any other. I did not press it 
further, when I perceived that he was displeased .... 29 
He responds similarly about nine years later in dialogue with Boswell in 
which the latter again adduces the relation between predestination, 
prescience, and free will: 
BOSWELL. " ... The argument for the moral necessity of human 
actions is always, I believe, forfeited by supposing universal 
prescience to be one of the attributes of the Deity." JOHNSON. 
"You are surer that you are free, than you are of prescience; you 
are surer that you can lift up your finger or not as you please, than 
you are of any conclusion from a deduction of reasoning. But let us 
consider a little the objection from prescience. It is certain I am 
either to go home to-night or not; that does not prevent my 
freedom." BOSWELL. ''That it is certain you are either to go home 
or not, does not prevent your freedom; because the liberty of 
choice between the two is compatible with that certainty. But if one 
of these events be certain now, you have no future power of 
volition. If it is certain you are to go home to-night, you must go 
home." JOHNSON. "If I am well acquainted with a man, I can 
judge with great probability how he will act in any case. [sic] 
without his being restrained by my judging. God may have this 
probability increased to certainty." BOSWELL. ''When it is 
281t appears in the context of a discussion regarding a comparison of Romanism and 
Anglicanism. 
29Boswell, op. cit., 173. 
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increased to certainty, freedom ceases, because that cannot be 
certainly foreknown, which is not certain at the time; but if it be 
certain at the time, it is a contradiction in terms to maintain that 
there can be afterwards any contingency dependent on the exercise 
of the will or any thing else." JOHNSON. "All theory is against 
freedom of the will; all experience for it."30 
Again, as has been frequently noted, Johnson "is not very concerned 
with explicating doctrine or developing a formal theology."31 
Predestination as a corollary of prescience, an orthodox attribute of God, 
is denied not so much on the grounds that it is philosophically untenable 
but that it is morally deleterious: "So long as men believed that they were 
morally accountable for their actions, he (Johnson] was not preoccupied 
with refuting every possible restriction on human liberty ."32 
Attributing to man freedom of the will while simultaneously affirming 
the transmission of Adamic corruption to his posterity is an Arminian 
tenet. As Hudson points out, however, Johnson deviates even from 
Arminianism and so embraces "original sin in its most diluted form"33 by 
transferring the locus of sin from a corrupt nature to the actual 
commission of transgressions.34 Hudson alludes to Johnson's comment 
that "thoughts are only criminal, when they are first chosen, and then 
voluntarily continued,"35 in evincing Johnson's deviation from the 
traditional Arminian and Wesleyan idea that, while man's will is free to 
choose good or evil, corruption adheres to man's very nature and sin 
consists not only in the performance of evil but also in its propensity. 
This mollified conception of sin Johnson employs in a sermon on 
repentance in commending to the sinner the mercy of God: 
But there is mercy with him, therefore shall he be feared. It is 
reasonable, that we should endeavour to please him, because we 
know that every sincere endeavor will be rewarded by him; that 
30ibid., 392, 393. Emphasis in original. 
31stock, "Johnson Ecclesiastes," 17. 
32Hudson, op. cit., 98. 
33ibid., 207. 
34ibid. 
35Johnson, Rambler 3:45 (number 8). 
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we should use all the means in our power, to enlighten our minds, 
and regulate our lives, because our errours, if involuntary, will not 
be imputed to us; and our conduct, though not exactly agreeable to the 
divine ideas of rectitude, yet if approved, after honest and diligent 
inquires, by our own consciences, will not be condemned by that 
God, who judges of the heart, weighs every circumstance of our 
lives, and admits every real extenuation of our failings and 
transgressions.36 
One may suggest that Johnson's moralistic and extemalist definition of 
sin is an attempt to counter a superabundance of the vexing scruples with 
which he already contends. Fully convinced of the depravity of mankind 
in its present state, it would be utterly crushing to define sin in such a way 
that it includes will, reason, propensity, and intent-features associated, in 
fact, with a Reformational, though not necessarily Thomistic, 
hamartiology.37 Since, as was noted in the introduction, Johnson 
understands justification as contingent on the improvement of divinely 
endowed capacities, mankind would despair to purge sin if the latter were 
conceived as blighting not merely one's actions but also his very will and 
propensities. 
Hudson alludes to Isobel Grundy's view that Johnson desires to relocate 
the concern about man from the ideal to the actual.38 When applied to 
Johnson's soteriology this creates a tension. Johnson agrees with Law that 
man should pursue perfection but recognizes man is far from perfect; he 
asserts men are inherently corrupt yet is convinced they can drastically 
improve their world. Johnson's soteriology oscillates between the actual 
and the potential, sometimes accommodating the former so as not to 
overburden man, and sometimes stressing the latter so as not to 
engender moral laxity. 
Reformational theology can posit such a comprehensive view of original 
sin and consequent human depravity because it concurrently stresses the 
imputational idea of justification by which Chrisfs impeccable 
righteousness is credited to one's account irrespective of his depravity. 
36ibid., Sermons [Sermon 2], 19. My emphasis. 
37J. E.C[olwell], "Sin," 641-643. 
38Hudson, op. cit., 158. 
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Johnson's soteriology, suspending the application of Chrisfs merits not 
on simple faith but on, in addition, obedience and repentance, can scarcely 
afford to include the will and propensities in the definition of the objects of 
sin. Such inclusion would effectively crush the individual who is already 
under compulsion to contribute to his own justification. 
It may be misleading, however, to neglect Johnson's recognition of the 
necessity of special grace for the performance of righteousness, a 
recognition that adjusts his assertions that morality resides within man's 
power. In one of his sermons on repentance, for example, he cautions 
But as this reformation is not to be accomplished by our own 
natural power, unassisted by God, we must, when we form our 
first resolutions of a new life, apply ourselves, with fervour and 
constancy, to those means which God has prescribed for obtaining 
his assistance.39 
In contradistinction to the Arminian-Wesleyan idea of "prevenient 
grace,"40 Johnson seems to hold that divine assistance follows, rather than 
engenders, "our first resolutions of a new life." That is, God assists men in 
their salvific efforts after they have demonstrated a willingness to apply 
his prescribed means of salvation. This patently is not the Arminian idea 
that God helps men to help themselves; it is rather the reasoning 
undergirding the stoic maxim, "God helps those who help themselves." H~ 
states this sentiment plainly in Sermon 9 on communion: 
When we thus enter upon a new life by a solemn, deliberate, and 
serious dedication of ourselves to a more exact and vigilant service 
of God, and oblige ourselves to the duties of piety by this 
sacrament, we may hope to obtain, by fervent and humble prayer, 
such assistances from God as may enable us to perform those 
engagements, which we have entered into by his command, and in 
the manner appointed by him. Always remembering, that we must 
use our own endeavours, and exert our utmost natural powers, for 
God only co-operates with the diligent and the watchfuI.41 
39Johnson , op. cit., 24. 
40r:rickson, op. cit., 634. See also Arminius, Works, 2:189-196. 
41Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 9), 101. 
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Thus Johnson's understanding of the necessity of grace does not 
contradict his belief that repentance and moral improvement are within 
man's power-men act, and God subsequently assists them. This is 
further evidence that Johnson's idea of original sin is minimal. Grace, 
according to Johnson, is co-operative, not prevenient. 
Johnson's view of original sin serves a critical role in his general 
soteriology. There is an essential relation between one's ideas of original 
sin and salvation. There is an inverse relation between the extent of 
depravity and the extent of human participation in salvation: as one's 
view of the extent of depravity increases, the view of man's participation 
in his salvation decreases. As one's view of the extent of depravity 
decreases, one's view of man's participation in his salvation increases. 
Reformational soteriology, for example, insists on such a minimal role of 
man in his salvation because it conceives of his depravity as so extensive 
that he is virtually helpless to save himself. By contrast, Johnson's 
soteriology, similar by degrees to Arminianism, semi-Pelagianism, and 
Romanism, insists on a more active role of man in his salvation since it 
does not regard the effects of sin as radically blighting his spiritual will. 
Johnson's reluctance to affirm an orthodox understanding of divine 
prescience derives from his unwillingness to curb free will; but his concern 
for the preservation of free will, in turn, is morally rather than 
speculatively driven: affirmation of determinism may conduce to vice. 
The vice, in addition, which man commits cannot be defined as anything 
other than sinful actions. The human will, reason, and propensities are not 
themselves sinful. To concede their intrinsic sinfulness is to impose an 
unbearable load on man who is already responsible for purging his sin 
and thus earning salvation. 
Johnson's idea of original sin influences his conception of the atonement. 
If men do not inherit Adam's depraved nature or guilt, the crucifixion 
cannot be interpreted as the complete vicarious punishment of that 
depraved nature and guilt, inherited from Adam: as Hudson queries, 
"With no conception of inherited guilt, of what benefit was Christ's 
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atonement?"42 Johnson's view of the atonement must therefore be 
considered. 
42Jf udson, op.· cit., 207. 
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Chapter 3: 
ATONEMENT 
So here is the problem. Man is a guilty sinner, God is a holy God. How can the 
two be brought together? The answer is the cross of Christ. 
David Martyn Lloyd-Jones 
from The Cross, 1986 
While Johnson mentions the atonement in both his sermons and diaries, 
the most memorable expression of his conception of the atonement is 
found in Boswell's Life. The sermonic and other personal comments reflect 
the ideas related to Boswell. 
Even in Johnson's scant treatment of the objective features of 
soteriology he is loath to ground his salvific views in the judicial, objective 
operation of God and instead clearly opts for experientialism: the salvific 
scheme of God is calculated first to create some subjective alteration of or · 
impression in man. Johnson's idea of the atonement of Christ on the cross 
affords a striking example of the interrelatedness of his soteriology. While 
it is not expressed systematically, it is embraced systematically. 
Johnson's idea of original sin stresses morally unacceptable dispositions 
and actions rather than inherent or inherited guilt 
We are informed by the Scriptures, that God is not the Authour 
of our present state, that when he created man, he created him for 
happiness; happiness indeed dependent upon his own choice, and 
to be preserved by his own conduct .... Thus religion shews us that 
physical and moral evil entered the world together, and reason and 
experience assure us that they continue for the most part so closely 
united, that, to avoid misery, we must avoid sin, and that while it is 
in our power to be virtuous, it is in our power to be happy ... .1 
Accordingly, since man needs rescue from his skewed dispositions and · 
actions but not a sinful nature, the atonement is conceived not as 
reversing federal and intrinsic sin but as deterring the sinful dispositions 
1 Johnson [sermon 5], Sermons, 55. 
and actions. This concept of the atonement clearly cannot be forensic and 
judicial, for such an interpretation of the atonement is meaningful only on 
the grounds that sin itself is forensic and judicial : if Adam acting as the 
federal head of humanity plunged his posterity into sin and its resultant 
guilt, Christ must act as its federal head to erase both sin and guilt by his 
impeccable active obedience in life and sacrificial, passive obedience in 
death, both of which may be credited to the sinner's account. 
It is almost self-evident that this latter Reformational idea can have little 
place in Johnson's scheme. For Johnson, morality is the goal of religion, 
and atonement is calculated to make men moral beings. The atonement 
can never dispose of the guilt of sin entirely. Charles Pierce observes, "He 
[Johnson] was reluctant to admit that even in a future state, after man had 
presumably been redeemed, man could sin again and thus expect to be 
punished again. And this reluctance sprang ultimately from his fear that 
God could never be appeased, that man could never be certain he had been 
redeemed. Behind this carefully reasoned discourse lurked Johnson's fear 
that man could never escape fully the wrath of God nor enjoy fully the 
love of God-either in this life or the next."2 
Johnson implied in his conversation with Mrs. Knowles that the 
inducement of morality is the principal goal of the atonement: 
I expressed [recalls Boswell] a horrour at the thought of death. 
MRS.KNOWLES. "Nay, thou should'st not have a horrour for 
what is the gate of life." JOHNSON. (standing upon the hearth 
rolling about, with a serious, solemn, and somewhat gloomy air,) 
"No rational man can die without uneasy apprehension." MRS. 
KNOWLES. ''The Scriptures tell us, 'The righteous shall have hope in 
his death."' JOHNSON. "Yes, madam; that is, he shall not have 
despair. But, consider, his hope of salvation must be founded on 
the terms on which it is promised that the mediation of our 
SAVIOUR shall be applied to us,-namely, obedience; and where 
obedience has failed, then, as suppletory to it, repentance. But what 
man can say that his obedience has been such, as he would approve 
of in another, or even in himself upon close examination, or that his 
repentance has not been such as to require being repented of? No 
2Pierce, Religious Life, 37. My emphasis. 
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man can be sure that his obedience and repentance will obtain 
salvation.3 
One's refusal to conform to the conditions of the application of the 
atonement renders him subject to divine condemnation. Since in 
Johnson's understanding the inducement of morality is the motivation of 
the atonement, it is not surprising that the efficacy of the atonement is 
contingent on morality. In brief, Johnson's idea of the atonement is that 
the great salvific work changes the way men act, not the way they are. 
This concern coincides perfectly with Johnson's overriding interest in 
experiential religion. 
On his birthday in 1738 Johnson requested God "Create in [him] a clean 
heart, that [he] may worthily lament [his] sins, acknowledge [his] 
wickedness, and obtain Remission and forgiveness through the 
satisfaction of Jesus Christ."4 He requested that God grant his petitions 
"for the merits and through the mediation of our most holy and blessed 
Saviour." 
On April 10 of 1773, three-and-one-half decades later, Johnson prayed, 
"Almighty God, by whose mercy I am now about to commemorate the 
death of my Redeemer, grant that from this time I may so live as that his 
death may be efficacious to my eternal happiness."5 
In his controversial and final diary entry of December 5, 1784, he 
petitioned: 
Almighty and most merciful Father, I am now, as to human eyes 
it seems, about to commemorate for the last time, the death of thy 
son Jesus Christ, our Saviour and Redeemer. Grant, 0 Lord, that 
my whole hope and confidence may be in his merits and in thy 
mercy: forgive and accept my late conversion, enforce and accept 
my imperfect repentance; make this commemoration [of] him 
available to the confirmation of my Faith, the establishment of my 
3Boswell, Life, 394. See also Pierce, op. cit., 56. 
4Johnson, Diaries, Prayers, Annals, 38. 
Sibid., 155, 
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hope, and the enlargement of my charity, and make the death of 
thy son Jesus Christ effectual to my redemption .... 6 
Significantly, in each entry, one at the beginning and the others near the 
end of his adult life, Johnson understands the benefit of Christ's merits to 
be contingent on his own actions, either repentance or obedience. This 
experiential orientation to the atonement is a prime example of the 
pattern of Johnson's soteriology. 
In the sermons this conception of the atonement is more explicit. 
Johnson declares in Sermon 11 that the "high price" of redemption is "the 
precious blood of Christ," which accomplishes "the salvation of [our] 
souls."7 While this description conforms perfectly to both Roman 
Catholicism and the Reformation Faith, in the issue of the application of 
Christ's merits, Johnson's view is much narrower. 
In Sermon 6, for instance, he asserts that "the blood of Christ was 
poured out upon the cross to make [our] best endeavours acceptable to 
God,"8 and in Sermon 9 he asseverates, "The terms, upon which we are to 
hope for any benefits from the merits of Christ, are faith, repentance, and 
subsequent obedience."9 
Another declaration in Sermon 9 on communion clearly links the 
benefits of Chrisf s atonement to human obedience: 
For certainly nothing can be more dreadful than to live under the 
displeasure of God, in constant danger of appearing before him, 
while he is yet unappeased, and of losing the benefits of our 
redemption.10 
Johnson's patent conviction is that the appropriation of Chrisfs 
redemptive merits is contingent on conformity to the will of God and that 
such conformity appeases God's wrath. It is not Christ's death alone that 
6ibid., 417, 418. 
7ibid., [Sermon 11], Sermons, 117. 
Bibid. [Sermon 6], 72. 
9ibid. [Sermon 9], 104. 
lOibid., 103. 
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appeases God's wrath; man's obedience also plays a propitiatory role.11 
Johnson expressed himself categorically in Rambler 11012: 
In times and regions so disjoined from each other, that there can 
scarcely be imagined any communication of sentiments either by 
commerce or tradition, has prevailed a general and uniform 
expectation of propitiating God by corporal austerities, of 
anticipating his vengeance by voluntary afflictions, and by 
appeasing his justice by a speedy and cheerful submission to a less 
penalty when a greater is incurred. 
Man and Christ co-operate in propitiating the wrath of God: because 
man cannot hope to fulfill the insurmountable requirement of perfection, 
Christ died "to make [our] best endeavours acceptable to God"; man 
however is required to exert his "best endeavours" to appease God's 
wrath against man's sin. 
Charles Pierce underscores Johnson's last recorded comment to Boswell 
on Christ's atonement and deems it a significant revision in favor of a 
more propitiatory or expiatory view.13 Earlier (1773) Boswell records: 
I spoke of the satisfaction of Christ. He said that his notion was, 
that it did not atone for the sins of the world; but, by satisfying 
divine justice, by shewing that no less than the Son of God suffered 
for sin, it shewed to men and innumerable created beings, the 
heinousness of it, and therefore rendered it unnecessary for divine 
vengeance to be executed against sinners, as it otherwise must 
have been; that in this way it might operate even in favour of those 
who did not hear of it: as to those who did hear of it, the effect it 
should produce would be repentance and piety by impressing 
upon the mind a just notion of sin.14 
Boswell discloses that Johnson's explanation of the atonement "removed 
the notion of imputed righteousness in co-operating; whereas by this 
view, Christ has done already that he had to do, or is ever to do for 
11ibid. [Sermon 13], 144. 
12yaie edition, 222. 
13Pierce, op. cit., 156-159. 
14Boswell, Hebrides, 88. 
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mankind, by making his great satisfaction; the consequences of which will 
affect each individual according to the particular conduct of each."15 
In 1781, however, Boswell quoted Johnson as saying that 
"Whatever difficulty there may be in the conception of vicarious 
punishments, it is an opinion that has had possession of mankind in 
all ages. There is no nation that has not used the practice of 
sacrifices. Whoever, therefore, denies the propriety of vicarious 
punishments, holds an opinion which the sentiments and practice 
of mankind have contradicted, from the beginning of the world. 
The great sacrifice for the sins of mankind was offered at the death 
of the MESSIAH, who is called in Scripture, 'The Lamb of God, that 
taketh away the sins of the world.' To judge the reasonableness of 
the scheme of redemption, it must be considered as necessary to 
the government of the universe, that God should make known his 
perpetual and irreconcileable detestation of moral evil. He might 
indeed punish, and punish only the offenders; but as the end of 
punishment is not revenge of crimes, but propagation of virtue, it 
was more becoming the Divine clemency to find another manner 
of proceeding, less destructive to man, and at least equally 
powerful to promote goodness. The end of punishment is to 
reclaim and warn. That punishment will both reclaim and warn, 
which shews evidently such abhorrence of sin in God, as may deter 
us from it, or strike us with dread of vengeance when we have 
committed it. This is effected by vicarious punishment. Nothing 
could more testify the opposition between the nature of God and 
moral evil, or more amply display his justice, to men and angels, to 
all orders and successions of beings, that that is was necessary for 
the highest and purest nature, even for DIVINITY itself, to pacify 
the demands for vengeance, by a painful death; of which the 
natural effect will be, that when justice is appeased, there is a 
proper place for the exercise of mercy; and that such propitiation 
shall supply, in some degree, the imperfections of our obedience, 
and the inefficacy of our repentance: for obedience and repentance, 
such as we can perform, are still necessary. Our SAVIOUR has told 
us, that he did not come to destroy the law, but to fulfill; to fulfill 
the typical law, by the performance of what those types had 
foreshewn; and the moral law, by precepts of greater purity and 
higher exaltation."16 
Boswell continues citing: 
15ibid., 88, 89. 
16Boswell, Life, 482. 
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''The peculiar doctrine of Christianity is, that of an universal 
sacrifice, and perpetual propitiation. Other prophets only 
proclaimed the threatenings of God. CHRIST satisfied his justice."17 
James Gray justifiably concludes that the later "argument ... is not 
greatly different from that of the 1773 conversation .... "18 He may be less 
justified, however, in assuming that Johnson's view of the atonement is 
consistently classifiable as propitiatory. 
There is much evidence to support Nicholas Hudson's identification of 
Johnson's notion of the atonement with that of Hugo Grotius,19 whose 
early seventeenth-century treatise provided a compromise between the 
classic Reformation concept of penal substitution and the prevalent 
Socinian idea-which denied Christ's death as an atonement altogether.20 
Grotius (like Johnson) did in fact speak of Chrisfs death as a satisfaction, 
but its nature was not nearly so significant as its goal: 
17ibid. 
God is the supreme rector of the world. To punish or liberate 
from punishment belongs essentially to this relationship. Not so if 
God is conceived as a judge [as in the historic Protestant view]. A 
judge administers the law; he cannot go against it to free the guilty 
from its punishment or to transfer the guilt to another. The guilty 
one must himself bear what the law decrees. If God were chiefly 
lawgiver, then a law attached to a certain crime must be carried out 
without relaxation. But God is chiefly ruler, whose concern is not 
the mere self-vindication of the law but the general good. As ruler, 
then, God can either abrogate or alter his law. Socinus had opted 
for the former alternative and so eliminated from his concept of 
God any regard for justice. Grotius takes the second alternative. 
God alters the law; for the commendable reasons of his own glory 
and man's salvation he toned it down .... 
... . Chapter four of [Grotius'] Defensio deals with the issue of 
punishment at length. His main conclusion is that it is required in 
the interests of government... This gives him justification for his 
declaration that "all punishment presupposes some common 
good-the conservation and example of order." 
18Gray, Johnson's Sermons, 82. 
19tfudson,"Johnson, Socinianism, and the Meaning of Christ's Sacrifice," 240. 
2°McDonald, Atonement, 196, 197. 
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Grotius ... presents Christ's work as a sacrifice of satisfaction to the 
necessities of the relaxed law. He accepts Socinus' criticism of the 
penal doctrine of Christ's sufferings as an exact equivalent for the 
divine penalty of sin. Since, however, the law is toned down, the 
idea that punishment need not correspond exactly to the 
transgression follows.21 
This concept of a "relaxed law" as a correlate of the atonement is echoed 
in Johnson's statement to Mrs. Knowles: one's "hope of salvation must be. 
founded on the terms on which it is promised that the mediation of our 
SAVIOUR shall be applied to us,-namely, obedience; and where 
obedience has failed, then, as suppletory to it, repentance."22 Christ does 
not penally substitute on the cross, bearing the full wrath of the Father for 
the sins of mankind. Rather, God as the moral Governor of the universe 
suspends his own law to provide salvation: the atonement is a 
demonstration of God's just government. 
The notion of the atonement as having the maintenance of God's order 
as its ultimate concern shifts attention from Christ's sufficient satisfaction 
for actual sins to the possible moral benefit to mankind. In fact, "Grotius 
does not see the death of Christ as itself an atonement for sin."23 Rather, it 
is well calculated by the Father to serve the ends of his just governance of 
the universe by serving as an example of the hideous consequences of the 
subversion of that government.24 Regard for justice therefore is 
subordinated to regard for sound universal government, the "common 
good." Similarly, justice is subordinated to the propitious effects the 
atonement will secure for the individual in his daily conduct. 
Hudson dissents from Maurice Quinlan's opinion (later adopted in large 
part by Charles Pierce) that Johnson's view of Christ's atonement was 
shaped by the "exemplary" (as opposed to "propitiatory") understanding 
of the atonement found in William Law's A Serious Call to a Devout and 
Holy Life and later modified to the substitutionary interpretation under the 
influence of Samuel Clarke's A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable 
21ibid., 203-205. 
22aoswell, op. cit., 394. 
23McDonald, op. cit., 206. 
24ibid. 
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Obligations of Natural Religion.25 Hudson suggests that Johnson embraces 
the governmental or rectoral theory of the atonement which recognizes 
propitiatory elements of Christ's death without surrendering the concept 
of the "notion of the purpose of punishment,"26 as the propitiatory 
theory as then expressed assertedly had. Johnson, in Hudson's opinion, 
holds the synthetic view first propagated by Grotius and transmitted to 
Johnson by Richard Fiddes' The Body of Divinity, "a work owned and 
consulted by Johnson."27 In short, according to Hudson, Johnson's view is 
both rectoral and substitutionary.28 Similarly, James Gray's theory differs 
from Quinlan's that Johnson revised his view of the atonement later in life 
and asserts instead that Johnson never deviated from belief in a 
propitiatory conception of the atonement.29 
A clue to the alleged alteration in the later Johnson to which Quinlan 
alludes as well as the consistency between the views of the earlier and 
later Johnson lay in Pierce's comment that in the later, expiatory concept 
that Johnson adopts "Christ's death had at least partially atoned for man's 
sins."30 This partial admission of the expiatory work of Christ on the 
cross differs from the earlier "exemplary" view only in degree, not in 
kind. Failure to recognize the truly basic similarity of Johnson's earlier and 
later views contributes to Hudson's and Gray's flawed thesis that Johnson 
never deviates from a substitutionary conception of the atonement, for 
neither the "exemplary" (the supposed earlier) concept nor the 
"government/ rectoral" (the supposed later) concept can be classified as 
truly propitiatory or substitutionary. 
For example, Hudson, it appears, is convinced Johnson never deviates 
from substitutionism merely because Johnson always believes (and never 
25ttudson,"Johnson, Socinianism, and the Meaning of Christ's Sacrifice," passim. For the 
influence of Clarke's theology on Johnson's view of the atonement and other theological tenets, 
see Gray, op. cit., 65-92. 
26ttudson, op. cit., 240. 
27ibid. 
28Quinlan too insists that Johnson, "during most of his adult life ... favored the interpretation that 
the Atonement was in the nature of a penal and and an exemplary sacrifice," Quinlan, op. cit., 
51. 
29Gray, op. cit., 86. 
30pierce, op. cit., 158. Emphasis in original. 
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repudiates, in spite of his possible late altered understanding) that the 
atonement satisfied the justice of God. What Hudson apparently fails to 
recognize, however, is that the exclusive and defining characteristic of the 
substitutionary theory of the atonement is not its result but its means. 
As H.D. McDonald has observed,31 the theological school whose views 
have historically been associated with the definition of the atonement as 
the satisfaction of justice is that of the Protestant Reformers-Luther, 
Calvin, Melanchthon, Zwingli, and their heirs. This Reformation 
conception of the atonement is entirely at odds with the sort of exemplary 
view later affirmed by Johnson and the latitudinarians. 
For Luther it was the demands of the law that must be satisfied if Christ 
was to make effective atonement. 
Christ is personally innocent. Personally, he did not deserve to be 
hanged for any crime of His own doing. But because Christ took 
the place of others who were sinners, He was hanged like any 
other transgressor. The Law of Moses leaves no loopholes. It says 
that a trangressor should be hanged. Who are the other sinners? 
We are. The sentence of death and everlasting damnation had long 
been pronounced over us. But Christ took all our sins and died for 
them on the cross .... All the prophets of old said that Christ should 
be the greatest transgressor, murderer, adulterer, thief, 
blasphemer that ever was or could be on earth. When he took the 
sins of the whole world upon Himself, Christ was no longer an 
innocent person. He was a sinner burdened with the sins of a Paul 
who was a blasphemer; burdened with the sins of a Peter who 
denied Christ; burdened with the sins of a David who committed 
adultery and murder, and gave the heathen occasion to laugh at 
the Lord. In short, Christ was charged with the sins of all men, that 
he should pay for them with his own blood. The curse struck him. 
The Law found him among sinners. He was not only in the 
company of sinners. He had gone so far as to invest Himself with 
the flesh and blood of sinners. So the Law judged and hanged him 
for a sinner. 
In separating Christ from us sinners and holding him up as a holy 
exemplar [as the Papists do], errorists rob us of our best comfort. 
31McDonald, Atonement,181. 
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They misrepresent Him as a threatening tyrant ready to slaughter 
us at the slightest provocation. 32 
It is significant that, in espousing substitutionism, Luther defines the 
nature of the divine justice satisfied by Christ's atonement as penal-
mankind violated the law whose penalty must be satisfied; in his 
atonement Christ bore that penalty in the stead of the offenders who 
rightly deserved it. Luther inveighs against the Roman Catholics who-
like their Anglican Restorationist successors and Johnson-diminish the 
absolute quality of penal substitution in favor of the exemplary view. 
Luther sees that their denial of the satisfaction of legal demands renders 
sinful humanity liable to suffer the penalty. That is, if Christ has not 
suffered the penalty of the law, we sinners must. 
Likewise, Calvin avers 
Now, there is no room for reconciliation without a previous 
offense. The sense [of Rom. 5:10, 11] therefore is, that God, to 
whom our sins had rendered us odious, has been appeased by the 
death of his Son, so as to be propitious to us .... Now we know 
what Moses frequently says-that an atonement shall be made for 
sin, and it shall be forgiven. In short, the ancient figures give us a 
fine exhibition of the power and efficacy of the death of Christ .... 
we too much undervalue the death of Christ, unless we attribute to 
his sacrifice an expiatory, placatory, and satisfactory efficacy .... it 
would be unnecessary, and consequently absurd, for Christ to be 
loaded with a curse [Gal. 3:13], except in order to discharge the 
debts due from others, and thereby to obtain a righteousness for 
them."33 
Calvin proceeds to articulate and defend penal satisfaction-the idea that 
Christ not only perfectly conformed his life to the law but also that he 
bore its penalty in our stead. In thus atoning he fully merited for us what 
we could not. 
We are justified or acquitted before God, because [Christ's] blood 
is a complete satisfaction for us .... hence we conclude, that we must 
seek from Christ what the law would confer upon any one who 
32Luther, Galatians, 116, 117. Luther's last sentence seems eerily to foreshadow the scruples ~d 
anxieties Johnson's soteriology produced. 
33calvin, Institutes, II:xvii:iii, iv. 
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fulfilled it; or, which is the same, that we obtain by the grace of 
Christ what God promised in the law to our works .... Hence [we 
have] that imputation of righteousness without works, of which 
Paul treats [Rom. 4:5]; because that righteousness which is found in 
Christ alone is accepted as ours. 34 
The continental Reformational view of penal substitution therefore 
stands somewhat in contradistinction to the "exemplary" view. For 
Johnson the expiation cannot be penal because it only "supplies our lack 
of obedience and repentance: such propitiation shall supply, in some 
degree, the imperfections of our obedience, and the inefficacy of our 
repentance: for obedience and repentance, such as we can perform, are 
still necessary." For Luther and Calvin, on the other hand, Chrisfs 
obedience alone is "accepted as ours," for there is nothing wanting in 
Chrisfs impeccable conformity to the law. 
In short, Christ does not simply supply our lack of obedience and 
repentance as in the Johnsonian conception; his entire obedience in life and 
death is credited to us. For this reason Calvin in the citation above and 
elsewhere insists with the other Reformers on "imputation of 
righteousness without works"; Johnson naturally finds it necessary to 
predicate the application of Christ's merits to us on obedience because, in 
his understanding, Christ did not penally substitute; he only satisfied for 
the specific areas of our lack of conformity to the law. The Reformers can 
insist on justification by faith alone precisely because they conceive of 
Christ as securing not merely propitiation for the sinners' lack of 
conformity to the law but the rewards of entire obedience to the law. 
The relation between one's ideas of atonement and justification is direct: 
if atonement secures penal satisfaction as in the Reformers' conception, 
justification is appropriated by faith alone (since Chrisfs perfect obedience 
is credited to one's account and there are therefore no works wanting); if 
atonement secures only propitiation for the lack of perfect conformity to 
the law and repentance on the part of man as in the latitudinarian and 
Johnsonian conception, justification is appropriated by both faith and 
34ibid. 
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works (since God did not intend for Christ's perfect obedience to be 
applied to the sinner's account in lieu of the latter's obedience). 
The misunderstanding of the vicarious atonement is particularly obvious 
in Hudson's explanation of the influences of Law's satisfaction views on 
Johnson's. In A Serious Call, Law contends: 
Thus was the Cross of Christ, in St. Paul's days, the glory of 
Christians; not as it signified their not being ashamed to own a 
Master that was crucified, but as it signified their glorying in a 
religion which was nothing else but a doctrine of the Cross, that 
called them to the same suffering spirit, the same sacrifice of 
themselves, the same renunciation of the world, the same humility 
and meekness, the same patient bearing of injuries, reproaches and 
contempts, and the same dying to all the greatness, honors, and 
happiness of the world, which Christ showed upon the Cross.35 
Law proceeds to explain in what sense the atonement may be 
understood to save: 
To have a true idea of Christianity, we must not consider our 
Blessed Lord as suffering in our stead, but as our Representative, 
acting in our name, and with such particular merit, as to make our 
joining with him acceptable unto God. 
He suffered, and was a Sacrifice, to make our sufferings and 
sacrifice of ourselves fit to be received by God. And we are to 
suffer, to be crucified, to die, and rise with Christ; or else his 
Crucifixion, Death, and Resurrection, will profit us nothing.36 
Plainly the dimension of Christ's suffering as providing an example for 
our own differs from Johnson's conception of the atonement as an 
example for the purpose of just government, but the idea that the 
appropriation of Christ's death is contingent on our sacrificial efforts 
mirrors in fact Johnson's idea that the contingency is man's obedience and, 
repentance. 
35Law, Serious Call, 197. 
36ibid. 
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Of Law's idea and its apparent influence on Johnson, Hudson correctly 
suggests, "[Law's] primary concern was that Christians do not believe 
that this satisfaction renders their own endeavors unnecessary."37 
Johnson said as much in Sermon 28, the famous sermon written for the 
incarcerated William Dodd. After showing how comforting the exercise of 
faith is to the weary sinner, Johnson warns: 
Yet let us likewise be careful, lest an erroneous opinion of the all-
sufficiency of Christ's merits lull us into carelessness and security. 
His merits are indeed self-sufficient! But he has prescribed the 
terms on which they are to operate. He died to save sinners, but to 
save only those sinners that repent.38 
The concern is existential and moralistic-not the definitive abrogation 
of inherent sin, but the example Christians may follow to procure eternal 
life. Hudson believes Law and Johnson preserve the doctrine of 
satisfaction in that both recognize "that Christ's death served to render 
our endeavors acceptable and our sins pardonable in the judgement [sic] 
of God."39 Yet neither Law nor Johnson depict Christ as bearing the exact 
or an equivalent penalty for man's sins, an indispensable ingredient of the 
satisfaction theory. 
It is difficult, in the first place, to understand how Johnson's 1773 
statement could be construed as affirming a substitutionary view of the 
atonement when Boswell quotes him as plainly saying he does not. 
Johnson stated: 
I spoke of the satisfaction of Christ. He said that his notion was, 
that it did not atone for the sins of the world; but, by satisfying 
divine justice, by shewing that no less than the Son of God suffered 
for sin, it shewed to men and innumerable created beings, the 
heinousness of it, and therefore rendered it unnecessary for divine 
vengeance to be executed against sinners, as it otherwise must 
have been; that in this way it might operate even in favour of those 
who did not hear of it: as to those who did hear of it, the effect it 
37Hudson, op. cit., 239. 
38Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 28], 304. 
39ibid. 
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should produce would be repentance and piety by impressing 
upon the mind a just notion of sin.40 
Hudson avers that Johnson's is "a distinctive understanding of this 
doctrine which, as was typical of so much eigh~eenth-century theology, 
emphasized the moral importance of the sacrifice."41 He is convinced that 
Johnson's admission in 1773 that God's justice was satisfied in Chrisfs 
atonement proves Johnson affirmed substitutionism. But the question is 
not, ''Did Christ satisfy God's justice?" It is, rather, "What is the nature of 
the justice it satisfied?" Divine justice can be-and has been-variously 
construed. Johnson, in fact, seems to construe God's justice as being 
satisfied by his "mak[ing] known his perpetual and irreconcileable 
detestation of moral evil," a matter altogether different from the historic 
Protestant conception of substitution and propitiation. 
There are, in fact, any number of explanations of the nature of the divine 
justice satisfied by Chrisf s atonement. The classical expression of 
substitutionary atonement, however, issues from the Reformation 
tradition, and it decidedly insists on the nature of the justice satisfied: it is 
penal satisfaction. It is this view that Johnson and the Anglican 
latitudinarians42 significantly adjust. 
Hudson concedes as much when he cites Isaac Barrow's opinion as an 
instance of the "exemplary" view and subsequently remarks, 
... the sacrifice was 'exemplary' so far as it was intended to 
promote virtue. This idea was formulated not only as the result of 
the century's preoccupation with Christianity's ethical role, but in 
order to vindicate the attributes of God from what were considered 
to be the implications of a purely 'propitiatory' sacrifice.43 
This latter view of the propitiatory sacrifice of the atonement was none 
other than the historic Protestant view of the vicarious atonement. 
40J3oswell, Hebrides, 88. 
41 Hudson, Eighteenth-Century Thought, 239. 
42ibid., 207, 208. 
43ttudson, "Johnson, Sodnianism, and the Meaning of Christ's Sacrifice," 240. 
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What requires further examination in Hudson's analysis is his statement 
that the latitudinarian and Johnsonian "exemplary" view was a favorable· 
appendage and needed corrective to the idea of a "purely 'propitiatory' 
sacrifice," as though one could concurrently insist on the exemplary and 
the propitiatory views. The exemplary view as expressed by Johnson and 
the latitudinarian divines, however, is, as noted above, a significant 
revision of the historic Protestant propitiatory idea. 
That Johnson shows little support for the Protestant propitiatory 
theory is demonstrated in a striking statement in Sermon 13. In warning 
of the error of equating external religious duties with authentic holiness, 
Johnson remarks, 
The religion of the Jews, from the time of Moses, comprized a 
great number of burdensome ceremonies, required by God for 
reasons which perhaps human wisdom has never fully discovered. 
Of these ceremonies, however, some were typically representative 
of the Christian institution, and some, by keeping them distinct, by 
dissimilitude of customs from the nations that surrounded them, 
had a tendency to secure them from the influence of ill example, 
and preserve them from the contagion of idolatry. 
To the use of such observances, thus important, they were 
confined by the strongest obligations. They were indeed external 
acts, but they were instituted by divine authority; they were not to 
be considered merely as instrumental and expedient, as means 
which might be omitted, if their ends were secured: they were 
positively enjoined by the supreme legislator, and were not left to 
choice or discretion, or secular laws; to the will of the powerful, or 
the judgement of the prudent. 
Yet even these sacred rites might be punctually performed, 
without making the performer acceptable to God; the blood of 
bulls and of goats might be poured out in vain, if the desires were 
not regulated, or the passions subdued. The sacrifices of the 
oppressour, or extortioner, were not an atonement, but an 
abomination. Forgiveness was obtained, not by incense, but by 
repentance; the offender was required to rend his heart, and not his 
garment: a contrite and a broken heart was the oblation which the 
supreme Judge did not despise. 
So much was the moral law exalted above all ceremonial 
institutions, even in that dispensation by which so many 
ceremonies were commanded, that those two parts of duty were 
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distinguished by the appellations of body and spirit. As the body, 
separated from the spirit, is a mass lifeless, motionless and useless; 
so the external practices of ritual observances was ineffectual and 
vain, an action without a meaning, a labour by which nothing was 
produced .... 44 
Johnson does not recognize the rich typical significance of the sacrificial 
ceremonies of the Jewish covenant because propitiation, the prime goal of 
the sacrifices (Lev. 17:11), is not a dominant factor in his soteriology. He 
therefore must express puzzlement at the plethora of ceremonies 
"representative of the Christian institution" with the proviso that they are 
valid if for no other reason than that God required them. Johnson 
presents no reasons for God's requiring them because their significance is 
clearly propitiatory; and just government of the universe, not 
propitiation, is the guiding principle of Johnson's theory of atonement. 
Johnson's opinion that the moral law was greatly "exalted above" the 
ceremonial institution of the Old Covenant is perfectly consistent with his 
proclivity to overshadow Christ's atonement in the present dispensation 
by human morality. 
He is quick to seize upon Jehovah's warnings to Israel for the 
performance of external ceremonies with a concomitant sinful disposition 
because they seem to reinforce a critical feature of Johnson's view of the 
atonement-it was effected mainly to influence morality, not to propitiate· 
divine wrath kindled by mankind's violation of divine law. 
For Johnson, just as the sacrificial ceremonies were necessary but 
meaningless without the morality of the worshippers, so the "external 
practice" of Christ's death is "ineffectual and vain, an action without a 
meaning, a labour by which nothing [is] produced" if "the desires [are] 
not regulated, or the passions subdued." That is, the sacrifice is ineffectual 
of itself. Only when accompanied by moral regulation is it meaningful. This 
conception of sacrifice can scarcely accommodate the propitiatory view of 
the atonement according to which, apart from any human act or 
44Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 13], 139, 140. 
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disposition whatsoever, Christ bore the penalty of the sins of mankind 
and so appeased God's wrath. 
To be sure, Protestants espousing penal substitution insist as heartily as 
their moralistic colleagues (and the latitudinarians and Johnson who 
followed them) on the necessity of good works and repentance, but these 
virtues in the Protestant scheme fall within the province of sanctification, 
not justification. In the words of Calvin, 
Why, then, are we justified by faith? Because by faith we 
apprehend the righteousness of Christ, which is the only medium 
of our reconciliation to God. But this [justification] you cannot 
attain, without at the same time attaining to sanctification .... Christ 
therefore justifies no one whom he does not also sanctify. For these 
benefits are perpetually and indissolubly connected, so that whom 
he illuminates with his wisdom, them he redeems; whom he 
redeems, he justifies; whom he justifies, he sanctifies .... Since, then, 
the Lord affords us the enjoyment of these blessings only in the 
bestowment of himself, he gives them [justification and 
sanctification] both together, and never one without the other. 
Thus we see how true it is that we are justified, not without works, 
yet not by works; since union with Christ, by which we are 
justified, contains sanctification as well as righteousness. 45 
When, in the 1773 statement, Johnson concludes that divine vengeance 
was unnecessary against sinners in that the atonement demonstrated 
God's aversion to sin, he denies substitution, just as he states at the outset 
of that dictation. The Protestant view of substitution is not that God may 
pardon sinners in that in requiring Christ's sacrifice he has publicly 
demonstrated his aversion to sin, but in that Christ has suffered their 
exact or an equivalent penalty in their stead. 
Johnson did not, then, support the historic idea of atonement as the 
satisfaction of God's justice, for in the Protestant conception God's justice 
is deemed satisfied only by perfect conformity to the law or payment of 
the penalty for violating that law. According to the historical Reformation 
view, Christ did both: he bore the penalty for man's disobedience in 
4Scalvin, op. cit., III:xvi:i. 
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man's stead, and his impeccable conformity to the law is credited to the 
sinner's account when the latter exercises faith in Christ. 
While Hudson holds that Johnson never deviates from an acceptance of 
substitution, Quinlan46 and Pierce47 believe the 1781 summary Johnson 
dictates to Boswell "reveals," in the words of Quinlan, "an important 
change."48 
Quinlan elaborates: 
Johnson no longer believes that it is man alone who must make 
propitiation for his sins. Christ by his universal sacrifice has made a 
perpetual propitiation. And this propitiation supplies the 
imperfections of man's obedience and repentance. True, Johnson 
qualifies the [later) statement by saying that Christ makes up for 
man's inadequacy "in some degree," a qualification that implies, as 
we have indicated, a shift in emphasis rather than a complete 
reversal of opinion. Nevertheless, by 1781 his idea of the 
Atonement had clearly altered and the former view that it served 
chiefly as an exemplary act is no longer predominant. Instead, he 
has now arrived at the more generally held Christian belief that the 
death on the Cross was truly an expiatory sacrifice.49 
On the premise that sermons 6 and 21 were written relatively late in 
Johnson's life, Quinlan argues further that, "in what may be deemed late 
sermons, those probably composed in the last ten years of his life, 
Johnson makes several specific allusions to the sacrifice as a vicarious 
act."50 
This assumption, offered as evidence of Quinlan's conclusions both that · 
Johnson's "1781 ... idea of the Atonement had clearly altered" his earlier 
view and that his revised view "arrived at the more generally held 
Christian belief that the death on the Cross was truly an expiatory 
sacrifice," is dubious. The fact that Johnson spoke more freely of the 
46Quinlan, op. cit., 55. 
47Pierce, op. cit., 157. 
48Quinlan, loc. cit. 
49ibid., 55, 56. 
SOQuinlan, op. cit., 97. 
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atonement as a sacrifice later in his life is not evidence that he changed his 
view to one more correctly classified as expiatory. 
First, despite Quinlan's recognition of Johnson's qualification in the later 
statement, Johnson's conception of vicarious punishment is incongruous 
with the name. Johnson declares that God "might indeed punish, and 
punish only the offenders." The key phrase which follows is, "the end of 
punishment is not revenge of crimes, but propagation of virtue." 
Johnson belies his insistence on a vicarious view of the atonement. In the 
Protestant satisfaction conception, "revenge of crimes" is precisely the 
"end of punishment." 
Johnson asserts that the atonement was necessary to display so publicly 
"such abhorrence of sin in God, as may deter us from it, or strike us with 
dread of vengeance when we have committed it." This, Johnson states, 
would not be accomplished were God merely to punish the offenders. 
However, by allowing his Son, very God in the flesh, publicly to suffer 
and appease divine justice, he has demonstrated his repulsion toward sin. 
Johnson seems therefore to tum attention away from the nature of the 
penalty Christ suffered on our behalf and instead stress, as in his earlier 
statement, the demonstrative effects of atonement on humanity. 
He says much in 1781 what he does in 1773: "the effect it [the 
atonement] should produce would be repentance and piety by impressing 
upon the mind a just notion of sin."51 The fact that in 1781 Johnson 
employs the terminology of substitution is no evidence he either alters his 
exemplary view or appends to it vicarious substitution. 
In the 1773 statement, Johnson explicitly states the grounds on which he 
believes God may justly forgive sins for Christ's sake: "by shewing that 
no less than the Son of God suffered for sin, [the atonement] shewed to 
men and innumerable created beings, the heinousness of it, and therefore 
rendered it unnecessary for divine vengeance to be executed against 
sinners, as it otherwise must have been." Similarly, in the 1781 dictation, 
51Boswell, op. cit., 482. 
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Johnson reveals that all men need not suffer the penalty of sin in that the 
death of "DIVINITY itself" evinces God's utter detestation of sin. 
The introduction of the idea of the satisfaction of divine justice cannot be 
construed to imply penal substitution, for Johnson in the very context 
refers to Christ's conformity to the law, but not, as in the Protestant 
conception, as the bearer of its penalty on the cross, but, rather, in typical 
Johnsonian fashion, as an example for the redeemed to follow. Law holds 
that "[Christ] suffered, and was a Sacrifice, to make our sufferings and 
sacrifice of ourselves fit to be received by God. And we are to suffer, to be 
crucified, to die, and rise with Christ; or else his Crucifixion, Death, and 
Resurrection, will profit us nothing."52 This "weakened conception of 
satisfaction," in the words of Hudson, is attributable to the fear "that too 
heavy an emphasis on the satisfaction would delude men into believing 
that continued obedience to the moral law had been rendered 
unnecessary by the crucifixion."53 
Second, in arguing that Chrisr s death does not emancipate man from 
his obligations of obedience and repentance, he betrays his retention of 
the "exemplary" theory. As noted above, affirmation of the necessity of 
good works is a crucial feature of the Reformation view, but Johnson's 
"exemplary" view suspends the application of Chrisfs merits on good 
works, a belief the early Protestants deplored. They held that good works 
were the province of sanctification, not justification. 
Justification, then, according to the Church of Rome, includes or 
comprehends not only the remission of sin, or deliverance from 
guilt, but also the sanctification or renovation of man's moral 
nature, or deliverance from depravity. In short, they [Roman 
Catholics] comprehend under the one name or head of justification, 
what Protestants-following, as they believe, the guidance of 
Scripture-have always divided into the two heads of justification 
and regeneration, or justification and sanctification, when the word 
sanctification is used in its widest sense, as descriptive of the whole 
process, originating in regeneration, by which defraved men are 
restored to a conformity to God's moral image.5 
52Law, loc. cit. 
53ttudson, Eighteenth-Century Thought, 207. 
54cunningham, Historical Theology, 2:14 
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In Johnson's soteriological scheme, however, these works of 
sanctification are an aspect of the ground or basis of justification, which 
Calvin and the other Reformers believe is appropriated by faith alone. 
Johnson's earlier view, according to Boswell, "removed the notion of 
imputed righteousness ... "; we have no reason to suppose from the 1781 
dictation that Johnson reintroduced it. 
Not only in the later statement to Boswell but also in the supposed later 
sermons, Johnson suspends the application of Christ's merits on "our best 
endeavors."55 This is no deviation from his earlier view expressed in the 
1778 remark to Mrs. Knowles that, "hope of salvation must be founded 
on the terms on which it is promised that the mediation of our SAVIOUR 
shall be applied to us,-namely, obedience; and where obedience has 
failed, then, as suppletory to it, repentance."56 Hence, Quinlan's belief that 
"Johnson's interpretation of this doctrine [the atonement] had changed by 
1777"57 does not seem supported by the evidence. 
Third, to say that Johnson's later view of the atonement mirrors "the 
more generally held Christian belief that the death on the Cross was truly 
an expiatory sacrifice" is accurate only if it is understood to exclude the 
concept of expiation as posited by historic Protestantism. Yet it seems it is · 
this very view Quinlan supposes Johnson was close to embracing in 1781. 
To the contrary, his emphasis on expiation and vicarious punishment in 
the latter explication of his views accords with his earlier view that the 
atonement 11satisfied divine justice" and served as a demonstration of 
God's hatred of sin but retained his estimate that Christ's atonement was 
not penal in the sense that Christ did not bear the equivalent of the full 
penalty due to those who violate God's law. If, according to Quinlan, 
Easter Sunday, 1776 "appears to mark a climax in the development of 
Johnson's belief in the propitiatory nature of [Christ's] sacrifice,"58 we 
55Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 9), 104. 
56Boswell, op. cit., 394. 
57 Quinlan, op. cit., 100. 
5Bibid., 59. 
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may be certain he never sanctioned the historic Protestant penal 
satisfaction theory. 
In his view of the atonement Johnson remains true to his general 
soteriological emphasis on the experiential rather than the judicial. The 
atonement, even if satisfying God's justice, is calculated not to wipe away 
judicially the necessity of good works to obtain justification as it does in 
the Protestant view. Rather, it is designed as in Grotius' view, to instill in 
mankind a horror for sin dreadfully dealt with by God in Christ at the 
cross and supply the lack of good works and of repentance which are the 
means of appropriating justification. 
Johnson, like the latitudinarian divines, demurred from the judicialism of 
Reformation soteriology in that, in the latter's assessment, only on the 
grounds of Christ's penal substitution on the cross could the Father justly 
declare sinners guiltless. In contradistinction to Johnson, their concerns 
were not primarily experiential-the effects of the atonement on 
mankind. Rather, they were judicial-maintenance of justice. Only 
afterward, i.e., after justice was served, was God free to address the 
experiential: the justification by grace through the instrumentality of faith 
alone of those whose salvation was secured by the judicial satisfaction of 
Christ. 
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Chapter 4: 
REPENTANCE 
... every hour, in which repentance is delayed, produces something new to be 
repented of. 
Samuel Johnson 
from Sermon 2 
Since Johnson believes repentance throughout one's life is an instrument 
and condition of salvation, it is an indispensable dimension of his 
soteriology. He states: "Salvation is promised to us Christians, on the 
terms of faith, obedience, and repentance."1 Johnson's view of repentance 
coheres with his other soteriological convictions: it is predominantly 
experiential and anthropocentric. 
Hudson recognizes the unique eighteenth-century matrix influencing 
Anglican views of repentance: "On the issue of repentance, as on many 
others, any neat division between 'Catholic' and 'Protestanf doctrines was 
breaking down. It is difficult to examine Johnson's thought according to 
this traditional division because his beliefs addressed modern issues and 
problems quite different from those which faced theologians of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries."2 
Quinlan and Hudson concur on "Johnson's acceptance of both contrition 
and attrition,"3 the former being the belief that repentance consists chiefly, 
in fear of reprobation, and the latter the belief it consists in amendment of 
life as a result of hatred of sin itself and faith in God's promise to pardon 
the penitent. It is clear that Johnson embraced not merely contrition, as 
Pierce concludes: "Johnson believed that it is not enough for man to feel 
sorrow for such sin; for repentance to be genuine it must result in 
discernable reformation."4 What is soteriologically crucial about Johnson's 
view of repentance, however, is his insistence on both contrition and 
1 Johnson [Sermon 28], Sermons, 303. An expanded version of this sentiment is found in Boswell, 
Life, 394. 
2Hudson, Eighteenth-Century Thought, 214, 215. 
3ibid., 213, 214. See also Quinlan, Layman's Religion, 67. 
4Pierce, Religious Life, 81. 
attrition when wedded to his belief in their saving efficacy. It should be 
recalled that while the Thirty-Nine Articles specified faith alone as the 
instrument by which the merits of Christ are procured (Article XI), 
Johnson appends obedience and repentance as conditions of justification. 
Rambler 110 discloses Johnson's general ideas regarding repentance. He 
frankly associates it with "propitiation and atonement."5 He seems to 
justify the Christian idea of repentance principally on historical and 
experiential grounds: 
In times and regions so disjoined from each other, that there can 
scarcely be imagined any communication of sentiments either by 
commerce or tradition, has prevailed a general and uniform 
expectation of propitiating God by corporal austerities, of 
anticipating his vengeance by voluntary afflictions, and by 
appeasing his justice by a speedy and cheerful submission to a less 
penalty when a greater is incurred. 
Incorporated minds will always feel some inclination towards 
exterior acts, and ritual observances.6 
Johnson seems obviously to have in mind the Roman Catholic idea of 
repentance, or "penance" as the Greek metanoia is translated in the Douai 
Version.7It introduces a subtle but clear shift away from the etymological 
denotation of repentance as individual feeling of contrition to specific 
external acts of self-abasement. More significantly, Trent includes 
satisfaction for sins as an aspect of the role of penance,8 a view Johnson 
plainly shares. 
By affirming both contrition and attrition, Johnson loses the solace each 
affords. The attrition of Romanism stresses the motive of repentance as 
the fear of damnation but is not accompanied by any doctrine of the 
inevitable sanctification of the believer.9 Conversely, the contrition of 
Protestantism lays no importance on fear of damnation but accents hatred 
SJohnson, Yale Edition, 221. 
6ibid., 222. 
7Grogan, "Repentance," 837. 
8Norman, "Penance; Penitence," 762. 
9Berkhof, History, 213-216. 
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for the transgression that offends God and determination of reformation, 
regarded as inevitable in believers.10 Johnson weds the Roman Catholic 
fear of damnation over specific sins to the Protestant fear of damnation 
over lack of reformation. Papists are assured they are saved if they 
remain within the fold of the visible church; Protestants see reformation 
issuing from the operation of the Holy Spirit as the index of salvation. By 
stressing attrition alone, Johnson could have left room for union with the 
church and its stipulations of satisfaction as the source of salvific 
confidence apart from any anxiety over the Protestant idea of inevitable 
sanctification, or "growth in grace." By stressing contrition alone, he could 
have avoided the internal scourging attrition entails while positively 
accenting spiritual reformation. By stressing both, however, Johnson can 
scarcely avoid spiritual vexation. 
Surveying the origin and course of repentance, Johnson asserts that 
man's "reasonable diffidence" in assuring himself of the efficacy of his 
repentance has conduced to the "desire to ascertain by some outward 
marks the state of the soul" which has led to two unfortunate results: on 
the one hand, a proliferation of rules and scruples that vex "tender and 
flexible minds" and, second, an utter abandonment of repentance on the 
part of those who recognize the excessiveness of these scruples and, often, 
the fraud with which their subscription is accompanied.11 Johnson 
contends that repentance is nonetheless "easily understood"; it "is the 
relinquishment of any practice, from the conviction that it has offended 
God." 
In sermon 2 Johnson enunciates the necessity of prompt and genuine 
repentance, on which individual salvation is contingent. That for Johnson -
repentance is soteriologically related and a requisite to salvation is clear. In 
I 
insisting that delinquency in full restitution for sins and ills committed is 
incompatible with genuine repentance, Johnson remarks: 
10aromiley, Historical Theology, 229-239. 
11Johnson, op. cit., 222, 223. 
85 
Restitution must be made to those who have been wronged, and 
whatever he [the offender] with-holds from them, he with-holds at 
the hazard of eternal happiness.12 
"Eternal punishments" await the sinful who defer or neglect 
reformation, which is "the chief and essential part of repentance."13 To 
Johnson, repentance generates reconciliation with God,14 and he who 
does not repent is "debarred from eternal felicity."15 As much, therefore, 
as Johnson prefers "horizontal" religion and disdains a form of 
Christianity oblivious to the domestic and social obligations of this life,16 
in the elucidation of his views of repentance he espouses the traditional 
orthodox tenet17 that repentance has grave implications not principally 
for this life but rather for the next. 
Johnson is intent to distinguish true from false repentance, complaining 
that the former "has been misrepresented by the weakness of 
superstition, or the artifices of interest."18 He enumerates three prime 
examples of misrepresentations or artifices of true repentance. 
First, some hold that repentance consists of "outward expressions of 
sorrow for sin, ... tears and sighs, ... [ and] dejection and lamentation."19 Yet, 
according to Johnson, these are "variable and uncertain tokens, as 
proceed more from the constitution of the body than the disposition of 
the mind,"20 and are consequently no certain sign of repentance. He 
inserts parenthetically that while the public repentance that so frequently 
embodies emotional sorrow is sometimes necessary, particularly "where 
the crime is public," such public confessions "are necessary only, for the 
sake of destroying the influence of a bad example, and are no otherwise 
essential to this duty [i.e., repentance]."21 Johnson, in fact, warns that 
12;bid. [Sermon 2), Sermons, 24. 
13ibid. 
14ibid., 23. 
15ibid., 26. 
16<:hapin, Religious Thought, 60, 61, 92-94. 
17Berkhof, op. cit., 204-210. 
18Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 2), 20. 
19ibid. 
20ibid., 21. 
21ibid., 20. 
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public repentance may be harmful inasmuch as "to confess crimes may 
be, in some measure, to teach them, and those may imitate him in 
wickedness, who will not follow him in his repentance."22 
Second, some believe their penitent duty is discharged if, after a life of 
transgressions, they cloister themselves from the temptations whose 
enticement leads them to the sin of which they are repenting. To be sure, 
Johnson concedes, it is erroneous to conclude that intentional exposure to 
temptation will conduce to anything but transgression; conversely, "any 
retirement from the world does not necessarily precede or follow 
repentance, because it is not requisite to reformation."23 
Third, others have "attempted to quiet their consciences" by "partial 
restitution," transforming their illicitly procured wealth into gifts of 
charity; but the contributions resulting in the furtherance of religion, 
benevolence, and education "will never atone for the violation of 
justice,"24 as will not the sinner's decision to will his ill-gotten assets to 
Christian charity at his death. 
Johnson concedes that the Roman Catholic view of confession to the 
priest as an aspect of repentance is valid as long as it is "convenient to 
observe" and that it is helpful more in its subjective benefits 
("disburthening the conscience" and "receiving comfort or instruction") 
than in the objective divine forgiveness posited by Roman Catholicism. 25 
Johnson believes one of the disastrous effects of persistent sin and 
delayed repentance is increasing hardness toward the spiritual and noble 
in life which eventually renders one virtually impervious to the wooings 
and reprimands of God. God may discontinue his redemptive interest in 
such obstinate individuals. Some "unaccustomed acts" like fasting and 
devotional seclusion will preclude "hardness of heart," which results from 
"alienation of the thoughts" from God, and, in more desperate cases, 
22ibid. 
23ibid., 21, 22. 
24ibid., 24. 
25ibid., 20. 
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from intentional suppression of the memory of some "enormous 
wickedness."26 In Sermon 4 pertaining to charity Johnson warns his 
congregation, "To-morrow is to all uncertain, to thee almost hopeless; to-
day if thou wilt hear the voice of God calling thee to repentance, and by 
repentance to charity; harden not thy heart.. .. "27 
Likewise, in exhorting to frequent communion, he declares: 
All ideas influence our conduct with more or less force, as they 
are more or less strongly impressed upon the mind; and they are 
impressed more strongly, as they are more frequently recollected 
or renewed. For every idea, whether of love, fear, grief, or any 
other passion, loses its force by time; and, unless revived by 
accident, or voluntary meditation, will at last vanish. But by 
dwelling upon, and indulging any idea, we may increase its efficacy 
and force, make it by degrees predominant in the souL and raise it 
to an ascendant over our passions, so that it shall easily overrule 
those affections or appetites which formerly tyrannized within 
us.28 
While the hardening of the heart will render us impervious to God's 
subjective dealings with us, so "hardening'' of virtuous habits will assure 
our virtue. 
Interestingly, while Johnson affirms the freedom of the will, he asserts 
that "grace ... when it has been offered and refused," may not certainly be 
"offered again": "He cannot expect to be received among the servants of 
God who will obey him only at his own time."29 Johnson seems to be 
saying that repentance is initiated by divine concern, and that if an 
individual persists in sin he may develop a condition in which he will not 
or cannot repent. This view, however, is not materially different from the· 
Calvinistic idea that will is shaped by one's spiritual condition, and varies 
widely from the semi-Pelagian, Roman Catholic and Arminian idea of the 
freedom of the will. In this Johnson seems inconsistent. 
26ibid. [Sermon 3], 36. 
27ibid. [Sermon 4], 51. 
28ibid. [Sermon 9], 101. 
29ibid. [Sermon 10], 114. 
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To Johnson, moral reformation is the index of genuine repentance:30 
one "is only to expect mercy upon his reformation"31 which consists not 
merely of the forsaking of sin but also reparation of the harm one has 
done.32 
The eighteenth-century Anglican ambivalence toward the Calvinistic 
conception of unregenerated man's spiritual and moral incapacity to 
obtain salvation33 underlies the anthropological dimension of Johnson's 
understanding of repentance, which may be accurately described as semi-· 
Pelagian.34 Calvinism is employed here as a foil to Johnson's primarily 
Anglican views since it was the prime alternative to Anglicanism among 
Protestants in England in the eighteenth century. While Johnson, in typical 
semi-Pelagian terminology, recognizes that the moral reformation 
necessarily springing from all true repentance "is not to be accomplished 
by our own natural power, unassisted by God,"35 he urges with equal 
fervor to repent "those that have polluted themselves with studied and 
premeditated wickedness; that have violated his commands in opposition 
to conviction; and gone on, from crime to crime, under a sense of the 
divine disapprobation."36 
Even these are not forever excluded from his favour, but have in 
their hands means, appointed by [God], of reconciliation to him; 
means by which pardon may be obtained, and by which they may 
be restored to those hopes of happiness, from which they have 
fallen by their own fault.37 
Though the "means" are divinely "appointed," no immediate gift of 
repentance is necessary to its performance, as it is in the Calvinistic 
version.38 Man innately possesses the capacity to turn from evil and to 
God and thereby assure his eternal bliss by his moral reformation: 
30ibid., [Sermon 2], 24. 
31ibid., 21. 
32ibid., 22. 
33<:alvin, Institutes, II:ii, passim. 
34Kyle, "Semi-Pelagianism," 1000, 1001. 
35Johnson, op. cit., 24 
36ibid., 19. 
37ibid. 
38Hodge, Systematic Theology, 487, 489. 
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Repentance is always difficult, and the difficulty grows still 
greater by delay. But let those who have hitherto neglected this 
great duty, remember, that it is yet in their power, and that they 
cannot perish everlastingly but by their own choice! 39 
39Johnson, op. cit., 26. My emphasis. 
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Chapter 5: 
CONVERSION 
This fit of sickness continued on me for seven weeks, and a glorious visitation it 
was. The blessed Spirit was all this time purifying my soul. One day, perceiving 
an uncommon drought and a disagreeable clamminess in my mouth and using 
things to allay my thirst, but in vain, it was suggested to me, that when Jesus 
Christ cried out, "I thirst," his sufferings were near at an end. Upon which I cast 
myself down on the bed, crying out, "I thirst! I thirst!"Soon after this I found 
and felt in myself that I was delivered from the burden that had so heavily 
oppressed me. The spirit of mourning was taken from me ... . Now did the Spirit of 
God take possession of my soul, and, as I humbly hope, seal me unto the day of 
redemption. 
George Whitefield 
from George Whitefield's Journals, 1735 
Both Maurice Quinlanl and Donald Greene2 have detailed the events 
surrounding the controversy of Samuel Johnson's "late conversion," a 
significant remark in a written prayer offered soon before Johnson's 
death. Greene provides the historical background of the controversy: 
Such was the prayer which that very great Christian, Samuel 
Johnson, composed and uttered ... eight days before his death, 
when, in his sick room, he, with a few friends, received his last 
communion at the hands of the Reverend George Strahan .... The 
transmission of the text of this prayer has had a curious history, 
involving very important questions concerning the nature of 
Johnson's fundamental religious beliefs. Eight months after 
Johnson's death, George Strahan became one of the first to publish 
in the field of competing Johnsonian biographers and editors, 
bringing out a book which he called Prayers and Meditations, 
composed by Samuel Johnson, LL.D., and published from his manuscripts. 
In this volume, heavily edited throughout, Strahan printed the 
prayer composed for Johnson's last communion-with silent 
alterations. The most drastic of these was the deletion of its second 
petition, "Forgive and accept my late conversion." Hawkins later 
published, both in his Life of Johnson and in Volume XI of the 
lQuinlan, "The Rumor of Dr. Johnson's Conversion." 
2Greene, "Dr. Johnson's 'Late Conversion': A Reconsideration." 
collected Works of Johnson, the full text of the prayer. But Boswell, 
in his Life, chose to reproduce the version emended by Strahan .... 3 
Quinlan insists that evangelicals like William Cowper misinterpreted 
Johnson's reference in his prayer of December 5, 1784 to refer to the 
Methodist and evangelical "conversion experience," and even that 
Johnson's biographers may have skewed the evidence in favor of an 
"evangelical conversion," just as Strahan and Boswell apparently 
attempted to obscure the comment to prevent such speculation. Quinlan 
believes that, in any case, since Johnson understood conversion as moral 
reformation, he did not have in mind the sort of emotional, often 
enthusiastic experience the evangelical view of conversion denoted. 
Greene, on the other hand, claims that there is no essential difference 
between the major branches of Christianity with respect to the definition 
of conversion and that, therefore, when Johnson employed the term, he 
attached to it no unique denotation.4 This view is endorsed by Pierce, who 
remarks, "there was no evidence for the belief that the phrase 'my late 
conversion' ever meant to Johnson ... a change from the Anglican to the 
Evangelical faith .... We should thus now look at this prayer not as an 
expression of new belief but rather as an affirmation of an old 
dispensation, of a lifelong desire to believe in the truths of Christianity."5 
This dispute is clouded by the differing interpretations of the term 
conversion. There is no question about its Biblical denotation; it means an 
active turning away from sin to God and religious virtue.6 The dispute 
concerns what this turning entails. Greene recognizes the genuine dispute 
but insists the necessity of conversion is a moot point inasmuch as all 
conceive of it as a turning away from sinfulness to righteousness.7 The 
very questions which Greene concedes do surround the issue of 
conversion in general impinge on the controversy of Johnson's "late 
conversion." He cites the employment of the terminology of conversion 
3ibid., 60, 61. 
4ibid., 73-79. 
SPierce, Religious Life, 163. · 
6Goetzmann, J. and Laubach, F. "Conversion, Penitence, Repentance, Proselyte," 1:353-359. 
7Greene, op. cit., 73. 
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by several Anglican divines who influenced Johnson to prove a consensus 
regarding the general idea of conversion. The issue is not so simple, 
however. For example, Greene himself admits one of the doctrinal 
controversies surrounding conversion is "about the degree of distinction 
to be made between the concepts of conversion and regeneration."8 
Indeed, this issue is most relevant to Johnson's conversion. There is no 
evidence Johnson even held to the evangelical doctrine of regeneration.9 
For the Methodists regeneration was intimately tied to conversion.10 They 
recognized conversion as the human response to regeneration, a 
gratuitous and instantaneous act of God by which the dead spiritual 
nature of the unbeliever is enlivened. This feature of eighteenth-century, 
as well as contemporary, evangelical soteriology which conceives of man 
as passive prior to regeneration because of his innate spiritual inability is 
absent from Johnson's ethical and moralistic understanding of salvation. 
For instance, in a sermon urging charity Johnson states: 
Men are not charitable, as they are not just; because they suffer 
themselves to be captivated by their senses, because they are 
wholly engrossed by present happiness, and extend not their 
prospects to another state; they do not contemplate the duration of 
their future existence, or impress upon their minds, the great 
importance of pleasing God; and the danger of falling into 
everlasting misery; and have therefore no motives, which they can 
oppose to the solicitations of appetite, the incitements of passion, or 
the tranquility of negligence; but pass their lives, some in the 
slumbers of indolence, and others in the hurry of business or of 
pleasure, without any preparation for that change, which must 
determine their state to all eternity.11 
Likewise, in Sermon 9 on communion, Johnson's extensive exhortation 
to self-examination is void of any reference to the necessity of reliance on 
God as supplier of our conversion: 
Bib id. 
We cannot receive the sacrament unless, unless we believe in 
Christ, because by receiving it, we declare our belief in him, and a 
lying tongue is an abomination to the Lord. We cannot receive it 
without repentance, because repentance is the means, by which, 
91n fact, in the Dictionary Johnson identifies conversion as regeneration. 
lOLJ.oyd-Jones, Puritans, 195-202. 
11Johnson, Sermons [Sermon 27], 293. 
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after sin, we are reconciled to God; and we cannot, without 
dreadful wickedness, by partaking of the outward tokens of 
reconciliation, declare that we believe God at peace with our souls, 
when we know, that by the omission of repentance, we are yet in a 
state of voluntary alienation from him. We cannot receive it, 
without a sincere intention of obedience; because, by declaring 
ourselves followers, we enter into obligations to obey his 
commandments.12 
In Sermon 14 Johnson expresses his idea of conversion; and here, 
moreover, he omits any allusion to the divine supply of regeneration as 
the cause of man's turning to God: 
He that hopes to find peace by trusting God, must obey him; and 
when he has at any time failed in his obedience, which amongst the 
best men will be very frequent, he must endeavour to reconcile 
God to him by repentance .... This constant and devout practice, is 
both the effect, and cause, of confidence in God. He will naturally 
pour out his supplications to the Supreme Being, who trusts in him, 
for assistance and protection; and he, who, with proper fervour 
and humility, prostrates himself before God, will always rise with 
an increase of holy confidence. By meditating on his own 
weakness, he will hourly receive new conviction of the necessity of 
soliciting the favour of his Creatour; and by recollecting his 
promises, will confirm himself in the hope of obtaining what he 
desires, and if, to secure these promises, he steadily practices the 
duties on which they depend, he will soon find his mind stayed on 
God, and be kept in perfect peace, because he trusteth in him.13 
Significantly, one's "holy confidence" in this conversion rests not with 
God's actions, but man's. Man can be relatively certain of God's promises 
if "he steadily practices the duties on which they depend." 
It is incumbent on individuals to prepare for "that change," conversion, . 
"which must determine their state to all eternity."14 However, to the 
evangelicals, following the Reformers, conversion is a "human response 
to regeneration, the infusion of new life into the soul."15 It is not an act for 
which one can prepare; he must be regenerated that conversion may 
occur. The key difference between the views of Johnson and the 
12ibid. [Sermon 9], 104, 105. 
13ibid. [Sermon 14], 157, 158. 
14ibid. [Sermon 27], 293. 
15Btoesch, "Conversion," 273. 
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evangelicals is the stress the latter place on special grace as a requisite of 
conversion. Johnson believes each individual has within himself the 
capacity to convert himself. In Sermon 2 he enjoins: 
But it is of the highest importance to those who have so long 
delayed to secure their salvation, that they lose none of the 
moments which yet remain; that they omit no act of justice or 
mercy now in their power; that they summon all their diligence to 
improve the remains of life, and exert every virtue which they 
have opportunities to practice.16 
This citation is typical of Johnson's numerous exhortations to 
conversion: there is no hint it is contingent on and engendered by a 
particular elective grace so indispensable to the Reformation and 
evangelical understanding of conversion. All men are given the means to 
convert themselves; they are under divine requirement to do so. 
While divine regeneration apart from human co-operation is no 
essential antecedent to Johnson's view of conversion as it is for 
evangelicals, "amendment of life" in the act of repentance clearly is. 
An amendment of life is the chief and essential part of repentance. 
He that has performed that great work, needs not disturb his 
conscience with subtle scruples, or nice distinctions.17 
The divine assistance necessary to this conversion is not regeneration, of 
course, but "those means which God has prescribed for obtaining his 
assistance," including "prayer," "the holy sacrament," and indeed "all 
those institutions that contribute to the increase of piety."18 
In his view of conversion, as in his conception of justification, 
sanctification, and assurance, the cast of Johnson's mind is largely 
Tridentine. While the Reformers and evangelicals insist that God must 
regenerate and convert the totally unable sinner,19 Trent holds that God 
enlivens the sinner so he may convert himself 
16Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 2], 25. 
17ibid., 24. 
18ibid. 
19Jones, "Reformation Theology," 565-569; Erickson, Christian Theology, 3:942-946. 
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... they, who by sins were alienated from God, may be disposed 
through his quickening and assisting grace, to convert themselves 
to their own justification, by freely assenting to and co-operating 
with that said grace: in such sort that, while God touches the heart 
of man by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, neither is man 
himself utterly inactive while he receives that inspiration, 
forasmuch as he is also able to reject it.. .. [Individuals are justified] 
when, understanding themselves to be sinners, they, by turning 
themselves, from the fear of divine justice whereby they are 
profitably agitated, to consider the mercy of God, are raised unto 
hope, confiding that God will be propitious to them for Chrisf s 
sake; and they begin to love him as the fountain of all justice; and 
are therefore moved against sins by a certain hatred and 
detestation, to wit, by that penitence which must be performed 
before baptism: lastly, when they purpose to receive baptism, to 
begin a new life, and to keep the commandments of God ... . This 
disposition, or preparation, is followed by justification itself .... 20 
Eight days before his death did Johnson experience an "evangelical 
conversion" distinct from the "amendment of life" he consistently 
equated with repentance and conversion? It hardly seems possible. The 
strongest evidence, in fact, that Johnson's soteriology remains essentially 
unchanged even at the end of his life is the text of the controversial prayer 
itself. Johnson prays: 
Almighty and most merciful Father, I am now, as to human eyes 
it seems, about to commemorate for the last time, the death of thy 
son Jesus Christ, our Saviour and Redeemer. Grant, 0 Lord, that 
my whole hope and confidence may be in his merits and in thy 
mercy: forgive and accept my late conversion, enforce and accept 
my imperfect repentance; make this commemoration [of] him 
available to the confirmation of my Faith, the establishment of my 
hope, and the enlargement of my charity, and make the death of 
thy son Jesus Christ effectual to my redemption .... 21 
It will be recalled Johnson's soteriological foundation is that "Salvation is 
promised to all Christians, on the terms of faith, obedience, and 
repentance,"22 key actions on the application of which Christ's merits are 
20schaff, Creeds, 92, 93. Emphasis in original. 
21Johnson, Diaries, Prayers, Annals, 417, 418. 
22ibid., [Sermon 28], Sermons, 303. Emphasis in original. 
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suspended.23 Interestingly, Johnson's final recorded prayer adverts to 
these actions in precise order. First, he mentions his faith: "Grant, 0 Lord, 
that my whole hope and confidence may be in his merits and in thy 
mercy." Second, he petitions God to take account of his most recent 
amendment of life: "forgive and accept my late conversion." Third, he 
appeals to God to accept his flawed but sincere repentance: "enforce and 
accept my imperfect repentance." Greene is quite justified, then, to chide 
"even the most assiduous Johnsonian students" for their lack of sensitivity 
to "the nuances of Johnson's style."24 I believe, though, such sensitivity 
may lead Johnsonians to conclusions differing somewhat from Greene's 
own that Johnson always affirmed justification by faith alone and that his 
understanding of conversion was no different from that of the Methodists 
and other evangelicals. 
For one thing, as Hudson observes, 
... at a time when many orthodox theologians [including the 
evangelicals] were trying to reintroduce real passion into 
Christianity, Johnson was still cautious and concerned to place 
limitations on this notion of piety. His idea of the Christian life ... 
saw Christianity not as a joyful celebration of God's love for 
mankind, but above all as a particularly impressive ethical code.25 
In addition, the Restorationist divines and, it appears, Johnson, identify 
justification by faith alone with antinomianism.26 Johnson is deeply 
concerned with morality to his dying day (as his diaries evince), and it can 
scarcely be expected that he can sustain such a radical change of heart 
weeks before his death. 
Further evidence that Johnson's "late conversion" represented no 
alteration in his essential soteriology is the advice in a paragraph in 
Sermon 28 to convicts whose death was impending just as Johnson's was 
in 1784: 
23Boswell, Life, 394. 
24Greene, ap. cit., 79. 
25ttudson, Eighteenth-Century Thought, 203. 
26ibid., 196. 
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Nothing therefore remains, but that we apply with all our speed, 
and with all our strength, to rectify our desires, and purify all our 
thoughts; that we set God before us in all his goodness and 
terrours; that we consider him as the father and judge of all the 
earth; as a father, desirous to save; as a judge, who cannot pardon 
unrepented iniquity: that we fall down before him self-condemned, 
and excite in our hearts an intense detestation of those crimes 
which have provoked him; with vehement and steady resolutions, 
that if life were granted to us, it should be spent hereafter in the 
practice of our duty; that we pray the giver of grace to strengthen 
and impress these holy thoughts, and to accept our repentance, 
though late, and in its beginnings violent: that we improve every 
good motion by diligent prayer: and having declared and confirmed 
our faith by the holy communion,-we deliver ourselves into his 
hands, in firm hope, that he who created and redeemed us will not 
suffer us to perish. 27 
This style of linked clauses urging Christian dedication is reminiscent of 
Law, who, like Johnson, indicates his concern for the application of the 
faith to "common life." Note the similarities: 
Our blessed Saviour and His Apostles are wholly taken up in 
doctrines that relate to common life. They call us to renounce the 
world, and differ in every temper and way of life, from the spirit 
and way of the world: to renounce all its goods, to fear none of its 
evils, to reject its joys, and have no value for its happiness; to be as 
new born babes, that are born into a new state of things; to live as 
pilgrims in spiritual watching, in holy fear, and heavenly aspiring 
after another life: to take up our daily cross, to deny ourselves, to 
profess the blessedness of mourning, to seek the blessedness of 
poverty of spirit: to forsake the pride and vanity of riches, to take 
no thought for the morrow, to live in the profoundest state of 
humility, to rejoice in worldly sufferings: to reject the lust of the 
flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life; to bear injuries, to 
forgive and bless our enemies, and to love mankind as God loveth 
them: to give up our whole hearts and affections to God, and strive 
to enter through the strait gate into a life of eternal glory.28 
There is every reason to assume the expression "accept our repentance, 
though late" in Sermon 28 is equivalent to Johnson's death-bed petition, 
"accept my late conversion." In both the sermon and petition holy 
communion is coincident; both depict repentance and amendment of life, 
27Johnson, op. cit., 308, 309. Emphasis in original. 
28Law, Serious Call, 6. 
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or at least intent to do so, as essential; both appeal to God's mercy; both 
express a confidence in personal salvation. Most importantly, both 
harmonize with Johnson's foundational dictum of soteriology: the 
application of Christ's merits are contingent on faith, obedience, and 
repentance. 
In addition, Johnson's description and defence of the viability of "death-
bed repentance" in Sermon 28 conforms to his own "conversion 
experience." Johnson implored, 
Fix in your minds this decision, "Repentance is a change of the 
heart, of an evil to a good disposition." When that change is made, 
repentance is complete. God will consider that life as amended if he 
had spared it. Repentance in the sight of man, even of the penitent, 
is not known but by its fruits: but our Creatour sees the fruit, in 
the blossom, or the seed. He knows those resolutions which are 
fixed, those conversions which would be permanent; and will 
receive them who are qualified by holy desires for works of 
righteousness, without exacting from them those outward duties 
which the shortness of their lives hindered them from 
performing. 29 
That is, God will accept sincerity in lieu of virtuous action as repentance 
and conversion. In his heart an individual repents and converts himself. 
We must not rely on faith alone30 as the evangelicals, following the 
Reformers, insist; rather, we must alter our intent and, if possible, our 
actions, if God is to receive us. Johnson's "late conversion" in no way 
deviates from this conception of conversion: he recognizes the error of his 
way and determines to amend his life. This is the essence of the 
Johnsonian conception of conversion. 
Finally, we would do well to remember that the very day of this entry 
Johnson tells John Ryland that he understands that the hopes of salvation 
are conditional, and that he is not certain he has conformed to the 
conditions: Pierce cites Johnson's comment to Ryland that "we have hopes 
given us; but they are conditional, and I know not how far I have fulfilled 
29ibid., 308. 
30ibid., 304. 
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those conditions."31 He would have said as much at any time in his adult 
life. Hence, the final prayer does not represent any alteration in his 
Tridentine conception of salvation as conditional, justification as 
processional, and absolute assurance as impossible. 
31Pierce, op. cit. 161. Citing ed., G. B. Hill, Johnson Miscellanies (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1897; reprint New York: Barnes and Noble, 1%6), 2:156. 
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Chapter 6: 
SANCTIFICATION 
Consider how my light is spent, 
Ere half my days, in this dark world and wide, 
And that one talent which is death to hide 
Lodged with me useless, though my soul more bent 
To seroe therewith my Maker, and present 
My true account, lest he returning chide, 
"Doth God exact day-labor, light denied?" 
I fondly ask. 
John Milton 
from "On His Blindness," circa 1652 
Sanctification as a dimension of Reformation soteriology is understood 
as "the continuing work of God in the life of the believer, making him or 
her actually holy. By 'holy' here is meant 'bearing an actual likeness to 
God.' Sanctification is a process by which one's moral condition is brought 
into conformity with one's legal status before God [justification]. It is a 
continuation of what was begun in regeneration, when a newness of life 
was conferred upon and instilled within the believer."1 Johnson's view of, 
sanctification, however, bears the character of the via media of Anglicanism 
that became especially pervasive after the Restoration. 
The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England do not treat 
sanctification as a separate category. In Article XVII addressing the 
doctrines of predestination and election, however, the framers' general 
conception of sanctification is clear: 
As the Godly consideration of Predestination, and our election in 
Christ, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to Godly 
persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of 
Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly 
members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things, 
as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of 
1 Erickson, Christian Theology, 3:967, 968. 
eternal Salvation to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth 
fervently kindle their love towards God.2 
The regenerate are those "such as feel in themselves the working of the 
Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly 
members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things." In 
contradistinction to Trent, Article XII contends that good works, which 
"are the fruits of faith, and follow after Justification, cannot put away our 
sins," though they "are ... pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do 
spring out necessarily of a true and lively Faith; insomuch that by them a 
lively Faith may be as evidently known as a tree discerned by the fruit."3 
The three sections of the chapter on sanctification in the Westminster 
Confession (XIII) are more specific. The truly regenerate possess a new 
heart and spirit; and by virtue of Christ's death and resurrection and by 
means of the Scriptures and the Holy Spirit who indwells them, they are 
gradually sanctified as the principle of indwelling sin is "weakened and 
mortified." While affecting every aspect of man, this process is "yet 
imperfect in this life"; it thus entails a conflict with "the remnants of 
corruption in every part." The success of sanctification is predetermined, 
however, and "the regenerate part doth overcome" in the end. 
By contrast, it should be evident that Johnson's soteriology permits no 
sharp distinction between justification and sanctification. Indeed, 
Johnson's view of justification seems similar to the Anglican and 
Reformed view of sanctification. This confounding of justification with 
sanctification is another instance of Johnson's Tridentine orientation to 
soteriology. William Cunningham, eminent nineteenth-century Scottish 
church historian, notes: 
Justification, then, according to the Church of Rome, includes or 
comprehends not only the remission of sin, or deliverance from 
guilt, but also the sanctification or renovation of man's moral 
nature, or deliverance from depravity. In short, they [Roman 
Catholics] comprehend under the one name or head of justification, 
2ttardon, Spirit, 178. 
3ibid., 176. 
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what Protestants-following, as they believe, the guidance of 
Scripture-have always divided into the two heads of justification 
and regeneration, or justification and sanctification, when the word 
sanctification is used in its widest sense, as descriptive of the whole 
process, originating in regeneration, by which depraved men are 
restored to a conformity to God's moral image.4 
This is even more apparent when one considers that Johnson's sermons· 
are not directed to the regenerate to the exclusion of the unregenerate. 
Pierce notes that ''Johnson, in particular, could not accept the Evangelical 
notion of 'saving faith' nor the role of the Holy Spirit in the act of 
'conversion.1115 Johnson does not perceive humanity as divided into the 
saved and unsaved as did the Wesleyans and other evangelicals; rather, 
like Romanism, he perceives salvation as processional, or, in a negative 
sense, recessional. One's salvation is contingent on the maintenance of 
good works and is jeopardized by evil works. In urging "those who have 
so long delayed to secure their salvation,"6 he declares: 
But as this reformation is not to be accomplished by our own 
natural power, unassisted by God, we must, when we form our 
first resolutions of a new life, apply ourselves, with fervour and 
constancy, to those means which God has prescribed for obtaining 
his assistance. We must implore a blessing by frequent prayer, and 
confirm our faith by the holy sacrament. We must use all of those 
institutions that contribute to the increase of piety, and omit 
nothing that may either promote our progress in virtue, or prevent 
a relapse into vice.7 
He argues that one's sin threatens his eternal standing before God. 
There is no hint of the necessity of a supernatural regeneration that 
engenders sanctification; man possesses the inherent capacity to conform 
to God's requirements, in intent if not in performance. 
The terms, upon which we are to hope for any benefits from the 
merits of Christ, are faith, repentance, and subsequent obedience. 
These are therefore the three chief and general heads of 
examination. We cannot receive the sacrament unless, unless we 
4cunningham, Historical Theology, 2:14. 
Spierce, Religious Life, 53, asterisk footnote. 
6Johnson [Sermon 2), Sermons, 25. 
7ibid., 24. 
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believe in Christ, because by receiving it, we declare our belief in 
him, and a lying tongue is an abomination to the Lord. We cannot 
receive it without repentance, because repentance is the means, by 
which, after sin, we are reconciled to God; and we cannot, without 
dreadful wickedness, by partaking of the outward tokens of 
reconciliation, declare that we believe God at peace with our souls, 
when we know, that by the omission of repentance, we are yet in a 
state of voluntary alienation from him. We cannot receive it, 
without a sincere intention of obedience; because, by declaring 
ourselves followers, we enter into obligations to obey his 
commandments.8 
It would be impossible, in fact, to direct sermons exclusively to the 
converted on the basis of Johnson's soteriology, because 
every sin, and much more any habit or course of sin long 
continued, is, according to the different degrees of guilt, an 
apostacy or defection from our Saviour; as it is a breach of those 
conditions upon which we became his followers; and he that breaks 
the condition of a covenant, dissolves it on his side. Having 
therefore broken the covenant between us and our Redeemer, we 
lose the benefits of his death; nor can we have any hopes of 
obtaining them, while we remain in this state of separation from 
hi 9 m. 
To the extent to which Johnson's sermons frequently exhort to 
sanctification, therefore, they cannot simply urge believers to 
perseverance in the faith; they must account for the number listening who 
have indeed violated the conditions of the bilateral covenant and thereby 
forfeited their salvation. He states in Sermon 14: 
He that hopes to find peace by trusting God, must obey him; and 
when he has at any time failed in his obedience, which amongst the 
best men will be very frequent, he must endeavour to reconcile 
God to him by repentance .... By meditating on his own weakness, 
he will hourly receive new conviction of the necessity of soliciting 
the favour of his Creatour; and by recollecting his promises, will 
confirm himself in the hope of obtaining what he desires, and if, to 
secure these promises, he steadily practices the duties on which 
they depend, he will soon find his mind stayed on God, and be kept 
in perfect peace, because he trusteth in him.10 
Bibid. [Sermon 9], 104, 105. 
9ibid., 100. 
1CJibid. [Sermon 14], 157, 158. 
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Johnson's sermons, then, are exhortations to justification and 
sanctification simultaneously, since to Johnson there is no material 
distinction between the two. 
Whether in comprehending the nature of divine prescience, the human 
will, the atonement, or justification, Johnson's concern is essentially 
experiential. Therefore, it is entirely characteristic for him to adopt the 
Roman view of justification which unites virtually all the threads of 
salvation. To posit the fine distinction of Protestantism that justification is 
a judicial and forensic ad while sanctification is an experiential process is 
incongruous with Johnson's religious outlook. It is not that Johnson is 
unconcerned with or oblivious of the judicial and abstract; it is simply that 
he is overwhelmingly concerned with the experiential. In this orientation 
he is strikingly pre-Romantic. Several instances from the sermons will 
suffice to demonstrate this experiential orientation. 
He argues in Sermon 2 that God does not require perfection of his 
human creatures, taking account of their frailty, and "every real 
extenuation of our failings and transgressions."11 He continues: 
But the mercy of God extends not only to those that have made 
his will, in some degree, the rule of their actions, and have only 
deviated from it by inadvertency, surprize, inattention, or 
negligence, but even to those that have polluted themselves with 
studied and premeditated wickedness; that have violated his 
commands in opposition to conviction, and gone on, from crime to 
crime, under a sense of the divine disapprobation.12 
There is nothing here of the Protestant insistence on the imputation of 
Adam's sin to his posterity and of Christ's righteousness to the elect, nor 
of regeneration as the requisite of true repentance. It is a moralistic and 
pragmatic concern with man as he is in reality, a gentle inducement to 
repentance with the assurance of the goodness of a forgiving God. 
1 libid., [Sermon 2], 19. 
12ibid. 
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Johnson is not reluctant to employ reprobation as an inducement to 
specific acts of morality, especially charity: 
Charity is likewise obstructed in particular persons by particular 
vices and habits, which, though, perhaps in themselves, not 
enormous or detestable, ought yet, to be, very diligently, 
corrected, since, in their consequences, they may prove equally 
pernicious with greater crimes, by hindering the practice of that 
virtue, without which no salvation has been promised.13 
Sanctification is clearly equated with what Protestants recognize as 
justification. Listeners are urged to note that their salvation is contingent 
on their sanctification: Johnson's burden is experiential and pragmatic. 
Johnson states, in fact, that cognizance of theological axioms and 
nuances is unnecessary; one simply looks to the Bible and obeys: 
The great purpose of revealed religion is to afford man a clear 
representation of his dependence on the Supreme Being, by 
teaching him to consider God as his Creator, and Governour, his 
Father and his Judge. Those to whom Providence has granted the 
knowledge of the holy Scriptures, have no need to perplex 
themselves with difficult speculations, to deduce their duty from 
remote principles, or to enforce it by doubtful motives. The Bible 
tells us, in plain and authoritative terms, that there is a way to life, 
and a way to death; that there are acts which God will reward, and 
acts that he will punish.14 
Johnson manifests in his sermons, though not always in his 
conversation, an impatience with abstruse theological issues, one of which 
is the fine differentiation between justification and sanctification. Perhaps, 
as Jordan suggests, this is due to the fact that "Johnson assumes an 
audience similar to those who might be able to follow his Idler essays. 
Generally he seems to follow the rule laid down by Swift in his Letter to a 
Young Clergyman to avoid "hard words" and abstruse theological 
diction."15 In the case of Johnson, however, the avoidance of "abstruse 
theological diction" seems more than an attempt to render theological 
13ibid. [Sermon 271 295. 
14ibid., [Sermon 3), 29. 
15ruchman, "Political Sermons," 29. 
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truth understandable; it is the logical expression of a theological 
conviction: religion is meant to be experienced, and if it cannot be 
experienced, it is not sound religion. 
Richard Brantley, in fact, contends that "Johnson's temperament was 
often decidedly Wesleyan," that "Wesleyan religion is not far from 
Romantic poetry," and that "the religious imagination for which Wesley 
was largely responsible related directly to Johnson's mind."16 Elements of 
Johnson's soteriology may have been a reaction to the apparently abstract 
judicialism of Protestant orthodoxy just as Romanticism was a reaction to 
the alleged aridity of neo-classicism. 
Brantley links Johnson's reaction to this influence of Wesleyianism. 
Many of Johnson's writings, Brantley insists, "show signs of the 
evangelical feeling and thought represented best by Wesley's intellect and 
sincerity."17 Further, Johnson's orientation mirrored Wesley's "generally 
pietistic outlook," "emphasis on religious feeling ... as distinct from 
intellectual belief," and "faith ... as a blend of syncretic thought and pietistic 
practice."18 As such, "Johnson was close to the Evangelical Movement."19 
It is questionable, however, whether Johnson's experiential orientation 
in religion is specially the result of evangelical influence; experientialism is 
a critical feature of Roman Catholicism, and Johnson's soteriological 
experientialism-for example, his affirmation of justification by works 
virtually identical to that of Romanism while at odds with 
evangelicalism-seems more the effect of via media Anglicanism than 
evangelicalism. Johnson and the "Romantic" Methodists both reacted to 
Protestant judicialism: the former from the standpoint of via media 
Anglicanism, and the latter from the standpoint of emotional religion. 
It is difficult to understand Greene's conclusion that "the doctrine of 
justification by faith alone is the foundation of the whole edifice of 
16Brantley, "Johnson's Wesleyan Connection," 144. 
17ibid., 145. 
18ibid., 146 
19ibid., 149. 
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Johnson's religion."20 Greene, it seems, is led to this questionable 
conclusion by his conviction that justification by faith alone is principally 
the antithesis of the idea that one may merit salvation by his good works. 
He insists the "kernel of the doctrine"21 is the belief that faith alone is the 
condition of salvation, although good works necessarily flow from 
genuine faith. Greene presents evidence that a number of the Anglican 
divines held to the Protestant view of justification, and claims virtually all 
Protestants, including Johnson, embraced it.22 Hudson, however, 
recognizes that by the eighteenth century the doctrine of justification by 
faith alone had fallen into disrepute among Anglicans. Indeed, as early as 
the first decade after the Restoration, the doctrine of justification by faith 
alone became controversial.23 Greene believes that the extremes in 
connection with justification are formal extemalism and moralism, on the 
one hand, and antinomianism, the idea that one need not perform good 
works if he is justified, on the other. He even couches the necessity of the 
Reformation in these terms. 24 Nothing could be more misleading. The 
heart of the theological controversy of the Reformation had nothing to dq 
with the necessity of good works, on which all sides agreed; rather, it 
hinged on the nature of the application of Christ's righteousness to 
sinners and the method of appropriating that righteousness. 
Johnson forcefully and consistently repudiates that justification is 
appropriated by faith alone. To Mrs. Knowles he states that "hope of 
salvation must be founded on the terms on which it is promised that the 
mediation of our SAVIOUR shall be applied to us,-namely, obedience; 
and where obedience has failed, then, as suppletory to it, repentance."25 
In Sermon 9 he declares that ''The terms, upon which we are to hope for 
any benefits from the merits of Christ, are faith, repentance, and 
subsequent obedience."26 He remarks in Sermon 14 that "Trust in God, 
that trust to which perfect peace is promised, is to be obtained only by 
20Greene, "Dr. Johnson's 'Late Conversion': A Reconsideration," 87. 
21ibid., 81. 
22ttudson, Eighteenth-Century Thought, 171. 
23cross and More, Anglicanism, 296. 
24creene, op. cit., 81. 
25Boswell, Life, 390. 
26Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 9), 104. Emphasis in original. 
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repentance, obedience, and supplication."27 Likewise, in Sermon 28 he 
avers unequivocally that "Salvation is promised to all Christians, on the 
terms of faith, obedience, and repentance."28 Johnson denies most insistently 
the Reformation and pre-Restoration Anglican idea of justification by 
faith alone. 
A clear differentiation between justification and sanctification is 
indispensable to the historic Protestant faith which stresses justification by 
faith alone.29 For instance, after expressing his affirmation of the 
definition of sanctification as found in the Westminster Confession, noted 
nineteenth-century Princeton theologian Charles Hodge distinguishes 
justification from sanctification at six critical points: 
(1.) In that the former [justification] is a transient act, the latter 
[sanctification] is a progressive work. (2.) Justification is a forensic 
act, God acting as judge, declaring justice satisfied so far as the 
believing sinner is concerned, whereas sanctification is an effect due 
to divine efficiency. (3.) Justification changes, or declares to be 
changed, the relation of the sinner to the justice of God; 
sanctification involves a change of character. (4.) The former is 
founded on what Christ has done for us; the latter is the effect of 
what He does in us. (6.) Justification is complete and the same in all, 
while sanctification is progressive, and is more complete in some 
than others. 30 
Justification as the declaration of individual righteousness which the 
Reformation view grounds in the passive and active obedience of Christ 
and suspends on the exercise of faith alone Johnson binds inextricably to 
consistent conformity to the divine standard, on pain of forfeiture of 
salvation if one fails: justification equals sanctification. 
In Johnson's soteriology as revealed in his sermons, the obedience that 
is a condition of salvation consists principally of devotion,31 the means of 
attaining sanctification, which issues in good works. The Tridentine 
27ibid. [Sermon 14), 156. 
28ibid. [Sermon 28), 303. 
29calvin, Institutes, III: xvi. The Lutheran distinction between justification and sanctification is 
even sharper than the Reformed. See Forde, ''The Lutheran View," 17-23. 
30ttodge, Systematic Theology, 3:213. 
31 Pierce, op. cit., 63. 
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formula that salvation is conditioned on practising virtue and avoiding 
vice is therefore a recurrent theme. In Sermon 10, for example, Johnson 
warns: 
... every action shall at last be followed by its due consequences; 
we shall be treated according to our obedience or transgressions; 
the good shall not miss their reward, nor the wicked escape their 
punishment; but when men shall give account of their works, they 
that have done good shall pass into everlasting life, and they that 
have done evil into everlasting fire. 32 
The statement is a literary apposition. It conveys well Johnson's firm 
conviction that justification is suspended on behavior. 
In addition, supporting Johnson's Tridentine concept of conditional 
salvation is his notion that all of life is a state of spiritual prohibition, a 
conviction saliently revealed in a statement in Sermon 19: 
As it hath pleased God to place us in a state, in which we are 
surrounded by innumerable temptations; so it has pleased him, on 
many occasions, to afford us temporal incitements to virtue, as a 
counterbalance to the allurements of sin; and to set before us 
rewards which may be obtained, and punishments which may be 
suffered, before the final determination of our eternal state.3:5 
Interestingly, Johnson believes that God's incitements to obedience 
intentionally correspond to temptations to commit evil. The idea that God 
postpones his decision regarding our eternal state until he has noted our 
actions is a virtual denial of election and predestination. Sanctification, 
therefore, is the variable of the probation. In short, man's salvation is 
contingent on his sanctification. 
Five powerful themes comprise Johnson's view of sanctification: the 
responsibility of charity, the necessity of the fear of God, the 
perniciousness of pride, the inefficacy of religious externalism, and the 
indispensability of communion. 
32Johnson, op. cit. [sermon 10], 115. 
33ibid. [Sermon 19], 208. 
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Charity, "the most excellent of all moral virtues,"34 occupies a place of 
almost disproportionate emphasis in Johnson's thought and sermons. 
Johnson follows Law, who stated plainly, "charity is the greatest of all 
virtues."35 "[F]or Johnson," Chapin remarks, "points of doctrine fade in 
importance before the sine qua non of Christian charity."36 A religious 
species of charity, as distinguished from mere personal concern for 
humanity, should characterize all Christians. 
In commending the practice of charity Johnson maintains: 
Whatever superiority may distinguish us, and whatever plenty 
may surround us, we know, that they can be possessed but a short 
time, and that the manner in which we employ them must 
determine our eternal state ... .37 
Johnson deems the practice of charity to be an aspect of spiritual 
probation of this life. He is even more insistent in Sermons 27 that lack of 
charity renders one unfit for the kingdom of God: 
At that day, when all the generations of the earth, shall stand 
forth in the immediate presence of their God, will the practice or 
neglect of charity be chiefly noted; then they, who have looked 
with indifference upon the calamities of others, who have scoffed at 
the mourner, and insulted the captive; who have diverted the 
uneasiness of sympathy by vicious enjoyments, and suffered 
others to languish in pain or poverty, for want of that relief, which 
would cost only a momentary pleasure, shall be condemned to an 
everlasting society, with those beings, whose depravity incites 
them to rejoice at the destruction of mankind .... The man, who 
places his felicity in riches, and the power and influence, which are 
confer' d by them, who passes, without ·regard, by the wretched 
and the poor, and forgets to "lay up treasures in heaven," may, 
surely, employ one moment in considering that his "soul" may 
"this night be required of him"; and that he may enter, in a few 
hours, into a state, in which all distinctions will be for ever 
obliterated, but those of virtue; and where only he can hope for 
mercy by whom mercy has been shewn. He, who counts his days 
by a succession of pleasures, nor knows any other use of time, than 
to squander it in amusements; who thinks on the misery of others, 
34ibid. [Sermon 27], 298. 
35Law, Serious Call, 229. 
36chapin, Religious Thought, 48. See also Hudson, op. cit., 58-65. 
37Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 4], 44. 
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only to heighten his own felicity, or declines the thought, only that 
his own enjoyments may not be interrupted, will surely start from 
his dream at the sound of age and death; at the mention of that 
time, in which he shall say, "I have no pleasure in if'; and of that 
hour, that shall translate him to scenes of horror and of misery; 
where nothing of his past gratifications, shall be remember' d, but 
the guilt. 38 
The gravity of the subject matter is reinforced by the accumulation of 
clauses. One reason Johnson's sermons are so effective is that his 
warnings are all-embracing. He seems to comprehend intuitively every 
chief impediment to righteousness and point out the hazard it is to the 
individual. 
Further, the extent to which Johnson's views follow those of Law is 
most apparent. Law begins a section of his defence of the necessity of 
charity with the very Biblical text to which Johnson alludes in Sermon 27, 
Matthew 25: 31: "When the Son of man shall come in His glory, and all the 
holy angels with Him, then shall He sit upon the throne of His glory."39 
Law then contends that he cannot expect salvation who refuses to practise 
charity: 
You own that you have no title to salvation if you have neglected 
these good works; because such persons as have neglected them 
are at the last day to be placed on the left hand, and banished with 
a "Depart, ye cursed."4cJ 
Johnson's sentiment of works-righteousness conforms to the temper of 
the times, as Hudson notes: 
A historian of the eighteenth-century might easily forget that 
there had never been any question that men 'merit' salvation 
through good works. Hostility towards the doctrine of meritorious 
works had in fact been one of the founding tenets of Protestantism, 
and continued to be the official position of the Anglican Church as 
set down in its articles. But Article XI, which condemns justification 
by works, was one of the many official doctrines which eighteenth-
century orthodoxy completely ignored. There was little doubt not 
38ibid. [Sermon 27], 292, 294. 
39r.aw, op. cit., 54. 
40ibid., 55. 
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only that men would finally be judged by their works, but that 
charity was exalted above all other virtues as the chief condition of 
salvation.41 
Because Johnson holds neither a forensic view of justification nor a 
supernatural view of regeneration, he cannot insist on charity as an 
organic effect of the indwelling Holy Spirit and the divine nature as 
implied in the statement on sanctification in the Thirty-Nine Articles; 
hence, the inducement to charity is moral and utilitarian, rather than 
theological or spiritual: 
Such are the general motives which the religion of Jesus affords, 
to the general exercise of charity, and such are the peculiar motives 
for our laying hold of this opportunity, which Providence has this 
day put into our power for the practice of it. Motives no less than 
the hope of everlasting happiness, and the fear of punishment 
which shall never end. Such incitements are surer sufficient to 
quicken the slowest, and animate the coldest.. .. 4 
Johnson's view of charity affords a striking example of how his 
soteriology influences prominent features of his outlook on life. While 
according to the Reformed idea, for example, virtue issues from the 
indwelling Spirit as a result of regeneration,43 to Johnson, the "most 
excellent of all moral virtues" is a key condition on which salvation is 
contingent. Johnson adds, similarly, that forgiveness of others is a 
condition of our own forgiveness by God.44 
In addition, the theme of the fear of God occupies a dominant place in 
Johnson's view of sanctification: 
In consequence of this general doctrine, the whole system of 
moral and religious duty is expressed, in the language of Scripture, 
by the "fear of God." A good man is characterised, as a man that 
feareth God; and the fear of the Lord is said to be the beginning of 
wisdom; and the text [Prov. 28:14a], that happy is the man that 
feareth always.45 
41ttudson, op. cit., 171. 
42Johnson,op. cit. [Sermon 4), 48. 
43calvin, op.cit., III:vi:i. 
44Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 28), 309. 
45ibid. [sermon 3), 30. 
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Johnson contrasts the appeal of heathen philosophers to human pride 
with the Christian appeal to humility. The great object of human fear 
should be sin-the consequence of the commission of which is the 
judgment bar of God before whom we "must in a short time appear."46 
The Godly man fears not merely sin but also temptation, since the latter is 
the cause of the former. The solution to the problem of temptation, 
however, is not actual monasticism and asceticism, which preclude 
temptation, and correspondingly prohibit the performance of Godly 
duties,47 but the self-discipline of fear that "carries about... in the world 
the temper of the cloister."48 Johnson explains that 
This can only be done, by fearing always, by preserving in the 
mind a constant apprehension of the divine presence, and a 
constant dread of the divine displeasure; impressions which the 
converse of mankind, and the solicitations of sense and fancy, are 
continually labouring to efface, and which we must therefore 
renew by all such practices as religion prescribes .... 49 
Johnson proposes a sort of practical asceticism. Since in sequestering 
himself from the world one would be unable to perform his duties to 
mankind, he must carry about within him the "temper of the cloister," 
that is, he must retain the ascetic attitude while engaging in social 
intercourse. Additionally, it will sometimes be necessary to engage in 
"unaccustomed acts of devotion,"50 including "fasts and other austerities" 
which ''have a natural tendency to disengage the mind from sensuality."51 
One is thus able to avoid the tragedy of "hardness of heart," the antithesis 
of the fear of God, and a state that may become irremediable.52 Thus, fear 
of God is the engine of sanctification. 
46ibid., 31. 
47'b'd 33 t t ., • 
48ibid. 
49.b'd 34 t t ., . 
soibid. 
51 ·b'd 35 t t ., • 
52 'b'd 36 t t ., • 
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For Johnson, moreover, pride is a chief impediment to sanctification. 
There was occasion in the chapter dealing with original sin to advert to 
Johnson's belief that "Pride is a corruption that seems originally ingrafted 
in our nature," and here should be noted his conviction of the 
pervasiveness of this vice: 
... it exerts itself in our first years, and, without continual 
endeavors to suppress it, influences our last. Other vices tyrannize 
over particular ages, and triumph in particular countries. Rage is 
the failing of youth and the avarice of age; revenge is the 
predominant passion of one country , and inconstancy the 
characteristic of another; but pride is the native of every country, 
infects every climate, and corrupts every nation.53 
The style is an instance of the healthy generalities in which Johnson 
speaks, the near exhaustiveness of his declarations. As Richman notes, 
"Swift wrote for a particular congregation, Johnson for mankind."54 
Sermon 8, a particularly insightful and poignant tract, is devoted entirely 
to the elucidation of the nature and egregiousness of intellectual pride. 
Pride is defined as "an immoderate degree of self-esteem, or an over-
value of a man set upon himself, and, like most other vices, is founded on 
an intellectual falsehood."55 This definition of pride, "conventional" and 
"down-to-earth,"56 is far removed from the eighteenth-century 
controversies relating to the definition of pride and its role in morality and 
the Christian religion. Its utility was "homiletic" and "could convince even 
the most unintellectual congregation that pride blocked the way to 
worldly wisdom, as well as the way to heaven."57 In this understanding of 
pride Johnson seems characteristically unconcerned about, though not 
oblivious of, the abstract distinctions of the philosophical moralists of his 
day. Rather, he is committed almost pastorally to the spiritual 
requirements of his listeners. 
53ibid. [Sermon 6], 66. 
54Richman, op. cit. 28. 
ssibid., 67. 
56Hudson, op. cit., 136. 
57ibid. 
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He is convinced pride is not merely speculative, but conduces to "effects 
equally injurious to others, and destructive to itself."58 Johnson insists that 
pride has disastrous social consequences when permitted to fester in the 
life of political leaders: 
He that overvalues himself will undervalue others, and he that 
undervalues others will oppress them. To this fancied superiority it 
is owing, that tyrants have squandered the lives of millions, and 
looked unconcerned on the miseries of war. It is indeed scarcely 
credible, it would without experience be absolutely incredible, that 
a man should carry destruction and slaughter round the world, lay 
cities in ashes, and put nations to the sword, without one pang or 
tear; that we should feel no reluctance at seizing the possessions of 
another, at robbing parents of their children, and shortening or 
imbittering human lives. Yet this fatal, this dreadful effect, has pride 
been able to produce.59 
Johnson is convinced the accumulation of wealth is frequently motivated 
by pride: ''To pride therefore must be ascribed most of the fraud, injustice; 
violence, and extortion, by which wealth is frequently acquired."60 In 
addition, pride is often accompanied by the vice of envy, causing one to 
be "uneasy and dissatisfied, when any of those applauses are bestowed on 
another, which he is desirous of himself."61 The proud man incessantly 
endeavors to increase his esteem in the eyes of his peers; Johnson 
believes, however, that God, who must as it were recoil in disbelief at the 
existence of pride among a race so weak and confused, seldom permits 
the proud to achieve their sinful ambitions: "But for the most part it is 
ordered by Providence, that the schemes of the ambitious are 
disappointed, the calumnies of the envious are detected, and false 
pretences to reputation ridiculed and exposed, so that still 'when pride 
cometh, then cometh shame, but with the lowly is wisdom.111 62 
58Johnson, op. cit., 68. 
59ibid. 
60ibid., 69. 
61ibid. 
62ibid., 70. 
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Interestingly, Sermon 6 proscribing pride reveals two specific tenets of 
Johnson's soteriological scheme. He warns of "a species of pride" "more 
dangerous"63 than the common carnal pride of mankind. He refers to 
"spiritual pride," which "represents a man to himself beloved of his 
Creatour in a particular degree, and, of consequence, inclines him to think 
others not so high in his favour as himself."64 While this form of pride as a 
transgression of God's law is most pernicious, it is not beyond 
forgiveness. Its remedy is reformation, for "the blood of Christ was 
poured out upon the cross to make [our] best endeavors acceptable to 
God."65 Christ's death, in other words, does not benefit the proud by 
eliminating the penalty in some vicarious transaction as historic 
Protestants understand; they contend, in the words of Luther, that 
"Christ was charged with the sins of all men, that he should pay for them 
with his own blood. The curse struck him. The Law found him among 
sinners. He was not only in the company of sinners. He had gone so far as 
to invest Himself with the flesh and blood of sinners. So the Law judged 
and hanged him for a sinner." 66 In Johnson's view, conversely, Christ's 
sacrifice compensates for our lack of perfection by allowing our "best 
efforts" to stand in lieu of that perfection. 
Second, Christ's humility in life and death benefit us only if we imitate 
his spirit in our own lives: "God of his infinite mercy grant, that, by 
imitating his humility, we may be made partakers of his merits!"67 
Johnson follows Law's conviction that 
[Christ] suffered, and was a Sacrifice, to make our sufferings and 
sacrifice of ourselves fit to be received by God. And we are to 
suffer, to be crucified, to die, and rise with Christ; or else his 
Crucifixion, Death, and Resurrection, will profit us nothing. 68 
63ibid., 72. 
64ibid. 
65ibid. 
66Luther, Galatians, 116, 117. 
67Johnson, op. cit., 73. 
68Law, op. cit. 197. 
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The proud have consolation then not that Christ has actually borne the 
penalty for their sins but that God will transfer Christ's merits to them if 
they repent, forsake their pride, and follow in Christ's steps. 
For Johnson external religion and ritualism are insufficient. "[E]ven the 
Christian religion has been depraved by artificial modes of piety, and 
succedaneous practices of reconciliation."69 Sanctification, on the other 
hand, entails "love of God and of our neighbour."70 Johnson does not, 
however, set religious duties and true sanctification in opposition: "it is 
necessary to the Christian life, that the form and the power of Godliness 
should subsist together."71 
From Johnson's two communion sermons (9 and 22) one deduces the 
importance he attaches to this sacrament. It is true that, as noted above, 
Johnson follows Clarke and the Restoration divines in his "skepticism 
with ritual" ;72 nonetheless, it is incumbent on believers to partake of the 
table, for refusal to do so is to disobey the Lord's command:73 "Johnson 
considered participation in this sacrament to be, along with attendance at 
church, one of the two principal duties of a practising Christian."74 
Johnson's concern with communion, as Hudson points out, is 
moralistic-as a sacrament it is designed to evoke good works. 75 This 
concern is characteristic of Johnson's soteriology as a whole. In this sense, 
in fact, communion fills a more prominent role in his soteriological 
scheme than has often been recognized. 
Hudson perceives that Johnson's limitation of the significance of the 
sacrament to the commemoration of Chrisf s death classifies him with the 
nonconformists in their eighteenth-century controversy with the high-
69Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 13], 141. 
70ibid., 146. 
71ibid., 147. 
72Hudson, op. cit., 215, 216. 
73Johnson, op. cit. [sermon 9], 103. 
74Pierce, op. cit., 70. 
75Hudson, op. cit., 215-218. 
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church Anglicans, for whom the sacrament was central.76 He notes 
Johnson's accord with the latitudinarian propensity to value the sacrament 
for its moral rather than supernatural effects in distinction from the high-
church Anglicans.77 I believe, however, while recognizing the 
ecclesiological and political import of Johnson's view of communion, 
Hudson underemphasizes the soteriological significance. For instance, 
Johnson attaches such importance to the sacrament that it becomes, as in 
Romanism, an instrument of re-entry into the family of God following sin: 
Thus the sacrament is a kind of repetition of baptism, the means 
whereby we are readmitted into the communion of the church of 
Christ, when we have, by sin, been separated from it; for every sin, 
and much more any habit or course of sin long continued in, is, 
according to the different degrees of guilt, an apostacy or defection 
from our Saviour.78 
Johnson's rejection of the Roman Catholic conception of 
transubstantiation may be attributed, as Gray remarks, to "the 
scrupulously rational mind of Samuel Johnson, unwilling to accept 
anything which was not absolutely evident to the sense and to the 
mind."79 Quinlan, like Gray, concentrates his discussion of Johnson's idea 
of communion on Johnson's rejection of transubstantiation.so This 
metaphysical deviation from Romanism, nonetheless, should not blind 
one to Johnson's soteriological continuity with Romanism in his 
understanding of the sacrament. When observed in the light of his 
soteriology, Johnson's understanding of communion may be judged 
indispensable to his view of sanctification, no matter how infrequently he 
may have partaken of the sacrament himself. i 
It will be recalled that in Johnson's opinion the application of Christ's 
merits is dependent on obedience and repentance. One example of 
obedience is partaking of communion. But to Johnson communion is 
more than that. Because it is a renewal of the baptismal vow, it is a means 
76ibid., 218-22. 
_ 77Hudson, op. cit., 218-221. 
78Johnson, op. cit., [sermon 9), 100. 
79Gray, Johnson's Sermons, 140. 
8°<Juinlan, A Layman's Religion, 173-175. 
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of sanctification inasmuch as it restores us to a place of salvation forfeited 
after sin. It is, in fact, the preeminent means of sanctification: 
But vain had been the sufferings of our Saviour, had there not 
been left means of reconciliation to him; since every man falls away 
from him occasionally, by sins of negligence at least, and perhaps, 
by known, deliberate, premeditated offences. So that some method 
of renewing the covenant between God and man was necessary; 
and for this purpose this sacrament was instituted; which is 
therefore a renewal of our broken vows, a re-entrance into the 
society of the church, and the act, by which we are restored to the 
benefits of our Saviour's death, upon performance of the terms 
prescribed by him. 81 
This Johnson regards as adequate inducement to frequent participation. 
If we consider this sacrament as a renewal of the vow of baptism, 
and the means of reconciling us to God, and restoring us to a 
participation of the merits of our Saviour, which we had forfeited 
by sin, we shall need no persuasions to a frequent communion. For 
certainly nothing can be more dreadful than to live under the 
displeasure of God, in constant danger of appearing before him, 
while he is yet unappeased, and of losing the benefits of our 
redemption.82 
That Johnson understands salvation as a bilateral covenant is therefore 
clear in his view of communion. When man sins, he has violated his 
covenantal obligation. God, therefore, is under no compulsion to honor 
his own obligation, the application of Christ's merits to the obedient and 
repentant. If, in fact, his life expires while he is in a state of sin and before 
he comes to the Lord's table, the sinner is in danger of "losing the benefits 
of [Christ's] redemption."83 The sacrament functions, then, as the divinely 
ordained means of "a renewal of our sacred vows, a re-entrance into the 
society of the church, and the act, by which we are restored to the benefits 
of our Saviour's death." Inasmuch as it is an essential covenantal 
ratification on which hope of salvation hinges, it is a critical feature of 
Johnson's comprehension of sanctification and hence his soteriology. 
81Johnson, loc. dt. 
82ibid.,l03. 
83ibid. 
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While one may question Quinlan's conclusion that "[William] Law, more 
than any other single writer, gave the temper to Johnson's religion,"84 
one can scarcely disagree that none so influenced Johnson's view of 
sanctification. And ;'the key to Law throughout his whole writing career," 
Quinlan continues, "is that he believed in, practiced, and preached the 
doctrine of Christian perfection."8.5 From this source to which Johnson 
was exposed at such a tender age he would have learned of perfectionism, 
though it is true, as Hudson reminds, that "Johnson did not have to go to 
Law to learn perfectionism:"86 it was existent-if not prevalent-among 
the Anglican divines and the Methodists. 
It is imperative to understand that neither Law nor the other 
proponents of perfectionism contend for the necessity or possibility of 
absolute perfection in the Christian life. They adjusted the definition of 
perfection to account for sins unintentional and those inherent in the 
condition of human frailty.87 Intention of righteousness and abstinence 
from known sin were crucial. To this view Johnson perfectly conforms. 
Clearly man cannot be impeccably sinless, asserts Johnson: 
He who falleth seven times a day may yet, by the mercy of God, 
be numbered among the just; the purest human virtue has much 
faeculence. The highest flights of the soul soar not beyond the 
clouds and vapours of the earth; the greatest attainments are very 
. f 88"" imper ect.. .. 
Further, God accepts pure intention and amendment of life and does no~ 
demand absolute perfection of his human creatures: 
It is reasonable, that we should endeavor to please him [God], 
because we know that every sincere endeavor will be rewarded by 
him; that we should use all the means in our power, to enlighten 
our minds, and regulate our lives, because our errours, if 
involuntary, will not be imputed to us; and our conduct, though 
not exactly agreeable to the divine ideas of rectitude, yet if 
84Quinlan, op. cit., 5. 
BS·b'd 6 t t ., . 
86Hudson, op. cit., 191. 
87ibid., 196, 197. 
88Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 13), 146. 
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consciences, will not be condemned by that God, who judges the 
heart, weighs every circumstance of our lives, and admits every 
real extenuation of our failings and transgressions. 88 
In the accent on intention and the belief that God accepts assiduous 
efforts instead of perfection, Johnson replicates the teaching of Law: 
If you are as forward in the Christian life as your best endeavours 
can make you, then you may justly hope, that your imperfections 
will not be laid to your charge; but if your defects in piety, humility, 
and charity are owing to your negligence, and want of sincere 
intention, to be as eminent as you can in these virtues, then you 
leave yourself as much without excuse as he that lives in the sin of 
swearing, through the want of a sincere intention to depart from 
it.89 
The idea that involuntary sins are not marked against the sinner 
underscores Johnson's conviction that intention is the axis of virtue. In 
Sermon 28 he assures the convicts with the statement that "If we are 
tempted to think that the injuries we have done are unrepaired, and 
therefore repentance is vain; let us remember that the reparation which is 
impossible is not required; that sincerely to will, is to do, in the sight of 
him to whom all hearts are open; and that what is deficient in our 
endeavours is supplied by the merits of him who died to redeem us."90 
Similarly, in Sermon 15 on the vanity of human existence he remarks: 
"From errours, to which, after a most diligent examination, the frailty of 
our understandings may sometimes expose us, we may reasonably hope,· 
that he, who knows whereof we are made, will suffer no irremediable evil 
to follow; but it would be unreasonable to expect, that the same 
indulgence shall be extended to voluntary ignorance; or, that we shall not 
suffer by those delusions to which we resign ourselves by idleness or 
choice."91 
88Johnson, op cit. [Sermon 2], 19. 
89Law, op. cit., 19. 
90Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 28], 304. 
91ibid., [Sermon 15], 160. 
122 
Intention is in fact the foundational factor of Law's view of sanctification: 
"the first and most fundamental principle of Christianity [is] an intention 
to please God in all our actions."92 
This view is in sharp contrast to the Reformation idea of the culpability 
of the individual for every sin committed. Article VI of chapter six of the 
Westminster Confession declares: "Every sin, both original and actual, 
being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary 
thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby 
he is bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of the law, and so made 
subject to death, with all miseries spiritual, temporal, and eternal." 
Here a correlate of Johnson's view of the atonement is discemable. The 
Reformers saw Christ's death as itself an exact or equivalent payment for 
sin; hence, they could affirm the full force of human depravity and the 
divine requirement of absolute perfection since Christ had endured the 
penalty for sin on the cross. Johnson, on the other hand, perceives Christ's 
death as rendering sincere efforts acceptable to God; therefore, he is 
content to stress an imperfect but diligent obedience. 
Quinlan93 and Gray94 document the specific influences of Law on 
Johnson's religion and sermons. They overlook, however, an overarching 
soteriological theme of both Law and Johnson relating to sanctification: 
the virtual absence of any organic relation between God himself and the 
human work of sanctification. They note Law is convinced sanctification is 
within the possibility of the force of human will; the avoidance of sin and 
the practice of piety are within human power. 
Quinlan draws attention to Law's conviction that, while man is a frail 
creature, he "has the will to free himself from the snares of earthly 
pleasures and to live piously."95 Law concedes that divine grace is 
essential to holy living, but the necessity of the continual infusion of the 
92Law, op. cit., 17. 
93Quinlan, op. cit., ch. 1. 
94cray, op. cit., 50-65. 
95'b'd 9 i i ., • 
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operation of the Holy Spirit so integral to the Reformation idea of 
sanctification is obscured by the twin dicta of pure intention and human 
ability: 
This doctrine does not suppose that we have no need of divine 
grace, or that it is in our own power to make ourselves perfect. It 
only supposes that through the want of sincere intention of 
pleasing God in all our actions, we fall into such irregularities of life 
as by the ordinary means of grace we should have power to 
avoid.% 
Indeed, Law asserts: "For whenever we fully intend it, it is as possible to 
conform to all this regularity of life as it is possible for a man to observe 
times of prayer."97 This view, according to Quinlan, conduced significantly 
to Johnson's view of sanctification: its influence "was to increase the 
severity of his scruples and to contribute to his fear that he might not be 
saved."98 
Gray acknowledges the stylistic and ideational influence of Law on 
Johnson.99 Johnson follows Law in employing "a methodical approach to 
self-examination,"100 in "hammer[ing] out his arguments with convincing 
logic and persuasive rhetoric,"101 in "invest[ing] his arguments with a 
powerful sense of urgency ,"102 and in embracing the following 
convictions: "the human tendency to regard one act of benevolence or 
charity by oneself as a proof of invariable virtue; the assumption that the 
act of approving virtuous conduct constitutes a virtue in itself; our 
proneness to treat acts of intemperance and anger as isolated or merely 
occasional, and therefore excusable and insignificant; and the habit of 
rationalizing or minimizing our guilt by comparing ourselves favorably 
with others whose sins, we believe, are greater than our own."103 
96Law, op. cit., 17 
97ibid. 
98Quinlan, op. cit., 26. 
99cray, op. cit., 50 f. 
lOO·b·d 54 l l ., . 
101 ·b"d 55 l l ., . 
102ibid. 
103'b"d 56 l l ., • 
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Law's general orientation to sanctification, however, more than any 
specific ideas, was the principal influence on Johnson. The conviction that 
the individual possesses inherently the capacity to adhere to the law of 
God, that his task is not so monumental as to require the special assistance 
of the Holy Spirit, dominated Johnson's conception of sanctification. 
This moralistic, inorganic, and mechanical conception of sanctification is 
not difficult to evince from Johnson's sermons. The numerous 
admonitions to virtuous living and warnings against vice of which the 
sermons consist contain no suggestion for one to rely on the indwelling 
Holy Spirit or principle of righteousness. While the Westminster divines 
spoke of "the continual supply of strength from the sanctifying Spirit of 
Christ'' by which "the regenerate part [of man] doth overcome [the 
unregenerate part],"105 Johnson leaves the sanctifying operation almost 
entirely in the hands of man. In Sermon 2 on repentance, Johnson 
encourages his listeners with the admonition, ''But let those who have 
hitherto neglected this great duty, remember, that it is yet in their power, 
and that they cannot perish everlastingly but by their own choice!"106 
Even "those that have polluted themselves with studied and premeditated 
wickedness ... are not forever excluded from [God's] favour, but have in 
their hands means, appointed by himself, of reconciliation to him; means 
by which pardon may be obtained .... "107 
Likewise, in Sermon 5 Johnson states: 
We are informed by the Scriptures, that God is not the Authour 
of our present state, that when he created man, he created him for 
happiness; happiness indeed dependent upon his own choice, and 
to be preserved by his own conduct .... Thus religion shews us that 
physical and moral evil entered the world together, and reason and 
experience assure us that they continue for the most part so closely 
united, that, to avoid misery, we must avoid sin, and that while it is 
in our power to be virtuous, it is in our power to be happy .... 
Complaints are doubtless irrational in themselves, and unjust with 
respect to God, if the remedies of the evils we lament are in our 
hands; for what more can be expected from the beneficence of our 
lOSwestminster Confession, ch. XIII, article iii. 
106Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 2], 26. 
107ibid. 
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Creatour, than that he should place good and evil before us, and 
then direct us in our choice.lo1" 
In Sermon 10, moreover, addressing self-deception and the course of 
sin, Johnson states: 
It is now certain that we are here, not in our total, nor in our 
ultimate existence, but in a state of exercise and probation, 
commanded to qualify ourselves, by pure hearts and virtuous 
actions, for the enjoyment of future felicity in the presence of God; 
and prohibited to break the laws which his wisdom has given us, 
under the penal sanction of banishment from heaven into regions of 
misery.JOB 
Further, in the celebrated Sermon 28 to the convicts, Johnson 
announces: 
Nothing therefore remains, but that we apply with all our speed, 
and with all our strength, to rectify our desires, and purify all our 
thoughts; that we set God before us in all his goodness and 
terrours; that we consider him as the father and the judge of all the 
earth ... that we fall down before him self-condemned, and excite in 
our hearts an intense detestation of those crimes which have 
provoked him; with vehement and steady resolutions, that if life 
were granted us, it should be spent hereafter in the practice of our 
duty ... )09 
In Sermon 2 Johnson argues that we "cannot perish everlastingly but by 
[our] own choice." In Sermon 5 he suggests the "remedies of the evils we 
lament are in our hands." In Sermon 10 we are "commanded to qualify 
ourselves, by pure hearts and virtuous actions, for the enjoyment of 
future felicity"; In Sermon 28 Johnson declares his conviction that we may 
"excite in our hearts an intense detestation" of sin. Lacking from all these 
exhortations is the idea, so prominent in the Reformed dogma of 
sanctification, that the Holy Spirit is given to assist in this monumental 
task. Since, however, Johnson holds a higher estimate of human ability 
than do the Reformed, since he dissents from their view that Chrisf s 
atonement was designed actually to cancel the sinner's need to propitiate 
107ibid. [sermon 5], 55. 
108ibid. [Sermon 10], 109. Emphasis in original. 
109ibid. [Sermon 28], 308. 
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God, and since he is convinced God will accept sincere intentions in lieu of 
actual conformity to God's law, he perforce maintains that man possesses 
within his own power the means of personal sanctification. 
While Johnson, then, exhorts his listeners to appeal to God for the grace 
to undertake these tasks, he does not refer to the potent operation of the 
indwelling Holy Spirit as in Reformation soteriology. This is the 
persuasion of Law who charged "that the fault does not lie here, that we 
desire to be good and perfect, but through the weakness of our nature fall 
short of it; but it is, because we have not piety enough to intend to be as 
good as we can, or to please God in all the actions of our life."111 
Significantly, Hudson remarks, "A second influence on the creation of an 
Anglican idea of perfection was the desire to confute supposedly 
antinomian doctrines of justification by faith. Justification by faith is, of 
course, not equivalent to antinomianism, a heresy with a limited and often 
uncertain history among the early Anti-baptists [sic: anabaptists?] and 
certain commonwealth sects such as the Ranters. Most Protestant groups 
have regarded outward obedience to the law as a manifestation or sign of 
inward regeneration or election."112 This, of course, was the perpetual 
charge the Roman Catholics leveled against the Protestants, and though 
Hudson does not cite it, a sentiment Johnson specifically shared. After 
consoling the convicts in Sermon 28 with God's receptivity to those who 
appeal to Him in faith, he nonetheless warned: 
Yet let us likewise be careful, lest an erroneous opinion of the all-
sufficiency of our Saviour's merits lull us into carelessness and 
security. His merits are indeed all-sufficient! But he has prescribed 
the terms on which they are to operate. He died to save sinners, 
but to save only those sinners that repent. Peter, who denied him, 
was forgiven, but he obtained his pardon "by weeping bitterly."113 
Of course, in the Protestant conception "security" (though not 
"carelessness," as Hudson recognizes) is what recourse to "the all-
llltaw, loc. cit. 
112Hudson, op. cit., 196. 
113Johnson, op. cit., 304. 
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sufficiency of our Saviour's merits" is all about. As documented in the 
chapter on Johnson's theological orientation, nonetheless, by "conditions". 
of salvation Johnson denoted faith, obedience, and repentance and thus 
deviated from the sofa fide (by faith alone) dictum of the Reformation. He 
shared the concern of Romanism and via media Anglicanism that 
affirmation of justification by faith alone potentially inhibits sanctification, 
protests of the Reformers to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Interestingly, Johnson endorses the peculiarly Tridentine concept of 
preparation for justification. Trent contended on January 13, 1547 in its 
decree on justification that when adults are aided by God's grace, they 
affirm the promises of God about salvation 
and when, understanding themselves to be sinners, they, by 
turning themselves, from the fear of divine justice whereby they 
are profitably agitated, to consider the mercy of God, are raised 
unto hope, confiding that God will be propitious to them for 
Chrisf s sake; and they begin to love him as the fountain of all 
justice; and are therefore moved against sins by a certain hatred 
and detestation, to wit, by that penitence which must be performed 
before baptism: lastly, when they purpose to receive baptism, to 
begin a new life, and to keep the commandments of God ... . This 
disposition, or preparation, is followed by justification itself ... _113 
Similarly, in issuing caveats to those delinquent in charity, Johnson 
states: 
Men are not charitable, as they are not just; because they suffer 
themselves to be captivated by their senses, because they are 
wholly engrossed by present happiness, and extend not their 
prospects to another state; they do not contemplate the duration of 
their future existence, or impress upon their minds, the great 
importance of pleasing God; and the danger of falling into 
everlasting misery; and have therefore no motives, which they can 
oppose to the solicitations of appetite, the incitements of passion, or 
the tranquility of negligence; but pass their lives, some in the 
slumbers of indolence, and others in the hurry of business or of 
pleasure, without any preparation for that change, which must 
determine their state to all eternity.114 
113schaff, Creeds, 93, 94. Emphasis in original. 
114Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 27), 293. 
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Johnson's description of the oblivion and apathy of the uncharitable to 
their responsibilities and salvation finds striking correspondence in 
distinction to Trent's description of the urgency of those preparing for 
justification. In the Reformation understanding, preparation for 
justification is an impossibility, given the belief that righteousness can only 
follow, and never precede, justification;llS according to Trent and 
Johnson, however, one exerts himself in righteousness and so prepares 
himself for justification. 
For all Johnson's exhortation to austere devotion, he believes that 
spiritual intensity may become excessive and therefore 
counterproductive: 
That a precept of courtesy is by no means unworthy of the 
gravity and dignity of an apostolical mandate, may be gathered 
from the pernicious effects which all must have observed to have 
arisen from harsh strictness and sour virtue: such as refuses to 
mingle in harmless gaiety, or give countenance to innocent 
amusements, or which transacts the petty business of the day with 
a gloomy ferociousness that clouds existence. Goodness of this 
character is more formidable than lovely; it may drive away vice 
from its presence, but will never persuade it to stay to be amended; 
it may teach, it may remonstrate, but the hearer will seek for more 
mild instruction.116 
Despite his lack of development of any do~trinal themes, Johnson is 
convinced of an inextricable link between dogma and sanctification: 
The serenity and satisfaction at which we arrive by a firm and 
settled persuasion of the fundamental articles of our religion, is 
very justly represented by the expression of finding rest for the 
soul. A mind restless and undetermined, continually fluctuating 
betwixt various opinions, always in pursuit of some better scheme 
of duties, and more eligible system of faith, eager to embrace every 
new doctrine, and adopt the notions of every pretender to 
extraordinary light, can never be sufficiently calm and unruffled, to 
11Scalvin, op. cit., III:xiv. 
116Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 11], 125. 
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attend to those duties which procure that peace of God which 
passeth all understanding.118 
Tenuous dogma, according to Johnson, conduces to a tenuous 
sanctification. For this reason, one's dogma should be sound. 
There is a much closer connection between practice and 
speculation than is generally imagined. A man disquieted with 
scruples concerning any important article of religion will, for the 
most part, find himself indifferent and cold, even to those duties 
which he practised before with the most active diligence and ardent 
satisfaction. Let him then ask for the old paths, where is the good 
way, and he shall find rest for his soul. His mind, once set at ease 
from perplexity, and perpetual aftitation, will return with more 
vigour to the exercises of piety .1 9 
Johnson considers the inspired New Testament and the early church 
fathers the "old paths," the pattern for Christian belief and practice and 
sufficient criteria for judging valid Christian practice. 
The oral doctrines, and occasional explications of the apostles, 
would not be immediately forgotten, in the churches to which they 
had preached, and which had attended to them, which the diligence 
and reverence which their mission and character demanded .... 
Every thing, at least, that was declared by the inspired teachers, to 
be necessary to salvation, must have been carefully recorded .... 
Thus by consulting first the holy Scriptures, and next the writers of 
the primitive church, we shall make ourselves acquainted with the 
will of God ... )20 
Johnson's firm commitment to orthodox belief and concomitant 
aversion to skepticism121 and ecclesiastical vacillation122 are more easily 
conceived when his conviction of the intimate association between belief 
and action is recognized. While the theologically oriented may insist that 
action is important inasmuch as it is the result of dogma, Johnson seems 
to hold that dogma is important in that it produces a certain life practise, 
the heart of Johnson's concern. 
118ibid. [Sermon 7), 83. 
119·b'd 84 l l ., • 
120'b'd 83 1 l ., • 
121Boswell, op. cit., 347. 
122ibid., 394, 395. 
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Johnson's conception of justification and sanctification highlights an 
interesting irony of the relation between atonement and sanctification in 
both the Reformational and latitudinarian schemes. The latter insist on a 
rigorous, almost inhuman, dedication to obedience as a condition of 
salvation, yet even that condition is short of strict divine requirements. For 
this reason, in fact, the atonement is necessary: in the words of Johnson 
"such propitiation shall supply, in some degree, the imperfections of our 
obedience, and the inefficacy of our repentance."122 Conversely, as noted 
in the introduction, the Reformational idea of judicial and imputed 
righteousness recognizes that nothing short of perfect conformity to the 
law will appease God. It refuses the latitudinarian and Johnsonian solution 
of obviating man's sinfulness by diluting the divine requirements. It 
preserves the undiminished justice of God by positing the notion that 
Christ himself bore the full blow of punishment for sins. The regenerate, 
in this Reformational idea, while ever striving toward the ideal of 
perfection, need not fret over their occasional failure, for Christ has 
conformed to the law in their stead. The irony is that the diluted 
conditions of justification understood by Johnson engender much greater 
anxiety than the absolute conditions as conceived by the Reformers. The 
key to the spiritual anxiety of the former is that, no matter how diluted 
the conditions may ~e, man is under compulsion to fulfill them if he is to 
be saved; the key to the spiritual confidence of the latter is that, no matter 
how formidable the conditions may be, Christ has fulfilled them in his 
vicarious life and death. 
It is thus evident how experiential is Johnson's soteriology. He does not 
distinguish between justification and sanctification. He directs his sermons 
not to the children of God as a separate group but to all men who may or· 
may not be the children of God, depending on their actions. He avoids 
theological argumentation in favor of experiential exhortation. He 
employs fear of reprobation as an inducement to virtuous conduct. He 
stresses the responsibility of charity, the necessity of the fear of God, the 
perniciousness of pride, the inefficacy of religious externalism, and the 
122ibid., 482. 
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indispensability of communion as key themes of sanctification. He denies 
any organic connection between the work of the Holy Spirit and 
sanctification, though he concedes divine grace is necessary to holiness. 
He agrees with Trent that one possesses the ability and is under obligation 
to prepare himself for justification. He holds, finally, that sound dogma is 
the foundation of sanctification. 
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Chapter 7: 
ASSURANCE 
And you all know security is mortal's chiefest enemy. 
William Shakespeare 
from Macbeth, Act III, Scene v, Lines 32, 33 
The patent anxieties Samuel Johnson suffers as a result of his religious 
beliefs can be understood more readily when considered against the 
background of his soteriology. Indeed, as Pierce observes, 
The second particular concern that grew out of Johnson's general 
question regarding his salvation was: how could he be sure that he 
had fulfilled the conditions for salvation? His intellect told him that 
he could never achieve this certainty but his heart demanded an 
answer just the same .... [T]he great desire of Johnson's soul was to 
know whether he had done enough to be saved. He knew, as we 
have seen, that obedience and repentance were the principal 
requisite conditions for salvation, but he also knew that no true 
believer could ever be certain that he had satisfactorily met these 
terms.1 
There has been a propensity by some Johnsonians, I believe, to 
psychoanalyze excessively Johnson's anxieties, a trend not surprising in an 
age bereft of deep religious conviction. Max Byrd, for instance, depicts 
Johnson's anxieties as arising from his role as a transitional figure in an 
increasingly nihilistic world: 
If it is possible to see [Johnson] stretching back toward the 
Renaissance and its vividly drawn struggles of faith, it is also 
possible to see him, as if at the center of a vast historical figure 
eight, stretching forward to the twentieth century and the 
beginnings of Christian existentialism. I am thinking in particular of 
the philosophical issue buried within Johnson's terror: the 
anguished demand for meaning from a world that absurdly refuses 
to disclose it.2 
1 Pierce, Religious Life, 56, 57. 
2Byrd, "Johnson's Spiritual Anxiety," 368, 369. 
While "the anguished demand for meaning" is a feature of many 
reflective souls, including Johnson's, I am not certain it is the fundamental, 
source of his anxiety. Since Johnson understands, ''The business of life is to 
work out our salvation,"3 it is more likely that the vexing philosophical 
questions issue from his religious views than vice versa. 
Similarly, William Siebenschuh argues that Johnson's evidentialist bent 
to ground religious certainty not only in the revelation of the Holy 
Scriptures but also in human experience evidences an internal struggle 
with orthodox belief in the Bible: 
The singular characteristic in Johnson's sermons is that while in 
general they formally uphold a doctrine of acceptance of the 
Scriptures on faith, he persistently changes the grounds of 
argument within them and moves inexorably towards the painful 
necessity (rather than the clear duty) of accepting them.4 
Yet while Johnson's evidential (a posteriori) rather than presuppositional 
(a prion) apologetic is quite evident from the sermons, it is unwarranted • 
and tendentious to argue that this evidentialism springs from the "painful 
necessity" of affirming the authority of the Scriptures. In examining the 
sermons I did not derive the sense that Johnson finds his faith 
commitment a laborious task; I did sense that he recognizes the numerous 
difficulties a life of faith must confront. Whatever may be the causes of 
Johnson's anxieties, I am convinced it is not that he was unsure of 
Christian orthodoxy. 
R. D. Stock wisely observes: 
The late eighteenth-century and Victorian stereotype of Johnson 
the bully and John Bull, pompously upholding the Thirty-Nine 
Articles, has long deserved a place on the scrapheap of asinine and 
condescending prejudices.5 
3Johnson, Sermons [Sermon 15), 161. 
4Siebenschuh, "On the Locus of Faith in Johnson's Sermons," 114. 
Sstock, "Johnson Ecclesiastes," 15. 
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Stock recognizes, in addition, the recent trend "to point to the 
existentialist elements in Johnson [as] a way of making him accessible to . 
the modem sensibility .... "6 He continues insightfully: 
... it is doing Johnson and his reputation no good tum if we come 
to perceive him as just an early version of the tormented neurotics 
and angst-suffering geniuses that now litter our intellectual 
landscapes. Nor, since Johnson took his beliefs seriously, is it doing 
his cause any good if we wind up sympathizing with the neurotic 
but dismissing his faith as a relic of superstition that he could never 
discard, a crutch on which the eccentric psrchic cripple hobbled 
along, counting his thirty-nine articles [sic much as he counted his 
steps.7 
Johnson's orthodoxy may indeed contribute to his anxieties, but it the 
mysterious and awesome doctrines orthodoxy entails, and not affirmation 
of the faith itself, that causes the turmoil. 
With respect to Johnson's popular image, Basney alludes to "how a 
secular present misunderstands and misrepresents the experience of a 
Christian past."8 When the social role of religion is reduced to sentimental 
opinion in an increasingly secular society, literary scholars are tempted to 
omit serious consideration of our forebears' theological convictions as the 
chief cause of human delights and anxieties and instead attribute them to 
psychological phenomena. In short, they psychoanalyze in order to 
secularize. This temptation Siebenschuh himself seems to insinuate in his 
comment that ''The human element-Johnson's struggles with his doubts 
and fears-rather than the strictly theological element has always had the 
greatest appeal for scholars and admirers."9 Johnson's religious beliefs 
wield a potent influence over "his life, his critical taste, his moral 
attitudes,"10 however, and the undergirding of his religious beliefs is his 
soteriology. 
6ibid. 
7ibid., 15, 16. 
8Basney, "The Popular Image of Johnson's Religion," 5. 
9Siebenschuh, op. cit., 103, 104. 
lOffumphreys, "Dr. Johnson, Troubled Believer," 37. 
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J. H. Hagstrum, then, is justified in opposing William Krutch' s 
suggestion that Johnson's "much-discussed fear may perhaps have 
resulted from lack of faith and may be considered further evidence of the 
skeptical tenor of Johnson's mind."11 In fact, as Pierce recognizes, "The 
tragic irony of Johnson's religious life was that the faith to which he 
turned to rescue himself from despair rapidly created within him its own 
anxieties."12 In due time I will examine how the nature of Johnson's 
theology contributed to this anxiety. 
Johnson's justly famous outburst expressing anxiety over his eternal 
state is a testimony not only to the extent of his acute anxieties but also to 
the intensity of his soteriological convictions and the anxiety they 
necessitate: 
Dr. Johnson surprised [Mr. Henderson] not a little, by 
acknowledging with a look of horrour, that he was much 
oppressed by the fear of death. The amiable Dr. Adams suggested 
that God was infinitely good. JOHNSON. ''That he is infinitely 
good, as far as the perfection of his nature will allow, I certainly 
believe; but it is necessary for good upon the whole, that 
individuals should be punished. As to an individual, therefore, he is 
not infinitely good; and as I cannot be sure that I have fulfilled the 
conditions on which salvation is granted, I am afraid I may be one 
of those who shall be damned," (looking dismally). DR ADAMS. 
"What do you mean by damned?" JOHNSON. (passionately and 
loudly) "Sent to Hell, Sir, and punished everlastingly."13 
Johnson mentions two theological beliefs which conduce to lack of 
personal salvific assurance: the goodness of God does not preclude 
punishment, and salvation is conditional. The latter of these is the 
foundation of Johnson's soteriology. In his response to Mrs. Knowles he 
remarks: 
... consider, [God's] hope of salvation must be founded on the 
terms on which it is promised that the mediation of our SAVIOUR 
shall be applied to us,-namely, obedience; and where obedience 
has failed, then, as suppletory to it, repentance. But what man can 
say that his obedience has been such, as he would approve of in 
11Hagstrum, "On Dr. Johnson's Fear of Death," 308. 
12p· •t 34 ierce, op. ci ., . 
13Boswell, Life, 539. Emphasis in original. 
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another, or even in himself upon close examination, or that his 
repentance has not been such as to require being repented of? No 
man can be sure that his obedience and repentance will obtain 
salvation.14 
Not coincidentally, Johnson issues this soteriological comment in a 
context of the question of spiritual assurance and anxiety. 
That Johnson holds the subjective role of conditional salvation to cut in 
both directions is seen in his advice to Dr. Dodd in a "soothing letter'' of 
June 26, 1777 soon before the minister's execution: 
That which is appointed to all men is coming upon you. Outward 
circumstances, the eyes and the thoughts of men, are below the 
notice of an immortal being about to stand the trial for eternity, 
before the Supreme Judge of heaven and earth. Be comforted: your 
crime, morally or religiously considered, has no very deep die of 
turpitude. It corrupted no man's principles; it attacked no man's 
life. Of this, and of all other sins, you are earnestly to repent; and 
may God, who knoweth our frailty, and desireth not our death, 
accept your repentance, for the sake of his Son JESUS CHRIST our 
Lord.15 
One can be reasonably (though not infallibly) certain of his salvation if he 
has fulfilled the conditions of salvation. 
In Sermon 28 that Johnson wrote for Dodd and his fellow convicts he 
characteristically declares: "Salvation is promised to us Christians, on the 
terms of faith, obedience, and repentance."16 Similarly, in Sermon 9 he states, 
"The terms, upon which we are to hope for any benefits from the merits 
of Christ, are faith, repentance, and subsequent obedience."17 In short, we 
may relatively be assured of our eternal state before God if we have 
avoided sins or confessed those we have committed; but we have reasons 
for anxiety if we have repeatedly transgressed God's commandments. 
14ibid., 394. 
15ibid., 345. 
16Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 28], 303. Emphasis in original. 
17ibid. [Sermon 9], 104. 
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In perhaps no other aspect of Johnson's soteriology is his Tridentine 
orientation as salient as in his understanding of Christian assurance. On 
Sunday, June 3, 1781 he expresses himself in response to Boswell's 
statement of his desire to live a godly life. 
Favourable impressions at particular moments, as to the state of 
our souls, may be deceitful and dangerous. In general no man can 
be sure of his acceptance with God; some, indeed, may have had it 
revealed to them. St. Paul, who wrought miracles, may have had a 
miracle wrought on himself, and may have obtained supernatural 
assurance of pardon, and mercy, and beatitude; yet St. Paul, though 
he expresses strong hope, also expresses fear, lest having preached 
to others, he himself should be a cast-away."18 
In Sermon 28 written for William Dodd and other capital convicts, 
Johnson addresses the issue of assurance even more fully: 
The reception of the holy sacrament, to which we shall be called, in 
the most solemn manner, perhaps a few hours before we die, is the 
highest act of Christian worship. At that awful moment it will 
become us to drop for ever all worldly thoughts, to fix our hopes 
solely upon Christ, whose death is represented; and to consider 
ourselves as no longer connected with mortality.-And possibly, it 
may please God to afford us some consolation, some secret 
intimations of acceptance and forgiveness. But these radiations are 
not always felt by the sincerest penitents. To the greater part of 
those whom angels stand ready to receive, nothing is granted in 
this world beyond rational hope; - and with hope, founded on 
promise, we may well be satisfied.19 
While Johnson does concede in this life we may procure a "rational 
hope," of special interest is Johnson's contention that full assurance is an 
impossibility except in unique cases in which "one may have obtained 
supernatural assurance of pardon." 
This sentiment virtually replicates Trent. In Canon XVI following the 
decree of justification, Trent asserts 
18Boswell, Life, 482. In the final sentence Johnson is alluding to Paul's remark in 1 Cor. 9:27. 
19Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 281306 Emphasis in original. 
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If any one saith, that he will for certain, of an absolute and infallible 
certainty, have that great gift of perseverance unto the end,-unless he 
have learned this by special revelation: let him be anathema.20 
A paragraph in Sermon 14 sets forth Roman Catholic dogma with 
regard to assurance: 
Trust in God, that trust to which perfect peace is promised, is to 
be obtained only by repentance, obedience, and supplication, not 
by nourishing in our own hearts a confused idea of the goodness of 
God, or a firm persuasion that we are in a state of grace; by which 
some have been deceived, as it may be feared, to their own 
destruction .... We are, without expecting any extraordinary 
effusions of light, to examine our actions by the great and 
unchangeable rules of revelation and reason .... 2r 
Johnson's concern that the affirmation of the Reformation dictum of 
justification by faith alone may render one diffident to indwelling personal 
sin is expressed in Sermon 28: 
Yet let us likewise be careful, lest an erroneous opinion of the all-
sufficiency of our Saviour's merits lull us into carelessness and 
security. His merits are indeed all-sufficient! But he has prescribed 
the terms on which they are to operate. He died to save sinners, 
but to save only those sinners that repent. Peter, who denied him, 
was forgiven, but he obtained his pardon "by weeping bitterly."22 
The sentiment of the Council of Trent is virtually identical: 
.... But neither is this to be asserted-that they who are truly 
justified must needs, without any doubting whatever, settle within 
themselves that they are justified, and that no one is absolved from 
sin and justified, but he that believes for certain that he is absolved 
and justified; and that absolution and justification are effected by 
this faith alone: as though whoso has not this belief, doubts the 
promises of God, and the efficacy of the death and resurrection of 
Christ. For even as no pious person ought to doubt of the mercy of 
God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the 
sacraments, even so each one, when he regards himself, and his 
own weakness and indisposition, may have fear and apprehension 
touching his own grace; seeing that no one can know with a 
20schaff, Creeds, 2: 113, 114. 
21Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 14), 157. 
22;bid. [Sermon 28), 304. 
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certainty of faith, which can not be subject to error, that he has 
obtained the grace of God.23 
Conversely, Reformational soteriology provides for assurance apart 
from any supernatural revelations.24 Indeed, the Westminster Confession 
devotes an entire chapter (XVIII) to assurance, a portion of which 
declares: 
... yet such as truly believe in the Lord Jesus, and love him in 
sincerity, endeavoring to walk in all good conscience before Him, 
may, in this life, be certainly assured that they are in the state of 
grace .... This certainty is not a bare conjectural and probable 
persuasion grounded upon a fallible hope; but an infallible 
assurance of faith founded upon the divine truth of the promises of 
salvation .... 
Significantly, the framers of the Confession seem almost intentionally to 
refute the Tridentine canon: ''This infallible assurance doth not so belong 
to the essence of faith, but that a true believer may wait long, and conflict · 
with many difficulties before he be partaker of it: yet. .. he may, without 
extraordinary revelation, in the right use or ordinary means, attain 
thereunto" (ch. XVIII). 
In light of Johnson's Tridentine experientialism documented in earlier 
chapters one finds odd; even disconcerting, amidst Donald Greene's 
evaluation of Johnson's famed "conversion experience" the remark: 
When [Sir John] Hawkins tried to comfort Johnson [in the latter's 
vexation over his spiritual state] with "the services he had rendered 
to the cause of religion and virtue, as well by his example as his 
writings," he was not at all comforted-nor should he have been; 
for as a devout adherent to the Augustinian Christianity taught by 
the Book of Common Prayer, he could have had no belief in the 
doctrine that any man's works in themselves can contribute to the 
salvation of his soul.25 
On the contrary, had Johnson been convinced of the worthiness of his 
own works, he would have every reason to be comforted in the prospect 
23schaff, op. cit., 98, 99. 
24The Thirty-Nine Articles do not specifically address the issue of assurance of salvation. 
25oonald Greene, Samuel Johnson, 36. 
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of his impending death. Since the application of Christ's merits is 
promised to the obedient and repentant, had Johnson fulfilled the terms 
of the bilateral covenant he could expect eternal life: "[E]very sin, and 
much more any habit or course of sin long continued, is, according to the 
different degrees of guilt, an apostacy or defection from our Saviour; as it 
is a breach of those conditions upon which we became his followers; and 
he that breaks the condition of a covenant, dissolves it on his side. Having 
therefore broken the covenant between us and our Redeemer, we lose 
the benefits of his death; nor can we have any hopes of obtaining them, 
while we remain in this state of separation from him."26 The rub, 
however, is that Johnson anxiously fears he did not fulfill those salvific 
terms.27 
Chadwick provides a key to understanding the intensity of Johnson's 
spiritual anxiety: ''To put it paradoxically, he developed a Calvinistic sense 
of the load of original sin without any Calvinistic sensation of the 
omnipotence of God in lifting the load from the person's back."28 
Likewise, Hagstrum argues that since, on the one hand, Johnson's 
Anglicanism represents a creedal rejection of Romanism, and, on the 
other hand, his abhorrence of predestination represents a practical 
rejection of Calvinism, he cannot not permit himself the consolation of 
either.29 Hagstrum's point is that, while the former denies, as we have 
seen, the possibility of absolute assurance, its sacerdotalism· and mystery 
furnish a sense of confidence to those exercising simple faith. Johnson's 
rational approach to religion, though, will not permit this simple faith. On 
the other hand, his denial of the Calvinistic tenets of predestination and 
election isolate him from the assurance these doctrines afford. Hagstrum 
attributes this quandary to the simultaneous affirmation of Enlightenment 
and orthodoxy, though it in no way suggests a lax commitment to the 
latter. 
26Johnson, op cit. [Sermon 9), 100. 
27Humphreys, loc. cit. 
28Chadwick, "The Religion of Samuel Johnson," 130. 
29ffagstrum, op. cit., 309-314. 
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The necessity of the "temper of the cloister'' the Christian must 
possess,30 when coupled with the strict requirement of obedience, 
conduces potentially to serious religious vexation. This vexation is 
compounded in the case of Johnson by his persuasion with Law that 
innate sinfulness is no excuse for spiritual failure. Pierce notes: 
Such conviction [of the divine standard for devotion] was 
impressive in itself but became even more compelling when Law 
expressed complete faith in man's ability to attain this ideal. Law 
believed that the only hindrance to this realization was not man's 
innate sinfulness but his lack of desire and of proper discipline.31 
The moralistic influence of the Restorationist divines contributed to an 
exaggerated estimate of the power of the will: "Anglican divines of the 
Restoration insisted on equating justification by faith with antinomianism" 
and "consistently instructed that an individual who had been truly 
converted to the Christian faith would be free from the practice of all 
deliberate sins."32 By the sheer force of will, man may avoid deliberate 
sin. 
Quinlan properly observes: 
... Law had a dual influence on Johnson. In the first place, A 
Serious Call awakened in him a lively and lasting sense of the 
importance of religion. In the second place, the acknowledged 
hortatory message of this work compelled him thereafter to 
engage in frequent comparisons between the high ideal that Law 
had set before him and his own shortcomings. The inevitable result 
was an intensification of his native fears and scruples.33 
In addition, Johnson's anthropology which insists on the freedom of the 
will and his Tridentine idea of justification which prohibits forensic 
righteousness imputed to the sinner on account of Chrisf s work afford 
little comfort. Man has a high standard of spiritual perfection; he is able 
and required to achieve it. 
30Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 3], 33 
31 Pierce, op. cit., 67. 
32Hudson, Eighteenth-Century Thought, 196. 
33Quinlan, Layman's Religion, 13. 
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Greene argues that one reason Johnson's "late conversion" is not 
incompatible with the Methodist understanding of conversion is that, 
contrary to popular opinion, Wesleyans did not hold that assurance of 
salvation can be absolute in this life.34 Hence, since Johnson never claimed 
absolute assurance, his conversion could very well have been evangelical, 
which in fact is no different from any other. As noted in the chapter on 
conversion, however, Johnson's concept could not have paralleled that of 
the evangelicals, no matter if his view of assurance may have coincided 
with Wesley's. 
Johnson, in fact, like Trent, warns against assurance: 
Those who contented themselves with believing, and professing 
Christianity, without obeying its precepts; those who while they 
call the great Authour of our faith, the Lord, their Master, and their 
God, and yet neglect his precept and work iniquity, will be rejected 
by him at the last day, as those whom he has never known; those 
to whom his regard never was extended; and, notwithstanding the 
confidence with which they may claim his intercession, will not be 
distinguished by any favour from other sinners. 35 
Sincerity, moreover, is no criterion of assurance of God's favour or 
eternal salvation. It is "not barely a full persuasion of the truth of our 
assertions, a persuasion too often grounded upon a high opinion of our 
own sagacity, and confirmed perhaps by frequent triumphs over weak 
opponents, continually gaining new strength by a neglect of re-
examination .... Sincerity is not a heat of the heart kept up by eager 
contentions or warm professions, nor a tranquility produced by 
confidence, and continued by indolence. [ff we do not assiduously practice 
virtue], let us not presume to put any trust in our sincerity ."36 
Johnson believes that apart from a supernatural insinuation, we cannot 
be certain of our salvation inasmuch as we cannot be certain we have 
fulfilled the conditions of salvation. Though Johnson's soteriology is not 
34Greene, "Dr. Johnson's 'Late Conversion': A Reconsideration," 89. 
35Johnson, op. cit. [Sermon 14], 156. 
36ibid. [Sermon 7], 80. 
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oriented to Arminianism, his emphasis on the efficacy of the will mirrors 
that of Arminians; hence the words of Chadwick succinctly summarize the 
relation between Johnson's soteriology and his anxieties: 
The question of confidence or overconfidence was the keenest of 
debating questions between Calvinist and Arminian. The Calvinist 
had and has a doctrine of assurance. God is almighty, He will never 
let you go; through faith you are assured of heaven. It was and is a 
powerful way of faith (which helped to make New England). That 
sort of assurance was not open to an Arminian. 37 
37Chadwick, ''The Religion of Samuel Johnson," 134. 
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CONCLUSION: 
The Need For Meaning 
· Judge not the Lord by feeble sense, 
But trust him for his grace; 
Behind a frowning providence 
He hides a smiling face. 
Blind unbelief is sure to err, 
And scan his work in vain; 
God is his own interpreter, 
And he will make it plain. 
William Cowper 
from "Light Shining Out of Darkness," 1773 
Johnson is concerned with the impact of religion on the experience of . 
one's life. This concern leads him often to embrace Tridentine conclusions; 
at other times it provokes an affinity with latitudinarian moralism; 
occasionally it appears distinctly Arminian. In nearly every instance, 
however, Johnson eschews what is today referred to pejoratively as 
"ivory-tower theology"; and more importantly, he understands salvation 
experientially and anthropocentrically rather than judicially and abstractly. 
Johnson formally embraces the doctrine of original sin as an a posteriori 
explanation of the moral predicament of mankind, but he seems not to 
permit his understanding of original sin to influence directly his 
conception of salvation. He believes men possess the inherent capacity to 
repent, believe, and convert, although he holds that communion and 
other rites and requirements engender grace of which Christians must 
avail themselves. He denies any sort of understanding of the imputation 
of sin that renders Adam's posterity guilty due to his breach of the 
primordial covenant: men are sinners because they sin; they do not sin 
because they are sinners. In fact, Johnson declares great confidence in 
human potential, convinced that the amelioration of social ills will result 
from commitment to moral virtue on the part of many citizens. He 
strongly affirms free will and denies, or seriously questions, the orthodox 
doctrines of divine prescience and predestination inasmuch as they may 
lead one to a diffidence toward moral virtue. He patently affirms 
conditional salvationi an explicit denial of the Augustinian, Reformation, 
and Arminian idea of justification by faith alone. Further, he holds the 
dictum of justification by faith to be deleterious to Christian experience 
inasmuch as it may lead to an uninspired approach to morality. Johnson 
believes the application of Chrisf s merits to one's account is contingent on 
faith, obedience, and repentance. He asserts that men maintain a 
covenantal relation with God, bilateral in the sense that God is under 
compulsion to provide eternal life only to those who fulfill the conditions 
He has established. The Protestant concept of a unilateral covenant in 
which God promises eternal life to the elect on the grounds of Chrisf s 
fully propitiatory and substitutionary death is not a feature of Johnson's 
soteriology. He sees Chrisfs death primarily as a demonstration of God's 
just government of the universe, and only secondarily as a payment for 
man's sins. Man's conversion is comprehended not in the evangelical 
sense as a result of a discontinuous, supernatural regeneration but as the 
improvement of his inherent moral qualities and employment of the 
divine means of salvation. Johnson's controversial "late conversion" is in 
no material sense evangelical: Johnson, in fact, affirms in the final prayer 
in which the conversion is mentioned the concept of conditional and 
moralistic salvation he embraced throughout his adult life. There is no 
material distinction in Johnson's soteriology between justification and 
sanctification; God declares man righteous and fit for eternal life if he 
conforms to the will of God by his obedience and repentance. Conformity 
to this divine will includes principally the responsibility of charity, the 
necessity of the fear of God, the avoidance of pride, the necessity of 
internal-as opposed to mere external-faith, and the indispensability of 
communion. For Johnson, however, God does not demand absolute 
perfection of mankind, but adjusts his requirements to man's capabilities 
and often accepts righteous intentions in lieu of righteous actions. Because' 
one can never be certain he has fulfilled all the requirements of salvation, 
he can never be certain he is truly in a state of grace, apart from 
supernatural intimation. Johnson considers absolute assurance not merely 
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impossible but also undesirable, in that it may lull one into a state of 
apathy about his soul. 
His conception of original sin is somewhat Tridentine inasmuch as he 
holds that mankind possess the propensity to sin. In no way does Johnson 
deny or rationalize the patent sinfulness of mankind, but he deems its 
source the refusal of individuals to exert their free will in the task of 
obedience and not specifically the imputation of Adam's corrupt nature 
and its resultant guilt. He questions determinism, predestination, and 
even prescience, not because he is convinced they are theologically or 
philosophically untenable but because they tend to weaken the imperative 
to live out faith in a useful community. 
This practical mollification of original sin has serious implications for 
Johnson's doctrine of atonement. Johnson's view mirrors that of the 
latitudinarians: Chrisf s death is designed to compensate for our sins and 
render our good works acceptable to God. Had Johnson held the strong 
Reformation view of original sin, this view of atonement would be 
logically impossible, for according to the Reformation idea, man is so 
utterly sinful that no amount of good works can contribute to his 
salvation. Therefore, Christ bore for the sake of mankind the actual or 
equivalent penalty of the violation of God's law. God then credits the 
impeccable righteousness of Chrisf s life and the payment of the penalty 
of the violation of His law to the sinner's account on the condition of faith. 
Johnson dissents therefore from the Reformation doctrine of vicarious 
atonement, first, because given his view of original sin it is unnecessary, 
and second, because it may tend to mollify the necessity of an active faith, 
Further, Johnson cannot consistently embrace the Reformation 
understanding of conversion, because he denies that depravity of the will 
is one effect of sin. The Reformers dissented from the Roman Catholic 
conviction that man may prepare himself for justification and thus convert 
himself. The Romanists have a somewhat higher estimate of human 
ability and that "nature" can accomplish a great deal before "grace" is 
necessary. Johnson comes down squarely, though implicitly, on the side 
of Rome in giving no place to a particular, supernatural regeneration by 
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which individuals are converted and in positively asseverating that man 
must prepare himself for justification. 
Naturally, Johnson agrees with Rome that, apart from supernatural 
revelation, concrete assurance of salvation is impossible. If faith, 
obedience, and repentance are the conditions of the application of Christ's 
merits, it is rare indeed for a conscientious Christian to gain impervious 
certainty that he has fulfilled the conditions. Johnson's denial of the 
possibility of absolute assurance apart from immediate divine intimation 
is the most patent Tridentine feature of his soteriology. 
While the Reformers can affirm that God requires absolute perfection of 
mankind as a condition of salvation inasmuch as they recognize Christ's 
active obedience in life and his atonement as an actual or equivalent 
substitute for the elect who so miserably fail to meet God's standard, 
Johnson adjusts God's standard of absolute perfection to account for 
human frailty and limitations since Christ's atonement is not seen as fully 
substitutionary. 
It would be most surprising if this soteriology did not conduce to 
anxiety in a sincere and intelligent believer like Johnson, just as it did in 
Martin Luther. Johnson can expect anxiety because his salvation rests 
from the human standpoint not upon the propitiatory work of Christ but 
on his own merit. The human will is not fully depraved and hence God 
expects individuals to apply themselves with rigor to their own salvation 
apart from any special divine grace. Moreover, while Christ died for the 
sins of humanity of the cross, he did not substitute for it in such a way as · 
to render meritorious works unnecessary; rather, he died to compensate 
for human failure. Men are expected to obey and exercise faith, and when 
they repent, Christ's atonement will compensate for their failure. They 
can never be certain, however, that they have exerted sufficient faith, 
obedience, or repentance. 
This anxiety is precisely what the consistent application of Reformation 
soteriology cures. Reformation soteriology asserts that when our parents 
fell, they acted federally, on the behalf of their posterity. Both the 
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corruption and guilt of sin accrued to all mankind. Therefore man, 
including his will, is utterly depraved. He needs God to save him; he does 
not need God to help him save himself. God's Son, Jesus Christ, 
conformed flawlessly to God's law and suffered voluntarily and 
vicariously on the cross the exact or equivalent penalty of the violation of 
God's law. He thus fulfilled the law for a depraved race, and bore the 
divine penalty violation of God's law incurs. Since man is impotent to save 
himself, God sovereignly elects some among mankind to be the recipients 
of his gratuitous salvation on the condition of faith, a virtue He provides. 
He regenerates and converts them, unites them judicially with Christ, and 
by virtue of that union credits them with Christ's righteousness and thus 
renders them innocent of wrongdoing. His elective grace and special 
work of regeneration secure their progressive, but never, in this life, 
perfect, sanctification. The key operative feature of the Reformation 
scheme is judicial: the judicial declaration of the guilt of mankind by virtue 
of their union with their disobedient federal head, Adam; the judicial 
treatment of Christ as sinner by virtue of his union with disobedient 
mankind; and the judicial declaration of the righteousness of the elect by 
virtue of their union with their impeccably righteous Head, Jesus Christ. 
I am convinced that it is this essential judicialism Johnson finds so 
objectionable in Reformation theology. He believes affirmation of a 
judicial view of original sin discourages morality, and that a judicial view 
of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the sinner seems to 
trivialize it. The solution to this seeming problem in Reformation faith is 
the understanding that sanctification, no less than justification, is a benefit 
of union with Christ and, therefore, all those truly justified will inevitably 
work out their salvation. 
Had Johnson affirmed full Reformation soteriology, he could have 
avoided, or at least mollified, much of the anxiety his soteriology could 
not but engender. He could have been certain of his acceptance before 
God, not because of his own merits, which in any case are inconsistent, 
but because of the impeccable merits of Christ. Conversely, he would not 
lapse into antinomianism, knowing that the Holy Spirit provides the 
149 
supernatural strength to practice spirituality and virtue and that God 
promises to sanctify all whom He justifies. 
While I dissent from Johnson's experientialist soteriology, I in no case 
diminish his religious commitment or its potential contribution to 
modernity. Johnson's religious views are not merely of historical 
moment. They hark back to a period in some ways superior to our own 
and from which we can learn a great deal. The superiority in large part 
derives from the intensity of religious conviction, intensity Johnson aptly 
illustrates. Much contemporary opinion deems this intensity one of the 
chief culprits of historical failures modem progressive attitudes are 
calculated to expunge. The supposed peaceable relativism of modernity 
has jettisoned the "sturdy prejudice"l of Johnson. As Allan Bloom has 
adduced in his insightful volume The Closing of the American Mind, 
however, relativism has not made good on its claims of peaceableness, for 
the repudiation of "sturdy prejudice" has unleashed a hydra of competing 
"interests," all contributing to the erosion of the Western commonweal, 
maintained in the past by a common commitment to ideals based largely 
on religion. 
In my opinion Johnson's "sturdy prejudice," so stodgy and intolerant to 
progressives, is a principal solution to a number of the peculiar difficulties 
of modern Western society. The intolerant attitude typified in Johnson in 
defending Christianity against the claims of Enlightenment rationalism did 
engender religious strife and division. But perhaps with historical 
hindsight we may consider this ferocity of conviction preferable to much 
of modem innocuous religion which has made its peace with 
Enlightenment, a religion impotent to compel loyalty because of its refusal 
to assert truth claims boldly, repugnant to the masses because of its facile 
sentimentality. When contrasted with the re-casting of orthodox 
Christianity in the mold of modem psychology and creedless sentiment, 
Johnson's irascible orthodoxy becomes less objectionable. Johnson and 
the orthodoxy he represents may have erred in defining truth too 
absolutely; much modem Christianity, slavishly following a secular 
1 Hudson, Samuel Johnson and Eighteenth-Century Thought, 7. 
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culture, finds it difficult to affirm the existence or intelligibility of truth at 
all. 
In Johnson we have an example of a Christian who takes his Christianity 
seriously. It is not the seriousness of modern Western man, the 
seriousness of "value-positing." Johnson does not insist, as do many 
modern believers, that Christianity is all right for him, but that he will 
refrain from imposing it on others. Intrinsic to Johnson's religion are truth 
claims, a fact that explains his vigorous commitment to apologetics: truth 
is entitled to defence: "values" are not so serious. 
Beyond the facade of the glittering materialism of modern secular man 
often lies a spiritual vacuum amply attested by the proliferation of 
alienation, and psychology as the new religion to replace the orthodox 
Christianity designed to cope with it. The Marxist, and ironically enough, 
capitalistic, thesis that this alienation is fundamentally economic seems 
declining in influence as wealth is found impotent to quench the ultimate 
longings of the soul. 
Johnson's grave approach to these longings is intensely religious; and 
while he does not in religion discover their cure, his approach and effort 
serve as a stellar model to the secularist moderns for whom life is, 
ironically, void of meaning while jaded with superficiality, and for whom 
historic Christianity is generally regarded an outmoded superstition that 
can never speak to contemporary life but who are willing in desperation 
to reconsider it as a life system that Johnson and so many others 
historically found the anchor of their souls. 
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